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This dissertation presents a situational theory of problem solving that highlights 
distinctive communicative and cognitive features in human problem solving. Its purpose 
is to provide a simple and useful, but not atheoretical, account of communication 
behavior and the cognitive approaches that we adopt during problematic situations.  
In the conceptualization, I introduce a new concept, communicant activeness in 
problem solving (CAPS), which has three domains in communicant activeness to explain 
not only when people voluntarily learn and share information but also how they choose 
certain information as more relevant than other information. The three domains are 
information selection (information forefending and information permitting), information 
transmission (information forwarding and information sharing), and information 
acquisition (information seeking and information processing).  I then use the focal 
construct, communicant activeness in problem solving, as a dependent variable in the 
new situational theory of problem solving.  
I also propose another new concept, cognitive entrepreneurship in problem 
solving (CEPS). It describes cognitive strategies that we take to reason about a solution in 
some problematic situations.  Depending on the situation, we adopt a more or less 
entrepreneurial mindset. This construct contains four distinct but correlated dimensions: 
cognitive retrogression, cognitive multilateralism, cognitive commitment, and cognitive 
suspension. For conceptual convenience, I named the more entrepreneurial approach the 
cognitive alpha strategy and the less entrepreneurial approach the cognitive omega 
strategy. The construct of cognitive entrepreneurship becomes another dependent variable 
to be accounted for by the independent variables in the situational theory.   
To explain the cognitive and communicative dependent variables in problem 
solving, I use four situational antecedent conditions from the situational theory of publics: 
problem recognition, constraint recognition, level of involvement, and referent criterion 
(J. Grunig, 1968, 1997). I refine these antecedent concepts to accommodate several 
conceptual issues found from the past research of the situational theory of publics (e.g., 
the multicollinearity issue among independent variables). I also introduce the concept of 
situational motivation in problem solving that explains motivational effects on 
subsequent cognitive approaches and communicative behaviors. These revised situational 
antecedent variables jointly explain 1) how and why people communicate and 2) how 
people use unique cognitive strategies when they approach problem resolution. I called 
this emerging theory the situational theory of problem solving (STOPS).  
This dissertation elaborates 1) a conceptual model of communicant activeness in 
problem solving; 2) another conceptual model of cognitive entrepreneurship in problem 
solving; 3) a situational and motivational account for when, why, and how people 
communicate and are cognitively unique in a problematic situation. It then empirically 
tests a set of hypotheses and propositions that pertain to new concepts and the situational 




This dissertation advances conceptual understanding about how communication 
behavior and cognitive approaches affect our problem-solving efforts (descriptive theory 
building). It also contributes to finding a way to improve our adaptability in dealing with 
life problems (normative theory building). The new concepts and theory, CAPS, CEPS, 
and STOPS, offer some solutions for theoretical and practical problems in 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this dissertation is to develop a situational theory of problem 
solving.  The situational theory of problem solving inherits, refines, and extends 
theoretical virtues of the situational theory of publics (STP) (J. Grunig, 1968, 1989, 1997, 
2005) to become a more general theory of human communication and cognition during 
problematic situations. The situational theory of publics has contributed not only to the 
communication field in general but also to the public relations field in particular, and it 
has a potential to become a general communication theory.  Specifically, I propose to 
broaden the situational theory of publics from simply information taking to a more 
general conception of communicative behavior, namely, communicant activeness in 
problem solving, which identifies such qualities as information taking, information giving, 
and information selecting. 
I differentiate six subdimensions in communicative activeness, which include 
information forefending and information permitting (information selection), information 
forwarding and information sharing (information transmission), and information seeking 
and information processing (information acquisition). I make this dichotomous 
subdivision of six variables in terms of proactiveness and reactiveness in communication 
action.   
In addition, I propose another new concept, cognitive entrepreneurship in 
problem solving, explaining cognitive strategies in problem solving. It captures a varying 
entrepreneurial mindset in approaching problem resolution. This new concept consists of 
four subconstructs: cognitive retrogression, cognitive multilateralism, cognitive 
commitment, and cognitive suspension. 
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People respond to problems with different cognitive approaches corresponding to 
their situational perceptions.  When people recognize a problem to which they feel 
closely connected and have sufficient cognitive resources, they are likely to use a forward 
reasoning strategy.  In a forward reasoning strategy, people tend to look for evidence 
before making a choice, and thus the evidence directs a certain, optimal, conclusion.  In 
contrast, when people recognize a problem as important but are severely constrained by 
lack of cognitive resources or a strong desire for a specific outcome, they tend to use a 
backward reasoning strategy.  The backward reasoning strategy is a decision-making 
strategy that flows from a conclusion to certain evidence that best optimizes the hastily 
drawn a priori conclusion. Thus, the backward reasoning strategy refers to an 
optimization process for an a priori conclusion. I hypothesize that as one’s cognitive 
entrepreneurship increases, the person is less likely to adopt a backward reasoning 
strategy. I refer to the backward reasoning as cognitive retrogression.  
In addition, people tend to consider more ideas and options as they become more 
entrepreneurial in problem solving. As a result, they display more cognitive breadth, 
requiring more tolerance for even those competing ideas and rather incompatible 
perspectives. I refer to such breadth and tolerance as cognitive multilateralism.   
Next, as one becomes a more entrepreneurial problem solver, one tends to be 
more enthusiastic and patronizing toward the proposed solutions.  I call this cognitive 
commitment. Entrepreneurial problem solvers are typically excited by new ideas.  They 
have a voracious appetite for information that will help them solve a problem.  At the 
same time, entrepreneurs are energetic and enthusiastic about a wide range of ideas, even 
wild ones, as long as they increase the potential to solve a problem. Thus, their 
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excitement with the possible ideas and options will grow as their cognitive 
entrepreneurship in problem solving increases. 
Finally, I hypothesize that as one’s cognitive entrepreneurship increases, one 
becomes more heedful and takes all steps before finalizing a solution. I name this 
cognitive suspension. En route to a final solution, a problem solver with heightened 
cognitive entrepreneurship will invest more discriminatory efforts in evaluating options 
and reevaluating a selected option before finalizing it.   
This dissertation attempts to move the situational theory of publics to a more 
general level by incorporating two new dependent variables in its theoretical formulation.  
After inclusion of a generalized dependent variable of communication behavior, the 
situational theory should be able to explain not only when and why people communicate 
but also how they communicate.  If publics are active in problem solving, they are more 
likely to seek, give, and select information. Likewise, after inclusion of differential 
cognitive strategies that publics might adopt, the situational theory should explain better 
how people mentally practice their problem-solving task in a given problematic situation.  
At some times, publics may be more entrepreneurial in problem solving, and thus they 
use a forward reasoning strategy (i.e., an optimal conclusion search process).  At other 
times, they may be less entrepreneurial and thus adopt a backward reasoning strategy (i.e., 
an optimization process of a priori conclusion). 
Scientific progress is possible not only when theorists introduce new theory and 
concepts but also when theorists increase the abstraction—“generalization”—of available 
concepts and theory.  As Popper (1963) said, a theory is “preferable…which tells us 
more…which contains the greater amount of empirical information or content” (p. 217).  
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Theory should tell more by abstracting and “replacing the particular by the general” 
(Kruglanski, in press, p. 3), and we need to “relentlessly” seek a general theory.  
Similarly, J. Grunig, the father of the situational theory of publics, said that no good 
theory ever stagnates (J. Grunig & Childers, 1988).  In this vein, this dissertation aims at 
a good and general theory about human problem solving. The new situational theory of 
problem solving replaces “the particular” (information seeking and processing) “by the 
general” (communicant activeness in problem solving). As a result, it brings a “greater 
amount of empirical information and content” (theoretical predictions and accounts). 
What follows is a brief history of the situational theory of publics.   
Situational Theory of Publics 
The situational theory of publics was built to explain why and how people 
communicate (J. Grunig, 1968, 1989, 1997, 2005).  The situational theory is a purposeful, 
teleological theory that predicts the communicative behaviors of publics that most matter 
to public relations practitioners.  This theory has helped define the field of public 
relations by spelling out who are publics in public relations.  It refines, improves, and 
formalizes two classic theories of public opinion, that of John Dewey (1927) and Herbert 
Blumer (1966), so as to identify publics and measure their opinions. 
According to Dewey (1927) and Blumer (1966), publics are critical components 
of the democratic process who find problems affecting them and organize and act 
similarly for problem resolution.  J. Grunig’s (1968, 1989, 1997, 2005) situational theory 
of publics provides a means to categorize varying compositions of publics in terms of 
responsiveness to problems; amount of and nature of communicative behavior; the effects 
of communication on cognition, attitudes, and behavior; and the potential to participate in 
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collective behavior in problem resolution (J. Grunig, 1989, 1997, 2005).  Because the 
situational theory has the power to explain and predict who is most likely to communicate 
actively about social or individual problems, it has been a most heavily used applied 
communication theory, not only by public relations theorists but also by public relations 
practitioners.  For public relations theorists, the STP provides a critical means to build a 
body of strategic management of public relations (e.g., the IABC Excellence Study, L. 
Grunig, J. Grunig, & Dozier, 2002).  For practitioners, the STP guides the preparation of 
communication programs and makes them more strategic (e.g., by identifying publics, 
choosing realistic short and long-term communication objectives, and evaluating the 
outcomes of program effectiveness).  
Above all, the most important lesson from the situational theory is that audience 
information consumption is, in general, random.  Information consumption becomes non-
random or systematic only when people find that information matches their subjective 
life problems.  The problems in people’s minds contain a limited subset of many possible 
problems.  Only problems that have relevance to their lives will enter into publics’ minds.  
Therefore, in their communication behavior, people are selectively systematic to meet 
their internal priorities that are influenced by situational perceptions. Notably, problems 
are situational—they come and go—in publics’ minds.  Publics actively communicate 
only when they experience problematic situations, and thus problems come and go. As 
their perceptions of problematic situations change, their communication behaviors change 
situationally. Just as communication behaviors are situational, therefore, publics arise and 
disappear situationally.  
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Message senders would like to define the list of problem priorities for publics.  
Organizations want their publics to behave in a way that the organization wishes (e.g., 
accept new business policy as it is).  However, this is not an easy pursuit.  
Disappointingly to message senders, publics identify problems themselves.  Likewise, 
publics define the priorities of their problems themselves.  In the strategic management of 
public relations (L. Grunig, J. Grunig, Dozier, 2002), the situational theory of publics 
shows why blind pursuit of a maximum number of people in a general public—opposite 
to specific publics defined by the STP—fails.  Because people selectively invest their 
cognitive and communicative resources only when they perceive it as necessary and 
relevant, massive audience campaigns, no matter how well intended, often frustrate 
organizational communicators (i.e., message senders) with poor success.  
Thus, public relations scholars use the implications of the situational theory to 
advise public relations practitioners first to identify who is likely to communicate with 
their organization and next to suggest that only those active publics, the subset of 
population who are interdependent and interpenetrating with the organization, will have 
strategic potential for the organization (J. Grunig & L. Grunig, 1997). Only these critical 
segments of the environment possess the potential to maximize opportunities and to 
minimize threats for the organization (L. Grunig, 1992).  Thus, the situational theory of 
publics logically leads public relations practitioners to selectively identify and invest 
resources in communicating with active segments of their environment and in building 
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long-term, quality relationships with the strategic publics without cost-ineffective random 
communication (e.g., mass1-oriented campaigns). 
Situational variables.  The prime interest of the theory is to account for the 
dependent variables, information processing and information seeking.  The two 
dependent variables address the question of who is more or less likely to communicate 
about some problems of interest.  Three independent variables are problem recognition, 
constraint recognition, and level of involvement.  In brief, one becomes active in learning 
some new information (information seeking) when she or he identifies something as 
missing in life situations and stops to think about it (problem recognition).  When the 
problem is perceived to be closely connected to oneself (level of involvement), she or he 
would do something to resolve the problem.  However, she or he would feel more or less 
capable in taking remedial action across different problems (constraint recognition).  In 
case she or he perceives there is an unmanageable obstacle to do something or feels less 
connected to the problem, even if the given situation were perceived to be serious, she or 
he would remain passive in communication (information processing) or not communicate 
at all.   
Problems of Communication Theories 
While communication theories have advanced our understanding of 
communication behavior, a majority of communication theorists have focused on 
communication as information learning or consumption by the audience.  This trend has 
limited the scope of communication research in a number of ways.  
                                                 
1 Blumer (1966) defined mass as heterogeneous and public as homogenous.  In brief, members of a mass 
become a heterogeneous collectivity because they turn to the same mass medium or because they share the 
same demographic characteristics (e.g., living in the same region).  
 7
Sender-bias in communication research and its consequences.  Paul F. Lazarsfeld 
coined the term administrative research in communication to refer to a series of research 
programs whose main purpose is to enhance the effectiveness of message senders (e.g., 
persuading an audience).  It addresses questions meeting the sender’s communication 
needs, such as: By which channel, can we most effectively reach our audience? To what 
extent will a mass-media campaign be counteracted by personal networks among 
audiences? How can we isolate the effects of a campaign from the influences of 
audiences’ interpersonal communication? (Chaffee, 1982). 
 McQuail (1997) classified the most common research goals in communication as 
“measuring actual and potential reach for purposes of advertising,” “manipulating and 
channeling audience choice behavior,” “looking for audience market opportunities,” and 
“product testing and improving communication effectiveness” (p. 15).  He found the most 
fundamental division of research purposes exists between audience control and audience 
autonomy.  
McQuail wrote:  
By far the greatest quantity of audience research belongs at the control end of the 
spectrum, since this is what the industry wants and pays for (Beniger, 1986).  Few 
of the results of industry research appear in the public domain and are 
consequently neglected in academic accounts of the audience. (McQuail, 1997, p. 
16) 
 
In the same vein, most communication literature considers communication something 
that a source does to a receiver, as something that always originates from the source (J. 
Grunig & Hunt, 1984).  Researchers conceptualize communication behavior mainly as 
information consumption, so that message senders can predict when people are more 
likely to buy or learn new information (e.g., information seeking or processing).   
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Few theorists, especially those who are empirically oriented, delve into 
communication behavior beyond information taking.  According to Reeves, Chaffee, and 
Tims (1982), "Only recently have mass communication researchers begun to question the 
sender orientation embodied in the set of questions [Lasswell's (1948) who, says what, in 
which channel, to whom, with what effect?] and to propose new ones." (pp. 287-288).  
Applied communication fields such as public relations have also shown little interest in 
the need for studying communicators’ voluntary information transmission and selectivity. 
Recently, there exists a burgeoning interest to better understand information dispersion 
through personal networks in advertising and marketing communication (i.e., word-of-
mouth campaigns, Rosen, 2000; Richins, 1983). Yet, its purpose is originated from a 
sender’s perspective to enhance information taking of new product and service among 
potential consumers.  Most studies about information giving are often fragmented or 
subsidiary to studies advancing knowledge of effective information learning among 
communicators.  
Why, then, is such a conceptual limitation persistent in the field? This is largely 
due to the legacy from social learning theory that considers human beings to be targets 
whose passiveness and ignorance require education and reformation. It looks for a best 
way to enlighten and educate ignorant masses in a way that the sender defines desirable.  
From such an asymmetric and limited perspective, we see trees but not the forest in 
communication research.  
This dissertation is meant to restore our conceptual orientation from a fragmented 
part (information acquisition) to an integrated whole (information acquisition as well as 
information transmission).  The prior fragmentary view of communication behavior 
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deemphasizes communicants’ voluntary acts of information selecting, producing, sharing, 
and transmitting.  It is a consequence of sender bias and adoption of a media perspective.  
In contrast, the integral view of communication behavior accounts for information taking 
and giving to explain how communication roles (sender vs. receiver) and communication 
action (information giving vs. information learning) have been confounded.  
From audience behavior to communicant behavior. Historically, communication 
researchers preferred the term audience in referring to people engaged in communicative 
action.  However, equating audience behavior exclusively with communication behavior 
is an overgeneralization.  McQuail (1997) reviewed the historical evolution of the 
concept of audience and concluded, “we keep the familiar word [audience], but the thing 
itself is disappearing” (McQuail, 1997, p. 2).  He pointed out: 
Beyond commonsense usage [of the term, audience], there is much room for 
differences of meaning, misunderstandings, and theoretical conflicts.  The 
problems surrounding the concept stem mainly from the fact that a single and 
simple word is being applied to an increasingly diverse and complex reality, open 
to alternative and competing theoretical formulation…“what is occurring is the 
breakdown of the referent for the word audience in communication research from 
both the humanities and the social sciences” (Biocca, 1988, p. 103) [italics added]. 
(McQuail, 1997, pp. 1-2) 
 
This is a problem of trying to do too much with one term. The theories adopting 
the audience concept produce merely phenotypic knowledge to distinguish 
communicators by “place” (e.g., local media), “people” (e.g., age or gender group), 
“particular type of medium or channel” (e.g., Internet or cable), “content of its messages” 
(e.g., subject matter), and “time” (e.g., prime-time vs. daytime audience) (McQuail, 1997, 
p. 2).  Thus, audience and audience behaviors, the central concepts in studies of mass 
communication, become misnomers that indicate the “breakdown of the referent” 
(McQuail, 1997).   
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Because of the limitation of this conceptual misnomer, communication research 
remains in a “flatlander thinking” (Abbot, 1952)--failure to think in all dimensions of 
communication behavior. Without a proper concept, we fail to think outside one narrow 
area of experience or interest. We cannot perceive the other aspects of communicators 
beyond the information taker implicit in the concept of “audience.”   
In addition, with the limited concept of audience, we miss valuable research 
questions other than a communicator’s receptiveness.  We end with knowledge, at best, 
about how and why audiences behave, not how and why communicators behave.  Hence, 
I propose a term, communicant, as a general name for encompassing both audience and 
sender of messages. In this newer perspective, communicant behavior subsumes audience 
as well as sender behaviors and recipient behaviors.   
In next section, I will discuss needs and reasons for bringing new concepts of 
communicant activeness and cognitive entrepreneurship in problem solving. These 
concepts try to overcome the limited assumption in the studies of communicant behaviors 
and problem solving. 
Communicant Activeness and Cognitive Entrepreneurship in Communication Research 
Why do we need to study communicant activeness in problem solving?  I 
selectively concentrate on communicant activeness, not passiveness, in studying 
communicant behavior. Such a delimitation for the concept of communicant behavior is 
necessary because the human default in communication behavior is apathy or passiveness, 
not ardor or activeness.  Irrespective of our awareness, human beings are constantly 
encountering and being affected by life problems.  For example, an abrupt hike in tuition 
fees exhausts my money in the savings account for spring break.  Global warming has 
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gradually increased electricity usage, which affects my utility bills.  Election of a certain 
political figure may increase my taxes. Or, a tsunami may threaten my new house at the 
beach.  The lists of our life problems painstakingly grow and continue.  Thus, enlisting 
and tracking the whole list of problems that affect us is simply impossible.  We know that 
we are less likely to recognize the consequences of some problems until they emerge.  It 
is one thing to be connected with something and another to recognize its presence.  When 
we realize that an almost infinite number of things defines our current state of being, it 
becomes clear that the human default communicative characteristic is passiveness, not 
activeness.  We become active in communication only when we face a life problem that 
has significant consequence for us.  
Communication is a purposeful act, a “tool for solving problems” (J. Grunig, 
1997, p. 11).  Just as we cannot recognize every problem that exerts influence on our 
current state of being, we cannot communicate about everything to which we are 
connected.  Hence, the notion that we are lethargic for most of problems is not shameful, 
but a modus vivendi or sustenance mechanism. We have learned this from our 
evolutionary process.  Thus, it is not clever to study about “not doing,” which is 
uninteresting and hard to observe. Instead, the promise lies in studying about “doing.”  
Logically, a better way to inquire about communicant behavior is to delimit the scope to 
how, why, and when we communicate, instead of how, why, and when we do not 
communicate. Therefore, the central concept in this dissertation is the narrow concept of 
communication activeness in problem solving.  Communicant activeness is the behavioral 
alpha and omega of information traffic among social actors.  It triggers a social process of 
problem solving by generating movements of words or symbols among communicants’ 
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minds. I choose to study such movements rather than immovable silence so that we can 
learn better about social process of problem solving. 
Next, why is it necessary to study a cognitive approach in problem solving?  And 
why does a cognitive entrepreneurial mindset matter?  To answer, I should note that 
people take different mental approaches corresponding to the kind of problems they have.  
When they have a problem with which they are not connected or well-trained from past 
experiences, they enjoy a mental idleness in tackling the problem. In other words, we 
have little need to make extraordinary efforts to solve trivial or solution-ready problems.  
In contrast, people take a more considered and risk-taking approach when a problem is 
very important or lacks an easy solution. They find a strong need to be entrepreneurial—
extraordinarily hardworking to build a new solution—to return to a default mental 
idleness.  In such instance, we are cognitively effortful in problem solving. 
Depending on problem types and our readiness for solution, our cognitive strategy 
moves from more entrepreneurial to less entrepreneurial.  Therefore, a problem solver’s 
cognitive strategy is a variable, not a constant across varying problems.  Although we 
would invest the same amount of cognitive and communicative resources to deal with a 
problem, our choice of mental approach (e.g., backward or forward reasoning strategy) 
will result in different problem-solving potentials.  In other words, a problem solver’s 
selection of a cognitive strategy becomes a strong predictor for how satisfactory our 
problem solving will be.  
In the earlier version of situational theory, J. Grunig (1968) introduced the term 
“entrepreneur” to characterize people with extraordinary problem-solving efforts who are 
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most successful in problem solving.   He defined the “entrepreneur” as someone who is 
actively seeking a solution: 
Entrepreneur is defined as “strategic decision maker” who “skillfully manages the 
resources at his command, which means he is more than a routine manager; he is 
always looking for the most efficient way of doing things.  The entrepreneur is 
“rational” not in the sense that he is always a profit maximizer or seeks always to 
maximize a pre-set goal, but rather in the sense that he recognizes alternative 
solutions to his problematic situation, evaluates these alternatives, and chooses 
one of them [italics added]. (J. Grunig, 1968, p. 4) 
 
Entrepreneurs are the innovators who devise new ways of working out their 
problems or who adopt new and strange methods in tackling a problem.  In general, they 
are more successful in dealing with their life problems.  Hence, theorizing about what an 
entrepreneurial mindset is and under what conditions people would have more (less) 
entrepreneurial mindset will enrich our understanding of the human problem-solving 
phenomenon.  
I note that communicant activeness or passiveness is an extrinsic behavioral 
blossom of the intrinsic cognitive strategy that one takes within a life situation.  That is, 
communicant activeness is a phonotypical phenomenon reflecting underlying genotypic 
internal cognitive strategies one adopts in a given situation.  For this reason, to study 
when a communicant takes a more entrepreneurial mindset can also deepen our 
understanding of communicant behavior. At the same time, the way we deal with 
information over the course of problem solving should also affect our cognitive 
approaches in thinking about the problem. Therefore, such bidirectional causal influences 
should be studied to better understand how we approach as well as how we should 
approach problem solving. 
 14
To conclude, I delimit the scope of this dissertational study to our cognition and 
communication. Studying our cognitive entrepreneurship and communicant activeness in 
problem solving promises a better understanding of how and why questions in problem 
solving. Improved understanding of cognition and communication, in turn, will advance 
the situational theory of publics to a more general theory of problem solving.  
Methodology 
Theoretically, this study aims to develop new theoretical constructs about our 
cognitive and communicative features in problem solving and to propose a refined 
situational theory. The two emerging concepts are set as dependent variables explained 
by independent variables mostly from the situational theory of publics (J. Grunig, 1997). 
Methodologically, this study has two main goals: first to develop reliable and 
valid measurement systems and second to test the new theory. I thus used a survey to 
collect data, and this required a relatively large number of respondents who were willing 
to answer many questions. To meet the need for a large sample size, I adopted a snowball 
sampling technique, a non-probability sampling strategy, recruiting student participants 
and their acquaintances in the University of Maryland with exchange of extra-credit.  
Generally speaking, non-probability sampling is less desirable because it has 
severe limitations in generalizing the findings. However, I aimed at theoretical 
generalizability rather than statistical generalizability. Considering the goal of this study 
(developing a theory), such choice of data collection can be allowed.  
Because this study requires using human subjects, I submitted appropriate 
documentation to the Institutional Review Board of the University of Maryland. Upon 
approval, I proceeded to data collection. Throughout the data collection, all the 
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participants received a full explanation about the title and purpose of the study, their 
volunteer participation, time commitment, their freedom of withdrawal and right to skip 
questions, and potential harm and benefits from participation in the study. Participants 
were neither forced to participate nor to disclose information. Confidentiality was 
carefully secured. If those contacted student participants refused to participate, they were 
offered an alternative opportunity for extra-credit.  
Significance 
This dissertation presents a situational theory of problem solving that highlights 
distinctive communicative and cognitive features in human problem solving.  Its purpose 
is to provide a simple and useful, but not atheoretical, account of communication 
behavior and the cognitive approaches that we adopt during problematic situations. This 
is a significant effort in that it expands and generalizes the situational theory of publics (J. 
Grunig, 1997, 2003). 
First, it is hoped that the emerging theory in this study will contribute to the 
communication field in general. I theorize communicative action as a purposive and 
instrumental act in dealing with life problems. The scope of the resulting theory is to 
explain human communicative characteristics in any life problems. The theory 
conceptually links communication action with problem-solving efforts we make. Thus, 
the resulting theory captures not only cognitive and communicative aspects, but also 
individual and social processes of problem solving. Those in the communication field 
have made few attempts to introduce a general theory of communication behavior. This 
situational theory of problem solving will address that deficiency.  
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In addition, as discussed earlier, theories and research in communication have 
often confined themselves to information taking or “processing” in the name of audience 
research (M. A. Hamilton & Nowak, 2005; McQuail, 1997; Chaffee, 1982). I have 
attempted to overcome such a limited conception in theorizing the new situational theory. 
Over the course of problem solving, a communicant actively seeks, forwards, and shares, 
and selects information to be a more effective problem solver. Thereby, unlike audience 
behavior research, communication behavior in the situational theory is more general—a 
purposive action by communicant in information transmission, selection, and acquisition 
dimensions in dealing with problems. 
Second, in addition to communicant activeness in problem solving, I theorize 
cognitive entrepreneurship in problem solving to describe our distinct cognitive 
approaches toward problem resolution. The theory contains four distinct but correlated 
dimensions: cognitive retrogression, cognitive multilateralism, cognitive commitment, 
and cognitive suspension.  At times, we adopt a more entrepreneurial mindset. Cognitive 
entrepreneurship should have implications in applied communication. For example, in 
risk and health communication, the concept can explain how some interest groups would 
behave in a particular way and how they cognitively approach their problems. Thus, it is 
possible to improve public health intervention practice by modifying cognitive 
characteristics rather than difficult behavioral changes. In political communication, the 
new concept of cognitive entrepreneurship explains how voters make decisions with 
electoral information. In public relations, the concept will improve our understanding 
about how managerial cognitive characteristics in problem solving would affect 
communication and managerial excellence (L. Grunig, J. Grunig, & Dozier, 2002).   
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Third, this study addresses several criticisms of the situational theory of publics. 
For example, Vasquez and Taylor (2001) attacked the STP because it explains little of the 
“nature, role, and influence of communication” and “marginalized the role of 
communication process and dynamics” in the emergence of publics and social issues (pp. 
149-150). Hallahan (2001) called for more research attention to “issue processes” and 
“issue dynamics” and communication processes in public relations research. Similarly, 
Cozier and Witmer (2001) requested a “framework that shifts the locus of analysis to the 
public’s communicative practices in interactional settings” (p. 618). The new situational 
theory addresses such calls for new theorizing efforts regarding communication process 
and dynamics among problem solvers.   
Fourth, the new concepts and the situational theory offer several conceptual tools, 
such as a new typology of publics, predicting problem-solving potential in social 
conflicts, predicting ethical decision-making styles with a cognitive approach in problem 
solving, and a more comprehensive segmentation of publics. These are not only practical 
advancements in public relations practice but also theoretical advancements in that these 
new conceptual tools are derived from a continuation of theorizing with the situational 
theory of publics.  
Lastly, the situational theory of publics, the parent theory of the situational theory 
of problem solving, has posed and answered questions such as: What are publics and how 
do they arise?, With which publics is it possible to communicate and how can one 
communicate most effectively with each kind of public?, When and why do members of 
active publics join activist groups?, What communication effects are possible with each 
kind of publics?,  How do activist publics differ from publics that have an intellectual 
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interest in an issue but do not get actively involved with the issue? (J. Grunig, 1997). The 
theory emerging from this study complements and refines the answers to these questions. 
Further, it continues to provide an answer for the “new challenges” that have emerged 
from the theory-building process (J. Grunig, 1997).   
In the next chapter, I will explain the new concepts of communicant activeness in 
problem solving and cognitive entrepreneurship in problem solving. After the explication, 
I will introduce the refined situational antecedent variables that will be integrated with 
the two new dependent variables about cognitive and communicative consequences.  
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CHAPTER II: CONCEPTUALIZATION 
In this chapter, I first introduce two variables, communicant activeness in problem 
solving (CAPS) and cognitive entrepreneurship in problem solving (CEPS). The 
communication field has treated communicants mainly as information takers, and has not 
studied their information providing and selecting behaviors. The first new variable, 
communicant activeness in problem solving, addresses this paucity of research by 
adopting an integrated framework—that is, conceptualizing communicants not only as 
information takers but also as information givers and selectors—of how people address 
their life situations. This new variable deepens our understanding about when, how, and 
why people communicate as addressed by the situational theory of publics (J. Grunig, 
1968, 1997, 2005)—i.e., how communication is used as a coping mechanism in 
problematic situations.  
Another variable, cognitive entrepreneurship in problem solving, also inherits the 
conceptual premise—i.e., entrepreneurial decision-making—from the earliest version of 
the situational theory of publics (J. Grunig, 1968). People in problematic situations take 
different cognitive approaches toward problem resolution corresponding to their 
subjective perceptions of a problematic situation. People are more entrepreneurial when 
they make a decision under some conditions and less entrepreneurial in other situations (J. 
Grunig, 1968). Because the chosen mental approach results in different outcomes, we 
need to theorize how people differ in their mindset in dealing with life problems. 
Although a good descriptive conceptual framework will promise a good prescriptive 
knowledge to guide better problem solving, there is also a paucity of research to describe 
different cognitive features in problematic situations. Thus, the new variable, cognitive 
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entrepreneurship in problem solving, is a worthy theoretical venture to extend our body 
of knowledge in problem solving. 
I next review under what conditions people take a certain communicative and 
cognitive mode of problem solving. For that purpose, the situational theory of publics (J. 
Grunig, 1997) provides a conceptual and measurement framework. The situational theory 
of publics proposed four independent variables (problem recognition, constraint 
recognition, level of involvement, and referent criterion). In conjunction with these four 
independent variables with the two new communicative and cognitive variables that 
features different problem-solving approaches, I propose a situational theory of problem 
solving (STOPS). The new theory generates a set of conceptual hypotheses that 
highlights the theory’s utility to the field of communication and public relations.  
A MODEL OF COMMUNICANT ACTIVENESS IN PROBLEM SOLVING 
Words are also actions, and actions are a kind of words.  
Essays: Second Series, “The Poet” Emerson, Ralph Waldo2 (1844) 
Generally speaking, two generations of researchers have studied communication 
behavior. The first generation focused on the sender. In market terms, the first generation 
focused on information supply and the information supplier’s interest about how 
information should flow (e.g., how consumers behave in responding to different 
supplying conditions.). Consequently, these researchers conceptualized communicants 
mainly as a target with varying degrees of receptiveness (information consuming 
potential) for the message that senders promote. Generation 1 asked “Who says what to 
whom with which channel with what effect?” (Lasswell, 1948). 
                                                 
2 I thank Miia Jaatinen for finding this quote. Jaatinen (1999) cited Emerson’s essay in her book, Lobbying 
Political Issues: A Contingency Model of Effective Lobbying Strategies. 
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In contrast, the next generation emphasized the receiver’s point-of-view. Again 
using the market analogy, this generation attempted to explain communication in terms of 
information demand and demanders’ interest. It described communicants as active 
information shoppers who consume information to meet their needs. These researchers 
asked “Who hears what from whom via what channels for what purpose?” (Chaffee, 
1982). 
However, neither generation identified communicants as active in information 
giving. They shared a common view of communicants as information takers. The two 
only differ in how active people are in information taking. Both approaches take 
information giving for granted and thus exclude it in theoretical explanations. Few 
researchers question why we have to limit our query only to the “audience’s learning 
potentials.” Communication theorists by default took the sender’s side. They looked 
curiously at message recipients to increase their receptiveness.  However, we can 
legitimately ask other questions: What would be a general theory of communication 
behavior that allows communicators as both, not either, sender and receiver under a 
single theoretical framework? Is it possible to integrate the sender’s as well as the 
receiver’s communicative behavior within a single theory? What features are common to 
sender and receiver that could fit into a single theory?  
A key conceptual link to incorporating these two approaches under a single 
conceptual roof is purpose of communication. In both approaches, the communicants, 
both givers and takers, use communication as a coping mechanism. A communicant seeks 
or disperses certain information for the purpose of problem solving. The contents that 
drive communicative action can vary, but the use of communication as a coping 
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mechanism is a constant. The role of communication and the purpose of communicant 
behaviors are identical in information taking and information giving. 
We can conceptually link both sender and receiver by their common purpose. 
They use communication instrumentally to deal with life problems. People generate and 
deliver messages (information) to others to solve their problems (e.g., promotional 
advertising). Likewise, people search for information to solve their problems when they 
find an absence of relevant information (e.g., reading medical journals). Senders 
communicate to solve their problems such as persuading people to adopt new ideas, 
practices, life styles and commercial products, whereas receivers communicate to solve 
problems such as remedial treatment or about a device to build a solution for their 
problematic life situations. Both message senders and message receivers share a common 
identity as communicants who consider communication as an instrumental and facilitative 
mechanism to cope with their life problems. In a nutshell, communication behavior, 
either giving or taking, becomes functionally identical. Hence, it should be possible and 
useful for us to build a theoretical framework that describes communicants as information 
givers as well as information takers simultaneously. This should lead us to a third 
generation of communication theories.  
A Need for General Look for Communication Behavior 
I follow Carter (1973) to define communication behavior as a movement of words 
or symbols by a person within a life situation. Communication differs from other 
behaviors in that a person may use it to plan other behaviors but not necessarily connect 
to other behaviors. Communication is a behavior in itself (J. Grunig, 1976). I began this 
chapter by criticizing the paucity of communication theories wherein simultaneity of 
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communicant roles can be housed. A prior approach (J. Grunig, 1989, 2005) segmented 
publics using the publics’ differential responses, such as their differential nature and 
amount of communication behavior. Previously, the nature of communication behavior 
has been solely about the nature of one’s information taking. I question now why we 
should limit ourselves to information seeking and processing in defining communication 
behavior. Whereas communication behavior could vary in terms of learning of new facts, 
ideas, opinions, and attitudes from others, it also could vary in giving facts, ideas, 
opinions, and attitudes from one’s own knowledge storage. We can describe 
communicative behavior via as many dimensions as we want. Then, an important 
question is what kind of dimensions can help us for the problems we face.  
In the following section, I will propose a more general model about 
communication activeness. The significance claim of that model will be based on the 
“empirical content of a theory” (Popper, 1999, p. 19). Empirical content refers to the 
class of empirical propositions that can be ruled out by a theory. The empirical 
propositions should be empirically falsifiable and subject to empirical testing. Thus, a 
theory contains more empirical propositions—i.e., a theory asserts more—takes more 
potential falsifiability and thus takes more risks. In other words, it is more subject to 
falsification. Hence, if a theory has passed tests of falsification, it contains a greater 
amount of empirical content because it has ruled out more empirical observations. A 
general theory says more, thus, it “can clear up more problems”—“Its explanatory 
potential or its potential explanatory power is greater” (Popper, 1999, p. 20). It is 
desirable in this sense to advance a theory with a greater empirical content—a high-
content theory (Popper, 1999). By proposing more propositions about communicant 
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activeness such as information giving and selecting, the new model of communicant 
activeness should have more empirical content than its predecessor, the situational theory 
of publics and other communication models of information consumption. Specifically, 
the propositions in the model of communicant activeness describe not only when people 
learn or consume information, but also when people produce and give and how they 
selectively take and give information.  
Situational Communicant Activeness 
Data, Information, and Knowledge 
According to Shannon and Weaver (1949), information is anything that reduces 
entropy and uncertainty. J. Grunig (1968) conceived of their definition as useful but not 
valid in that a definition of one construct should not be what it does but what it is. Instead, 
he advocated McDonough’s (1963) definition as having more merit. According to 
McDonough (1963), the common term information is composed of three components: 
data (unevaluated messages), information (data evaluated to apply in a specific problem 
situation), and knowledge (data evaluated for future use in general). Following these 
definitions, J. Grunig (1968) said that only information and knowledge can reduce 
uncertainty in a judgmental situation. Information refers to certain data that are judged to 
be specific and relevant to a given problem situation. All data are candidates for 
information (or knowledge), but not all data become information unless they prove their 
applicability and relevance to specific problem solving. In this dissertation, I adopt 
McDonough’s (1963) and J. Grunig’s (1968) conceptual explication of information. 
A person who recognizes a problem explores the sea of data –i.e., the sea of 
unevaluated messages—inwardly and outwardly to palliate the perceived discrepancy.  
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The more one is capable of narrowing the perceived discrepancy by any means, the 
shorter the situation (i.e., the psychological time period of a problematic state) will be. 
Typically, one initiates an internal search for knowledge that has relevance to a current 
problem. Knowledge carries over from prior situations to apply to a similar kind of 
problems. This is “knowledge activation” (Higgins, 1996). When attempted knowledge 
activation cannot yield an adequate solution, one turns to an external source of 
knowledge—i.e., information seeking. This is a knowledge action.  
Knowledge should first be available to the problem solver. Next, the available 
knowledge is evaluated for its relevance and applicability to a given problem. After it 
demonstrates sufficient relevance and applicability, it becomes information to be applied 
to a current problem. Likewise, data should be available and then evaluated whether 
relevant and applicable to a given problem. I distinguish data, information, and 
knowledge so that information is the central concept in a problematic situation. Neither 
knowledge nor data can be used in itself without an evaluative process for the current 
specific problem state. Problem solvers judge it by their own subjective criteria, although 
their judgmental competencies vary. 
Communicant Activeness 
Communicant activeness in problem solving (CAPS) is a conflated construct to 
measure communicator’s heightened communicative behaviors by a trichotomic model. I 
conceptualize the nature of communicant activeness in terms of three domains –the 
communicative behavioral aspects of information connoisseurship, information outflow, 
and information inflow. I call them information selection, information transmission, and 
information acquisition, respectively. I subdivide the tripartite domains of communicant 
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activeness further into six subdimensions by an activeness dichotomy, reactive and 
proactive. This results in the variables of information permitting, information forefending, 
information sharing, information forwarding, information processing, and information 
seeking. I hypothesize that the increased level of communicant activeness will result in 
increased communicative proactiveness in each dimension. 
CAPS is a key component of the situational theory of problem solving (STOPS), 
which provides a set of endogenous variables to be accounted for. Each dimension 
captures some unique characteristics of communicative activeness that a person possesses 
when one encounters a problematic situation. The theoretical assumption of CAPS is that 
we use communication behaviors to cope with problematic situations. To adapt into our 
never stable environments, communication behavior becomes a way we live as well as 
operate. 
Conceptualizing Communicant Activeness:  
Information Selection, Information Transmission, and Information Acquisition 
Main Postulate 
I delimit the communicant’s behavioral aspects to one’s information inflow and 
outflow and one’s selectiveness. Such a delimitation does not mean there is no other 
communicative behavioral aspect, nor does it suggest that other communicatory aspects 
are uninteresting. Rather, I purposefully select these three dimensions to fill the void in 
communication research that I feel is most problematic. I refrain from theoretical monism, 
that there is one best theory to represent the phenomenon of interest. Thus, I advocate 
ongoing theorizing efforts to construe communicant activeness better.   
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I first propose a guiding premise about communicant activeness. People use 
communication instrumentally and purposefully to solve their life problems.3 Thus, their 
instrumental use of communicative acts increases when confronting important 
problematic situations. The general postulate is: The more one wants problem resolution, 
the more one’s communicative actions will increase. Further: 
The more one commits to problem resolution, the more one becomes selective in 
dealing with information, the more one becomes transmissive, and the more one 
becomes acquisitive about information pertaining to the problem.  
In the following I will elaborate on each dimension of communicant activeness. This will 
lead to empirical operationalization to build a set of testable measures. 
Information Acquisition: Information Processing and Information Seeking 
When one faces a problem, he or she starts a process to find a solution. If the 
problem is recurring, the person would have a transferable solution from prior experience 
and endeavors to solve it. Hence, once available, one starts an internal retrieval of a prior 
solution. If the transferred solution fits well into the new problem, the problematic 
situation will end soon with application of the readymade solution to the problem. In 
contrast, one may confront a totally new problem with no applicable prior solution. Such 
a void of applicable knowledge can produce a meta-problem, a problem about a problem. 
If one cannot find an applicable solution, a problem solver will take a longer time and 
have a harder time closing a problematic state. Then, the problem holder must make 
extraordinary efforts to build a de novo solution. This requires “building blocks” 
                                                 
3 I temporarily define problem as a perceived discrepancy between expected and observed states regarding 
a domain of experience. This is a provisional definition. I will fully elaborate the constructs, problem, 
situation, and problem recognition, in the following section of situational antecedent variables of this 
chapter. 
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(Kruglanski, 1989), that is, information relevant to constructing a new solution. 
Consequently, one turns to external sources to forage for potentially applicable data and 
knowledge. 
Information acquisition refers to the varying extent of information-collecting 
efforts for problem solving. In general, the more a communicant becomes active in 
problem solving, the more one exerts efforts for information acquisition (Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Conceptual relationship between information acquisition and communicant 
activeness. 
 
Specifically, when one feels an urge to deal with a problematic situation, one is more 






Information Processing and Information Seeking 
communicant tends to be remain passive and reactive in tak
processing. The closure of information acquisition efforts corresponds to the incre
competence regarding subjective relevance of information acquired in constructing a
solution. Once a communicant has built a solution and successfully tested its workab
to a given problem, one’s competence increases and subsequently decreases his or he
need for information. 
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 J. Grunig (1997) developed a situational theory of publics to “predict the 
differential responses” such as “responsiveness to issues,” “amount of and nature of 
communication behavior,” “effects of communication on cognitions, attitudes, and 
behavior,” and “the likelihood of participating in collective behavior” (pp. 8-9). The 
amount and nature of communication behavior has special importance in theory and 
practice in that it solves a critical problem among public communication professionals, 
that is, who is likely to learn and pick up, not to ignore, the information provided to 










e and less active communicants because active communicants 
are eq t, 
are two dependent variables. The former represents a passive communication behavio
which is “unplanned discovery of a message followed by continued processing of it” 
(Clarke & Kline, 1974). The latter represents an active communication behavior, that i
“the planned scanning of the environment for messages about a specified topic” (J. 
Grunig, 1997, p. 9), or “premeditated information seeking” (Clarke & Kline, 1974).  
 The use of information in problem solving is functionally crucial in proble
solving because availability and applicability of the information one possesses determines
the likelihood of successful problem solving. As a problem solver has a more serious 
perception about a given problem, one’s need for more quantity and better quality of 
information increases situationally. Therefore, the less one perceives a situation as bein
problematic, the less the person is acquisitive for information about the problem. 
Information processing characterizes the less active communicants; information s
characterizes the more active communicants. However, information processing cann
distinguish between activ







n to refrain from using the STP to think about activeness beyond 
informa
y 
knowledge— people begin to look for external sources, that is, information seeking in the 
tion seeking is a communicative characteristic exclusively representing active 
communicants’ behavior. For that reason, active communicants are both high in 
information processing and seeking, but less active communicants are only high in 
information processing.  
Information Transmission: Information Sharing and Information Forwarding
Two dependent variables in the STP--information seeking and processing--hav
solved many practical problems of public relations practitioners. By the two distin
communication behaviors, the STP helps public relations practitioners identify a gro
individuals who are willing to be readers or partners in communicative interactions. 
However, the STP delimits its scope only to the learning aspect of communication 
behavior. It discusses public activeness more as an information consumer. However, 
there is no reaso
tion taking. Indeed, with the limited scope of thinking about communicant 
activeness solely as information taking, we delay advancing a better theory about who 
publics are and what their characteristics are. One promising communicative dimension 
to extend our theoretical purview in studying publics is information transmission by 
communicants. 
To cope with their problematic situations, people make instant judgments (Bargh, 
1996). Making a good judgment requires reliable and applicable judgmental clues and 
rules for problem solving. Such clues and rules are first sought by the internal inventor
check of whether relevant (applicable) information or rule(s) are available in memory. 
When requests for guiding knowledge or referent rule(s) are unmet—absence of 
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STP. In reality, however, during this process, problem holders are not only “learning” of 









ork for activist events. At the heart of such coorientation 
transmission. In summary, the more the communicant becomes active in 
problem solving, the more the communicant is likely to transmit information pertaining 
to the problem (Figure 2). 
d how much its consequences are as close enough to have direct effects on them. 
Such an effort is often captured in some social movement theories as how people g
organized or form a group around a common problem. Yet, few communication theori
directly conceptualize how it occurs. 
Communicative behavior has a central place in the process that connects pe
each other not only by collecting and learning related information or solutions for 
problem but also by providing, provoking, or seeking sympathy for problems. P
intuitively and unconsciously realize that a problem becomes easier to solve when it 
became a problem for others. The communication act of educating others about a 
problem is a coping strategy. It forms a collective around the problem. By talking about a 
problem with others, individuals free their secluded problem. For that purpose, 
information giving (talking about one’s problem) costs little, but the payoffs are huge.
is a thrifty way to solve a problem by activating information traffic that makes 
body of people perceive a problem as similarly problematic. It also increases the poten
for collective behaviors, such as participating in pressure campaigns, donating money, 
and engaging in voluntary w
toward a problem is information exchange among problem holders, especially 
information 
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Figure 2: Conceptual relationship between information transmission and communicant 
activeness. 
 
Reasons for Information Transmitting 
People use communication not only to learn relevant information on their w
finding a solution but to share the burden of a problem collectively. They also educate 
others about potential harms of and treatments for some problems. Why, then, do 
communicants give information to others? People use communication to build a solutio
for a problem as w
ay to 
n 




den into a smaller pieces) and translate the attempted solution into action in the 
most active case.  
We can break down information transmission as problem forwarding a
sharing. Active and activist communicants make efforts to spread their perceived 
problems widely as being worthy of attention from other people. At times, an 
organization that has negative consequences on its publics has to compete for publics’ 
attention against activist publics (J. Grunig & L. Grunig, 1997; L. Grunig, 1992). 
Maltreatment of these negative consequences creates angry publics. Those active
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disperse their problem perception and a self-serving solution to other publics (e.g., medi
government officials, courts, other activist groups). Against the activist publics’ 
communicative efforts, the organization finds it difficult to represent its perspective on 
the problem. Then the organization becomes active in problem solving. It not onl
information to better explain its perspective, but also gives inf
a, 
y seeks 









nts its perspective to other publics. We commonly find such information 
transmission efforts both from publics and organizations. 
We initiate and forward the presence of a problem, our own diagnosis of the 
source of a problem, and a resolution method to stakeholders. Frequently, information 
giving such as problem forwarding or solution forwarding becomes the act of problem
resolution. For example, you may be annoyed by noise every night (problem recognition
Your investigation reveals that the source of the noise is your neighbors upsta
fight almost every night. A solution would be to ask the neighbors to stop fighting or to 
call the police to stop the rude behavior. As such, the very act of information 
transmission becomes a problem-solving behavior. For another example, you may find 
that smoking smells bad and that your children are coughing as a result. You begin to 
look for the source of problem and find your neighbor is violating the no smoking rule i
your apartment building. You would like to share your trouble with other neighbors w
face the same problem by asking whether they are also affected by the smoking. Then, 
you may put up a “no smoking” sign in the corridor to politely correct the neighbor’s 
misbehavior. You give information of the problem as well as a solution by inform














 a solution. Thus, at the earlier 
n is primarily about 
on resort among problem holders. As they learn and build a solution by 
information seeking, they educate and apply a solution when they face a problem.  
Information Sharing and Information Forwarding 
CAPS distinguishes two levels of activeness in information giving. A passive 
information giver shares when someone else requests their expertise in problem solvi
The information sharer possesses relevant knowledge and decision rules applicable 
problem at hand. The information sharer has acquired knowledge and decisional ru
from past problematic situations. In other words, an information sharer is a form
active problem solver. Ho
tion giving themselves. Rather, they proffer information only when being 
solicited by some information seekers. Information sharing is, thus, a reactive 
communicant behavior.  
In contrast, a more active information giver forwards information about a proble
even if no one solicited it. An information forwarder is proactive in propagating his or 
her problem perception and preferred way of problem solving. Information forwarders
are thus active communicants who exploit communication instrumentally for problem 
solving by reproducing a similar problem perception and a solution. Thus, information
outflow from an information forwarder is voluntary and self-propelled by heightened 
problem perception. Notably, information transmission evolves from problem givin
solution giving as a problematic situation continues. At early stages, a problem s
communicates to obtain necessary information to build
phase of a situation, a communicant’s information transmissio
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problem sharing and forwarding. At the later phase, however, a problem solver 
communicates both the problem as well as a solution. 
Individual Problem Solver versus Collective Problem Solver 
 Publics are disconnected systems of individuals experiencing common problems, 
and they can evolve into organized and powerful activist groups (J. Grunig, 1997; 
Grunig, 1992; J. Grunig & Hunt, 1984). Problem solvers can maximize their problem 
solving potential and minimize its costs when they are better connected and coordi
in action. In essence, information giving increases connectedness among isolated 










e same problem. In other words, coorienting 
among 
s communicants commonly face. Therefore, we can meaningfully distinguish 
problem solvers by the extent of activeness in information transmission (active vs. 
passive giving). 
Chwe (2001) explained that whether members of a collectivity have “common 
knowledge” is the prime mark differentiating between disconnected and connected social 
groups. Cross meta-perceptions about whether members know about their common 
problem leads a transition from individual problem holder to collective problem solve
The cross meta-perception of a problem demarcates between “disconnected systems” and
connected systems: e.g., I know I have a problem. I know she has the same problem
knows I have the same problem. I know that she knows I have the same problem. She 
knows that I know that she knows I have th
disconnected individual problem solvers toward a problem will transform 
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individuals toward connected collective problem solvers if they are aware of common 
perceptions about the problem they face.  
In terms of the coorientation model (J. Grunig & Hunt, 1984; McLeod & Cha








 if a 
 solving 
ted to problem resolution, a 
comm ation 
sharing
e extent to which each person thinks the other persons’ idea or evaluation is 
similar to one’s own) and accuracy (i.e., the extent to which one person’s perception of 
the other persons’ idea or evaluation approximates the other person’s actual idea or 
evaluation) is a necessary condition to form a social collectivity in problem solving.  
Importantly, communication behaviors among problem solvers are the only wa
to increase common knowledge (congruency and accuracy) among publics. Specific
voluntary information transmission about a problematic state and the following cross
awareness of knowing each other’s meta-perceptions regarding the common problem is 
the primary mechanism that allows separated individual problem solvers to transform
into interconnected and coordinated collective problem solvers. To summarize,
communicant becomes active in the task of problem resolution, he or she is likely to 
make more effort in information transmission. Specifically, when one commits to
a problem, he or she is more likely to initiate information transmission proactively—
information forwarding. In contrast, if less motiva
unicant tends to be remain passive and reactive in giving information—inform
. The heightened likelihood of each problem holder to share and forward 
information about a given problem increases the collective problem-solving potential 
among disconnected individual problem solvers.  
Information Selection: Information Permitting and Information Forefending 
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Communicants tend to develop certain preferences in their “usual diet of 
information” (Case, 2002, p. 93).  Festinger (1957) and Hyman and Sheatsley (1947
were forefathers of research on communicator selectivity. Since then, social 
psychologists and communication researchers have done ample studies about selective 
exposure. Although communication selectivity has attracted many researchers, findin
are often controversial (Frey, 1986; Sears & Freedman, 1967). Putting aside all the 
hubbub around selective exposure, I conceptualize information selection as a situationally 
evolving human communicative feature, not only to cope with the problem of “cognitive 








n are two 
lem recognizers—who find a discrepancy between 
expecta
t 
communicant. Past researchers have explained that selective attention or exposure occur
when people attempt to solve a problem of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957, 1964
by taking information in a selective manner (i.e., avoid dissonant but approach consonant 
information).  
 I am dissatisfied with the default dissonance reduction mechanism that cons
solely of avoiding dissonant information or seeking consonant information (Festinger, 
1957, 1964). Avoiding dissonant information and seeking consonant informatio
ways, but not the only ways, to reduce an internal state of dissonance. In general, through 
information behavior, communicants can reduce dissonance in two ways. One is a 
revising expectation strategy. Prob
tion and current observation—may modify their expectation state (e.g., 
“conjectural knowledge” Popper, 1963) to reduce the perceptual distance (e.g., the exten
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of departure from an anticipated state) by approaching to relevant information and by 
avoiding irrelevant information.  
The other is reinforcing expectation strategy.  Problem recognizers may modify a
current observation state by avoiding dissonant and/or seeking consonant information.  
Here, in any strategy, a communicant’s information selection will occur given that the 
communicant is highly active in problem solving.  To resolve dissonance, one has to 
discriminate between irrelevant and r
 





e communication did not use such a general conception of 
f information (i.e., specific 
interpretation pursuit). At times, communicants have low control in processing certain 
available information.  Specifically, one could reduce a dissonant state either by 
weighing reinforcing information to modify a problematic expectation state (i.e.,
dissonance reduction by deflecting observation that is a pseudo problem-solving strategy
or by weighing reforming information to modify a problematic observational state (i.e.
genuine problem-solving strategy).  
Past studies in selectiv
dissonance reduction strategies.  In the former reinforcing expectation strategy, 
communicants tend to seek and forward any information that is subjectively relevant to 
reinforce prior expectation. In the latter, revising expectation strategy, communicants 
tend to seek and forward any information that is relevant to revision or refinement of 
content of prior expectation. 
 Also, I put emphasis on selective interpretation and selective production of 
information in addition to selective access, processing, or exposure. I conceptualize 
information selection to include not only selective information taking and giving (i.e., 










elevant to the problem solving) in their communication behavior. 
Traffic
ve 
able information (e.g., a TV news program). At other times, communicants have 
sufficient knowledge or confidence enough to face and tolerate distasteful inf
Further, communicants may systematically seek dissonance-arousing information (e.g.,
communicant who anticipates a discussion with opponents).  
Finally, selective communication often occurs among communicants who need to 
reduce information during a problematic situation. As a result of heightened 
communicant activeness in problem solving, communicants tend to accumulate a va
amount of potentially relevant information, more than they were able to manage. At som
point, communicants face a problem about problem solving—i.e., managing an adequate 
information pool while considering the tradeoff between quality and quantity. Whereas
communicants will take any information related to the problem at an early stage of 
problem-solving efforts, they begin to collect information discriminately at later stages. 
In sum, communicants situationally evolve from relation seeker (e.g., taking and gi
any information related with the problem) to relevance seeker (e.g., taking and givin
only information r
king information—i.e., information inflow and outflow—is more and more under 
the guidance of certain discriminatory judging criteria as communicant activeness 
increases. The more one becomes an active communicant, the more one becomes a 
relevance seeker. 
In summary, information selection occurs either to solve the problem of cogniti
discrepancy reduction (i.e., problem) or to solve the problem of information reduction 
(i.e., a meta-problem in dealing with a problem). In both cases, communicants use 
information selectively for problem solving (i.e., to reduce cognitive discrepancy or to 
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reduce information). In any instance, a communicant becomes increasingly more of a 
relevance pursuer whose perceived relevance is subjectively defined corresponding to
changes in one’s situational perceptions. At one tim
 
e, communicants may avoid some 
inform
ation 
ful to revising old beliefs) and ignore or avoid information confirming prior 





ation selection results from a self-defined notion of 
e discrepancy reduction) or a 
meta-p cate 
ective 
ation-causing discrepancy as irrelevant (i.e., because one feels that information 
conflicting with a prior belief is wrong and unworthy) and approach agreeing inform
as relevant (e.g., because information bolsters one’s confidence that a prior belief is 
appropriate and valuable) to the discrepant state.  
At another time, the same communicants may approach discrepant information as 
relevant (e.g., because one feels that information conflicting with a  prior or present 
belief is use
s irrelevant (e.g., because one feels that information supporting prior belief has
little use in rescripting an old belief). In all cases, the communicant becomes a relevance
pursuer, corresponding to the communicant activeness and to the amount of info
available.  
In taking, interpreting, and giving information, communicants tend to deve
some discriminatory rules about what kind of information is relevant in the current ta
of problem solving. Thus, communicants solve a meta-problem (i.e., a need for 
information reduction) by situationally evolving from a relatedness pursuit to relevance 
pursuit. In either case, inform
relevance in solving a problem (i.e., a need for cognitiv
roblem (i.e., a need for information reduction). Before I conceptually expli
what I mean by information selection, a brief review of those issues in studying sel
communication is required. 
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Problems in Studying Selective Communication 
In the literature, almost without an exception, researchers have discussed 
communicant selectivity only in terms of selectivity in information collection and
recollection—i.e., selective retrieval of internal memory or selective search for an 
external pool of information. There are few, if any, attempts to extend the scope
human information selection beyond information acquisition. The common terms 
referring to studies in selective communication are selective exposure, selective 
perception, or selective communication. T
 
 of 





lants, previous studies regarding 
ose 
ter communicant activeness, the more the communicant becomes selective in 
information acquisition as well as in information transmission (Figure 3). In the next 
section, I will discuss the issues in selectivity research. 
tion consumption.  Selective communication studies have their roots in 
dissonance theory and Heider’s (1958) balance theory. Its main assumption is that 
tend to avoid dissonance-arousing information while looking for information reinforcing 
current beliefs, opinions, and decisions.  
Putting aside whether selective information processing or seeking is empirically 
tenable, I question why we limit selective communication to selective exposure. I 
alternatively suggest that we should study selective communication in terms of selective 
information giving as well. Such selectivity in information giving can introduce 
important knowledge to explain individual and collective problem-solving processes (e.g.,
via what mechanism an extreme view reproduces itself among active publics). Thus, t
conception I propose here supplements, rather than supp
communicative and cognitive selectivity with a general theoretical frame. I here prop
that the grea
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Figure 3: Conceptual relationship between information selection and communicant 
activeness. 
 
Selective processing, selective production, and selective propagation. As briefly 
mentioned, there is a paucity of literature on the phenomenon of selective communication 
as both acquisition selectivity and transmission selectivity. Thus, I raise the question of 
why we do not see selectiveness in terms of information production and propagation. Past 
research has invariably focused on the learning aspects of human information selectivity, 
namely, selective exposure.  In his classic review of selective exposure to information, 
Frey (1986) surveyed the scope and history of selective exposure research up to that date. 
However, even his exhaustive review of informational selectivity remained exclusively 
within a notion of “selective exposure to information”—i.e., information inflow—with no 
consideration of information outflow (Frey, 1986). Such a narrow focus in 
communication research programs has its origin from the sender-oriented research 
paradigm (e.g., to increase audience susceptibility to educate or persuade target recipients 
                                                
 4
 
4 Chaffee, Stamm, Guerrero, and Tipton (1969) noted that selective exposure has some problems: “at any 
rate, it is impossible to distinguish between these two kinds of behavior in that study, so the more inclusive 
term selective exposure is used, to indicate that selective behavior of either type is under observation” (p. 
17). 
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as a message sender intends). Thus, conceptual balance in a subsequent review of 
selectivity is necessary to get generalized lessons from past studies of selectivity.  
In addition, the inconsistent findings in selective exposure studies have suggested 







ify, and translate information they are processing 
in a wa eness 
 selective 
earchers should consider selectivity in terms of “information evaluation” 
Freedman, 1967; Feather, 1963) or selective interpretation. Often, information medi
allow little control for communicants in processing messages. Chaffee et al. (2001) noted
that selective attention is not empirically observable from the less controllable media 
such as newspapers and television (news program and television political ads). As th
summarized well, these media sources “offer balanced coverage” and “certainly some 
exposure to both sides is unavoidable when watching or reading news” (p. 263). Thus, 
audiences have “little opportunity to avoid counter-attitudinal information” (Chaffee et 
al., 2001, p. 264).  
Instead of viewing selectivity solely as selective processing, it would be 
theoretically more promising to take selective communication as not only selective 
processing under some conditions (e.g., more constrained or presence of strong decision 
rules) but also selective interpretation. Indeed, people processing identical information
reach starkly different conclusions. For example, voters who watched the same T
presidential debate often conclude that their preferred candidate has won the debate. Th
suggests that communicants resist, mod
y consistent with their internal rules and beliefs. Hence, information selectiv
not only comes in the way of selective processing (de facto selectivity) (Sears & 
Freedman, 1967) but also takes the form of selective interpretation or selective 
production. In addition, selective interpretation of some information results in
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propagation through communicants’ networks (e.g., if an active communicant processe
and interprets information in a selective manner, she or he would also discharge it to 
others in that way). In the present study, I develop such a general conception of 
information selectiveness t
s 




alternative(s) are missed; and thus dissonance is easier to observe. To reduce 
postdecisional internal negativity (i.e., dissonance), one type of selectivity deals with 
information—i .e., uses a “confirmatory strategy” by favoring information supporting 
one’s already made decision and/or by avoiding information challenging that decision.  
Frey (1986) summarized: 
The general hypothesis was that the search should differ according to whether it 
be relatively unbiased in their seeking and evaluation of information. Once the 
on-
supporting (consonant) information and avoid decision-contrary (dissonant) 




ested that there may be a 
“biased  
on of 
e transmission of information. 
Postdecisional selectivity versus predecisional selectivity. In his cognitive 
nce theory, Festinger (1957, 1964) identified different effects from dissonanc
st dissonance is aroused after a decision is made because counterfactual decision 
occurs before or after the commitment is made. Prior to a decision, people should 
decision has been made, however, selectivity sets in: People search for decisi
information. This same bias is evident as well in the manner in which people 
often considered to be more credible and reliable than contrary information. (p
Festinger (1957, 1964) and Frey (1986) said that selectivity could be observed
“postdecisional” processing, assuming that it cannot be observed in predecisional 
processing. However, Brownstein (2003) examined many studies conducted since 
Festinger’s (1964) dissonance theory was developed and sugg
 predecision processing.” According to Brownstein (2003), biased predecision
processing may happen “when decision makers restructure their mental representati
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the decision environment to favor one alternative before making a choice” (p. 545). 
Specifically, this bias related to a selective information search that “favors one alternative,
or reevaluation of alternatives, in which one alternative is bolstered and/or the others 
denigrated until the choice becomes obvious” (Brownstein, 2003, p. 545). Review
relevant research on theories of cognitive dissonance and selectivity (e.g., studies abou
choice certainty or motivated reasoning) led him to favor, despite some disfavoring
findings, the empirical presence of predecisional selectivity.  









 exposure studies resulted in a serious pessimism about 




sional or postdecisional processing. We frequently encounter a problematic 
situation wherein we hold a strong preference for or avoidance of a certain outcom
(e.g., curing my beloved one’s disease). It often leads us to selectively pursue information 
that can enhance our subjective confidence and sustain hope for the desired end. At time
we selectively forage for information to increase self-fulfilling confidence while 
suspending a final judgment (predecisional selectivity). At other times, we selectively 
collect information to reinforce a previous conclusion (postdecisional selectivity). 
Communicant selectiveness regarding information behavior, therefore could occur, either 
in a predecisional or in a postdecisional way.  
Reinforcement account versus relevance account. Freedman and Sears’ (1965, 
1967) reviews of selective
ve dissonance theory because it had failed to generate empirical support t
ical claims. Sears and Freedman (1967) pointed out: “It is enough to say that th
[from testing hypotheses derived from cognitive dissonance theory] are agai
al” (p. 208) and “there is no consistent result in this research” (p. 207). Feather 
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(1962, 
information than were nonsmokers. Brock (1965) failed to find clear support for selective 
exposure in his partial replication of what Feather (1962, 1963) had found. Freedman 
(1965) even found a strong preference for non-supporting information among those who 
experienced dissonance.  
Sears and Freedman (1967) reviewed this literature and concluded that: 
… a considerable amount of experimental research has uncovered no general 
nces, 
people seem to prefer information that supports their opinions; under other 
ns. 
In no way can the available evidence be said to support the contention that people 
rmation.  
(p. 212)  
However, Sears and Freedman (1967) also noted the existence of some “de facto 
selectivity.” “Most audiences for mass communications apparently tend to over-represent 
persons already sympathetic to the views being propounded, and most persons seem to be 
exposed disproportionately to communications that support their opinions” (p. 212). They 
took it as “paradoxical” and questioned: “How can it be that people are in fact selective, 
yet display no trace of a general preference for supportive information?” (Sears & 
Freedman, 1967, p. 212). More recently, Chaffee et al. (2001) found that selectivity 
increases both in “counter-attitudinal” and “attitude-consistent” directions if a 
communicant becomes active for a problematic situation. The prediction of the direction 
in which one’s selectivity moves is inconsistent in their views. In brief, Chaffee et al. 
(2001) tested and found some support for the conclusion that the more people are 
involved, the more information they seek in both directions.  
1963) found that smokers were more interested in both consonant and dissonant 
psychological preference for supportive information. Under some circumsta
circumstances, people seem to prefer information that contradicts their opinio
generally seek out supportive information and avoid nonsupportive info
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Earlier, Carter, Pyszka, and Guerrero (1969) presented strong experimental 
evidence that selectivity can be in an opposite direction. They found from three 
experiments that whereas there was equal selectivity under a control group, two-thirds of 
the participants in a “dissonance” condition chose to read an essay countering their 
favored position as the personal relevance increased. Carter et al. (1969) interpreted tha
result as suggesting that dissonance should be reformulated “simply as perceived 
cognitive discrepancy” so that avoidance would just be one possible communicative 
reaction en route
t 
 to discrepancy reduction. This finding tells us the concomitant presence 







ersal” selectivity with confirmatory selectivity, unlike what dissonance theory had
suggested. Dissonance theory adheres to the notion that “preservation of current beli
the only communicative goal in a dissonant situation (i.e., a pseudo problem solving). In 
contrast, what Carter et al. (1969) suggested was more general. At times, preservation of 
current beliefs can become irrelevant if one’s perceived involvement with a problematic 
state is high. Under such a circumstance, one would perceive the revision of curr
beliefs as more relevant. At other times, preservation of current belief would be more 
relevant for situational reasons (e.g., high constraints against embarking on 
 efforts) and thus looking for information increases confidence in one’s cur
beliefs.  
Unlike the prior reinforcement account, Carter et al.’s (1969) relevance account 
better explained why some selective communication happens. Its major premise is: 
Communicants select some information over other information because of its subjectively
defined relevance. Subjectively defined relevance in using information suggests that one’s 
judgment about information relevance depends on whether the communicant finds som
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utility after due consideration of problem-solving conditions (e.g., constraints). 
Subjectively defined suggests that the perceived relevance by the communicant could be 
fairly different among communicants even if they have the same problem.  










a communicant can reduce discrepancy via any method—
i.e., by r by 
imation of situational constraints. However, a given communicant’s judgment is
the most important, no matter how biased it is, because one translates one’s perceptio
action. What matters is the value defined by the eyes of beholder. Thus, at one time, a 
communicant would avoid dissonant information, not because it is unbearably dissonan
but because the person felt it is less relevant to the task of problem solving. In other cases,
one would approach some dissonance-causing information because he or she f
levant to his of her effort to solve a problem. I adopt the relevance account as a 
more general explanation for selective exposure. In contrast to the reinforcement acco
(e.g., dissonance theory), relevance explains not only the old findings but also e
other selection types such as reversal selective strategy. 
The relevance account thus becomes a general explanation. Whereas cognitive 
dissonance theory adopted a reinforcement explanation, the present study will use a 
relevance explanation wherein reinforcing and revising strategies can be explained by 
single account. It allows that 
pseudo problem solving (e.g., selective exposure to reinforcing information) o
genuine problem solving (e.g., selective exposure to reforming information).  
Whereas selective attention is a more ethereal approach to reducing a dissonant 
state (e.g., by deflecting one’s perception of environmental conditions), the problem 
solving approach is a more material approach to reduce perceived discrepancy 
 49
permanently (e.g., by bending one’s course of action to fit into environmental condit
However, both app
ions). 







 orients one to be more selective—i.e., to pursue a specific subset 
of infor he 
 one has 
nce 
 
, the information one selects plays the role of augmenting subjective confidence 
either by strengthening a current belief (attempted solution) or by constructing a new 
belief (attempted solution).  
However, the reinforcing approach is a self-fulfilling strategy resulting from 
situational constraints and/or from a self-serving referent criterion (i.e., wishful or will
thinking on the outcome state). On the other hand, the revising approach is a more self-
reforming strategy through which communicants are free from situational constraints and
have less of a self-serving referent criterion. The choice of a problem-dealing strate
closely associated with the extent of constraint recognition and strength and type of 
referent criterion.  
In both cases, communicants travel the path from general to specific, from random 
to systematic, and from related to relevant in dealing with information corresponding to
the level of communicant activeness. A communicant’s heightened situational mo
toward problem solving
mation to fit into the specific characteristic of the given problem content. T
content of a referent criterion, its magnitude of influence, and the extent of situational 
constraints explain the type of information specificity. For example, if one’s problem is 
to anticipate a political discussion with opponents, he or she would use a revising 
selectivity to better attack an opponent’s view and defend his or her own view. If
unmanageably high situational constraints in a given problematic situation (e.g., prese
of another urgent problem), he or she would use a reinforcing selectivity. Or, if one has a
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strong decisional reference readily applicable to the current problem (e.g., knowledge 
carried from past problem solving of a similar kind), he or she would again use a 
ith 




us scrutinize the influence of 
reinforcing selectivity. 
To summarize, some situational parameters such as referent criterion and 
constraint recognition jointly lead communicants to be more or less selective as well as to 
turn to specific directional information in a given problematic situation. Thus, one who is 
devoted to a position would situationally pursue more countering information regardless 
of the current stance one favors. The same person could be a partisan pursuer of 
information who only keeps cognitive poise under serious commitment to a priority. 
However, at any rate, the strict and exclusive association of selective directionality w
only avoidance
s, is theoretically and empirically less tenable. 
Emerging Communicant Selectiveness during Problem Solving 
 It is easy to be open and generous in taking information when we feel little 
connection (e.g., a small stake) to an issue the information is about. However, we tend to 
develop some needs and find a certain method to discriminate information when it begins 
to interrupt one’s routine commitments to other life problems. People without much of 
stake either become generous and open-minded or less caring and indiscriminant abou
information that comes in and out of their minds. They feel little difficulty in permitting 
any position, opinion, or information to enter unless they perceive something being 
problematic.  
In contrast, people with high stakes (e.g., highly motivated people) need to 










from the want of time and wit to pursue it all. There is just too much material. The 
stacks… I would drown, or panic, and certainly lose my way.  (pp. 29-30; as cited 
 
e “send an assistant to 
get it so
94). He
esearching, despite some potential relevance, which he thinks might be redundant and 
low in quality. Such “nonuse” (Wilson, 1996) or “filtering” (Case, 2002) commonly 
expedites, rather than distracts, from a given problem solving process.  
Similarly, Wilson (1995) observed and advocated efficiency and rationality in 
filtering out information—a “nonuse policy”—that is necessary when one is given more 
information than one could absorb (Wilson, 1995, pp. 45-46). To avoid being engulfed by 
tion more carefully (positive or negative, supporting or refuting). Thus, they often
 selective as a result of increased seriousness of a problem. Notably, when people
 more active in proble
information to enter their minds. Although we know that being open to take, interpret, 
and give information is more desirable in problem solving, various reasons (e.g., too 
much seemingly important information) prohibit us from remaining open and gene
dealing with information. Thus, selecting a manageable subset of useful information out
of would-be useful information is a necessary but challenging task to communicants. 
Perrow (1989) observed what an active researcher—who is a pro
oes in taking information during research: 
I require libraries to hide most of the literature so that I will not become delirious 
problem is not access, it is the reverse, containment….Were I now to browse the 
in Case, 2002, p. 94) 
Perrow (1989) confessed that when he needs books and articles, h
 that he will not be distracted by adjacent materials” (as cited in Case, 2002, p. 
 wants the assistant to keep him away from the literature in the areas he is 
r
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a large supply of relevant information we make and apply rules in managing the 
information we face. Perrow (1989) added a similar observation: 
“foreign” contributions, ignore contributions from identifiable schools and 
styles or with particular approaches (p. 199; as cited in Case, 2002, p. 95) 
Throughout problem solving, communicants tend to create some discriminatory 
rules to guide judgments that will be included and excluded. Case (2002) sharply 
distinguished such information “filtering” from “avoidance.” Information is often “not 
avoided but rather simply not used” (Case, 2002, p. 95). Although using discriminatory 
rules could lower the quality of information, it can, at least, solve the problem of 
information overload—a meta-problem of problem solving.  In summary, as a 
communicant becomes active, information selection or specification is heightened. In the 
following, I will discuss more closely sources, types, and strategies of communicant 
selectiveness.  
Defining information selection. Communicants with some heightened situational 
need for information soon would face another problem. Because active foraging of data 
often results in a huge pile of information that would surpass one’s cognitive capacity and 
cognitive capability (Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999), managing information effectively 
to build a solution to the problem is a meta-problem one must deal with. As Evans noted 
(Evans, 1989; Evans & Over, 1996), one often must reduce an overwhelming amount of 
candidate data in the problem solving task. Indeed, just as the absence of available 
knowledge is a serious problem, the abundance of available knowledge is an equally 
challenging problem—i.e., the embarrassment of riches. Hence, I conceptualize the 
problem of information reduction as another source of communicative selectiveness that 
Large literatures may be cut down drastically: one may ignore the past, ignore 
traditions of thought…ignore work done with certain techniques or in particular 
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communicants use in taking, interpreting, and giving information. In summary, during a 
problematic situation, there is a tradeoff between quantity and quality of would
information. As the available poo
-be 
l of data increases, a need for related and more 











tion turns into a need for relevant but less information—a contradictor
a narrowing down mechanism.  
Naturally, we carry out information taking, evaluating, and giving “in a highly 
selective manner using some form of heuristic process” (Evans, 1989, p. 112). We 
adaptively opt for a strategy of selective search to increase the range of viable alternative
solutions. In the present model, therefore, I define information selection as the degree of 
pursuing specificity evolving from random to systematic, from general to specific, and 
from related to relevant in dealing with data corresponding to a communicant’s
activeness. The two general sources of communicant selectiveness arise from the problem
of reducing cognitive discrepancy and/or the problem of reducing a surplus of 
information in problem solving.  
Selection types. I use the terms, information selection and information 
specification, interchangeably in this stud
 (i.e., counter to or consistent with current belief), I mean that a communican
becomes selective if one develops some preference for a certain subset of informatio
pursuit of problem resolution. Communicants develop more confidence in some subse
of information. The direction of information a communicant will pursue (e.g., avoiding
seeking dissonant information) is associated with type and magnitude of referent crit
as well as the level of constraint recognition. However, in the current model of 
communicant activeness, predicting direction of information specificity (i.e., selectivi
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expressed either counter to or consistent with current belief) matters less than predicting
the magnitude of information se
 
lectivity. Regardless of the direction of information 









ity, we can impose a single conceptual dimension of the extent of selec
the direction of information selectivity.  
In other words, I conceptualize reinforcing selectivity (i.e., what dissonanc
theory predicts) and revising selectivity as being functionally equivalent in reducin
cognitive discrepancy and the amount of information. Communicants at times prefer
supporting information while avoiding nonsupporting information; at other times they 
prefer nonsupporting while avoiding supporting information corresponding to their 
choice of problem solving approach. What then is common around such contradictory 
tendencies is the pursuit of specificity of certain information over other information, 
which depends on the communicant’s own meaning and definition of relevance for the 
given task—problem solving.  
The direction of content material can be attitude-consistent or attitude-
inconsistent, but the magnitude of specificity
l. Just as pro-life and pro-choice activists can fall into a single variable of 
activeness or partisanship, the degree of pursuing specificity in taking and givin
information can merge the duality of contents (e.g., seeking supporting vs. seeking 
nonsupporting information) into a singular concept—i.e., information selectivity. Hence
we can reinterpret the contradictory tendencies as a common way such that the more 
active the communicant is the more one becomes selective or specific in consuming and 
sharing information with others. In other words, there is no reason to view selectivity as 
patently associated with “a general preference for supportive information” only (Sea
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Freedman, 1967, p. 212). Rather, communicants develop a need for pursuing specifi
in whatever way they perceive to be subjectively relevant, either to reduce cognitive 
discrepancy or the amount of information.  
After divorcing direction of selectivity from magnitude of selectivity, we can 
develop a more general concept of communicant selectiveness in dealing with 
information. This is a good way to solve the
city 





ategy. Once a communicant finds he or she has an important problem 
but doe
g 
ective, yet display no trace of a general preference for supportive information?” 
(Sears & Freeman, 1967, p. 212). When we stripped the direction of selectivity from the
presence of selectivity, the paradoxical two conclusions (i.e., contradictory empirical 
findings regarding information selectivity) noted by Sears and Freedman (1967) can be 
reconciled. If a communicant decides to revise a prior expectation, he or she would 
ignore information consistent with beliefs or pursue information countering beliefs 
because it is more relevant to the situation. If a communicant decides to reinforce a prior 
expectation, he or she would pursue specific information reaffirming current belief 
because it is relevant to meeting the goal of problem resolution. Because such a need f
specificity arises situationally, one crucial question is: Under which conditions does s
selectivity in communicant behavior arise. 
Selection str
s not have adequate knowledge internally, he or she starts an external search to 
find a workable solution to the problem. In general, at earlier phases of problem-solvin
efforts, communicants adopt an adding strategy. By an adding strategy, communicants 
attempt to collect any information that is perceived to be related to the problem.  By 
using an inclusive strategy that selects information indiscriminately, communicants can 
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generate copious amounts of potential information in a relatively short period o
terms of goal concepts, this suggests that in earlier phases, the most important goal 
recognizing a serious problem is to build a solution. However, when a person finds a 
shortage of relevant knowledge, it creates another problem of problem solving. This 
meta-problem thus creates a subordinate goal of gathering information applicable to 
finding a solution.  








s natural consequence of earlier covetousness) to the primary 
To provide enough information grist for the cognitive mill, communicants w
forage for as much potentially useful information as possible. Again, in terms of go
concepts, this task is a meta-goal or instrumental goal that facilitates the achievement of
the superior goal—problem solving. However, at some point, problem solvers encoun
another kind of meta-problem. By using an inclusive strategy, communicants tend t
through a threshold of adequate would-be information. Problem solvers find it 
increasingly difficult to manage the information pool they collect. It then taxes the 
problem solver’s cognitive capabilities enough to threaten the investment of cognitive 
resources to the primary goal—problem solving. Hence, at a later phase, communicants 
begin to adopt a removing strategy that takes information only when it is relevant—i.e
an only if strategy.  
To solve a new meta-problem of information inflation, one starts to reduce 
cognitive complexity caused by earlier covetousness in acquiring information. To 
illustrate with goals concepts, two situational goals begin to compete in recruiting 
necessary cognitive resources for meeting goals at a later phase of problem solving. 








sidiary to the 






nal goal, problem resolution. Hence, as a compromise, a communicant shifts one
informational behavioral strategy from increasing complexity of the cognitive pool—
increasing quantity of available information— to reduction of cognitive complexity b
being miserly and stringent in selecting information to be added. Communicants thus 
become more aesthetic and selective—connoisseur-like—as they pick up informati
only if it meets certain criteria. In other words, communicants now seek cogn
competence in problem solving rather than cognitive complexity that is sub
primary goal of a situation. The rule that emerges in co
d inating information should change from vaguely alluding to specifically referring, 
from randomly encountered to systematically located, and from remotely related to 
closely relevant.  
In summary, problem solvers pursue available information at the earlier phase, 
whereas they pursue applicable information at the later phase of problem solving.
judging criterion evolves during a problematic situation. It in turn guides subsequent 
information acquisition and transmission toward resolution of the problem. This explain
why information selection occurs in the continuum toward higher communicative 
activity—i.e., the higher communicant activeness, the greater selectivity in 
communicative actions (information acquisition and transmission).  
Information Permitting and Information Forefending  
An active communicant exhibits selectivity not only through selective intake and
outtake of information but also by selectively interpreting and producing information. 
Specifically, information selection will be observable in selective consumption, 
production (or interpretation), and propagation of certain information that fits well into 
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referent criterion a communicant holds for a problematic situation. I break down 
information selection conceptually into two distinct states of communicative activene
The higher state of information selection is information forefending, the lower state of 
information selection is information permitting. Forefending information means advance 
or prior warding off or resisting information. These are parallel to the proactive (more 
active) and reactive (less active) information acquisition (information seeking and 
processing) and information transmission (information forwarding and sharing).  
In taking and giving information pertaining to a problem, communicants te









                                                
tion forefending as an active communicative feature of information selection. A
a problematic situation continues, some forethought or discriminatory referent criterion
emerges whereby communicants solve problematic situations by reducing cognitive 
discrepancy or information. In other words, the more active a communicant within a 
problematic situation, the more one develops some forethought in evaluation of data to 
construct a solution (i.e., external data information) and in evaluation of knowledge
give out to other communicants (i.e., internal knowledge information). The foretho
or discriminatory referent criterion helps communicants organize the search process for 
related information and to sort out the irrelevant from the relevant. It not only provid
some preliminary familiarity with data that will be evaluated but also provides an 
organizing frame wherein a wide but related range of information can be hosted.5
 
5 A need for forethought arises from information abundance—i.e., active communicants tend to have more 
information sources and thus more cognitive knowledge available. An active communicant’s decision and 
solution building derives from the “composite of all information” they learn (J. Grunig, 1997, p. 25). To 
make a decision and to compose a solution, thus, an active communicant develops a strong need for an 
effective reduction mechanism. Some evaluative lens or referent criteria evolve therefore.  
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Whether a communicant applies a discriminatory criterion in judging the value 










ve processes. The process could be preconscious if one has brought a strong 
decision rule, or guiding principle, carried from prior situations, or a strong desire 
end state (e.g., parent’s willful thinking to cure one’s ill child). In such instances, he or
she will use the decision rule to evaluate the relevance of given information without 
consciously evaluating. At other times, communicants would not have such a cross-
situational decision rule or guiding principle—encountering a problem requiring a novel 
solution. As a result, one has to deal with more information and thus find a need to 
reduce it to expedite the process of problem solving. Hence, as the problematic situation 
continues, communicants tend to better train themselves in evaluating the utility of 
information by developing a set of criteria (e.g., reliable sources, topics, or content areas
to distinguish and sort out the influx of candidate information
In contrast, communicants tend to not discriminate information if they are not 
active regarding the problem. They do not commit to any specific judging criteria 
because of problem irrecognition. Such communicants behave in an ill-guided and ill-
focused manner in taking and giving information. In dealing with information, they are 
random, general, and pursuing of mere relation; they are not specific, systematic, 
pursuing of relevance. In the absence of information judging criteria, the less active 
communicant is, the more one is lenient in evaluating information so as to consider 
merely related information to be potentially useful. Thus, less active communicants of
little value to an information provider because they are painfully nonchalant, their minds
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are crowded by too much irrelevant information, or they are incompetent in sorting out 
applicable information from that which is simply available.  
 Because I postulate that the heightened perception of a problematic situatio
higher problem recognition and a high percepti
n (e.g., 
on of involvement to a problem) increases 
 of being problematic 
would 
a newly  
compos
motiva he person to be permissive, which is 
indifferenc oid 
being  a 
side. Th urce, 
 
nformation Selection, Transmission, and Acquisition:  
blem Solving 
the activeness of situational communication, a weak perception
elicit a lower need for revising/reforming a current solution or lower confidence in 
 emerging solution. For the former case, the person feels less provoked to
e a new solution, meaning that a less active communicant has little internal 
tion to think about a problem. This leads t
e: e.g., “I don’t care whatever it says.” For the latter, the person can av
 explicit because of the absence of any committable solution, thereby not taking
is leads him or her to be permissive, which is diffidence. Regardless of the so
that is, indifference or diffidence, I here postulate that people under lower magnitudes in 
situational-perceptual parameters will be more permissive in their communication 
behavior, whereas those higher in situational-perceptual parameters will be more 
forefending in their communicative behavior.  
 In sum, regarding communicant selectivity I postulate: 
The greater the communicant activeness, the more the communicative behavior is
systematic, specific, and pursuing of relevance. In contrast, the lesser the 
communicant activeness, the more the communicative behavior is random, 
general, and pursuing of mere relation.   
Integration of I
A Catchall Conceptual Model of Communicant Activeness in Pro
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Communicant activeness in problem solving is the central concept that bring 
together three communicative behavioral dimensions: information selection, transmission, 
and acquisition. The construct, communicant activeness, here becomes the integrative 
glue that binds together six variables about information behaviors. The major premise is 
that the more a communicant becomes active for a problem resolution, the greater the 
communicant becomes selective, emissive, and acquisitive for information related to the 
problem. Specifically, as communicant activeness increases, a communicant does more 
information forefending, forwarding, and seeking. As communicant activeness decreases, 
a communicant does more information permitting, sharing, and processing. Figure 4 and 
5 summarize the major premise of communicant activeness and three dimensions of 
informational behavior.  




Figure 5: A model of communicant activeness in problem solving. 
 
I define six subdimensions of informational behavior that are correlated with each other. 
In factor analytic terms, the six dimensions of communicant activeness are correlated 
with the construct of communicant activeness. Information permitting, sharing, and 
processing indicate reactiveness in communicant activeness, whereas information seeking, 
forefending, and forwarding indicate proactiveness in communicant activeness. These 
dimensions conceptually tap different levels of communicative activeness (e.g., liking vs. 
absence of liking). Therefore, the greater the communicant activeness, the more likely are 
reactiveness and proactiveness indicators to both be strongly present. In contrast, the less 
communicant activeness, the more likely it is that only reactive indicators are present.  
H1: The higher the communicant activeness in problem solving, the higher the 
H2: The higher the communicant activeness in problem solving, the higher the 





H4: The higher the communicant activeness in problem solving, the higher the 
H5: The higher the communicant activeness i
information sharing. 




Two Phases of Situational Communicant Activeness: Inquiring and Effectuating Phases 
 I sequentially break down communicant behavior during a problematic situation 
into an inquiring phase and effectuating phase. By an inquiring phase, I refer to 
communicant’s activeness that is salient in composing—i.e., exploring, investigating, and 
delving into—a solution. By an effectuating phase, I refer to a communicant’s activeness 
in carrying into effect a solution that is to be selected. As a communicant’s activeness 
continues to solve a problem, the communicant shifts his or her focus from information 
acquisition to information transmission and selection. At the early stage of 
 the 
on 
H6: The higher the communicant activeness in problem solving, the higher the 
communicative behavior in a problematic situation, problem solvers invest their 
communicative resources primarily to extend the pool of usable knowledge and 
information. Sooner or later, problem solvers reach a level of subjective confidence in
quantity and quality of information and knowledge they have gathered. Once saturated 
with information, a communicant feels fatigue in increasing his or her information 
inventory. Hence, one’s wealth of relevant information toward a given situational 
problem bolsters selectivity in managing—processing, producing, and propagating—
information during a problematic situation. Thus, a subjective conception of informati
saturation leads one to the effectuating phase—investing communicative resources in 
applying and carrying out a solution. This is a turning point from the inquiring phase to 
the effectuating phase. To illustrate the two phases, I offer the sequence model of 
communicant activeness shown in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6: Sequence model of communicant activeness. 
  Once we detect a problem, we seek a solution internally. Human beings have a 
general tendency to record and transfer their successful experience of problem solving—
i.e., knowledge—to other similar problems. Thus, one’s own memory is the first stop 
when one recognizes a problem. If one’s effort for knowledge activation results in some 
solution that is available, applicable, and having judged usability (Higgins, 1996), she or 
he can immediately move into the effectuating stage—carrying into effect the available, 
applicable, and usable solution. I call such an initial retrieval effort for knowledge and 
information recollection from past situations the internal inquiring stage. If the initial 
internal retrieval efforts are not successful, one turns to external sources. External sources 
could be any one in one’s communicant networks as well as any medium or database that 
could provide knowledge and information related to a given problem. I name such 
external collection stage the external inquiring stage.   
 Should one’s inquiring efforts be successful, the communicant transfers oneself 
from information consumer to information supplier. That is, the more one is active in 
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taking information about something, the greater the communicant is likely to give 
information as a result because he or she is now likely to have certain ‘solutions’ of one’s 
own (i.e., a new revised referent criterion as the outcome). As noted earlier, information 
transmission contributes to problem solving in many ways (e.g., resource mobilization
Notably, such a new perspective (consisting of a new revised referent criterion or solu
for the problem) is likely to drive information seeking and forwarding in a more selectiv
way (i.e., as consistent with his or her new revised solution/referent criterion). Figure 6 
captures this sequential shift of focus by its differential curves. As seen in the figu
information acquisition increases first and information selection and information 
transmission follow next. 
 To summarize, in the inquiring phase, we can observe more information 
permitting in processing and seeking possible solutions. The transition from the inqu
phase to the effectuating phase is demarcated by the perceived information saturation











rease his or her ability to deal with the problem. However, this threshold point can 
be hastily reached—i.e., shortened—by external pressure (e.g., if immediate action is 
necessary). 
In the effectuating phase, we can observe more information forefending in 
processing, seeking, sharing, and forwarding. To do something about a problem (i.
reduce a negative consequence from the given problem), one now should endorse a 
specific solution. That is, the problem solver finalizes a certain inferential rule, solution, 
or treatment that has developed and emerged from the inquiring phase. Such endorsemen
and finalizing of a proposal for a certain solution (at least temporarily until one 
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encounters a new problematic situation in which the chosen solution is not effective)
transitory process of wedging (i.e., decisive and committing to one conclusion) from
hedging (i.e., indecisive and dividing risks by considering more than one options) (J. 
Grunig & Stamm, 1979). Now the selectiveness of information acquisition increases—
that is, the communicant selectively seeks and forwards information that better supports, 
reinforces, and elaborates the endorsed solution. A wedged solution becomes an 
evaluative lens through which any information is interpreted subsequently. That becomes 
a new referent criterion (decision rule) for subsequent problems of t
 is a 
 
he same kind. Under 
nquiring), a person’s activeness in communication behavior is mainly expressed 
er phase II 
(effectuating), a person’s activeness in communication 
info mission a refending.  
Finally, the sequence m ceptua pirically distingu
to differentiate between active and 






in terms of information acquisition and more permitting. In contrast, und
behavior appears in terms of 
rmation trans nd more fo
odel helps to con lly and em ish 
between active and activist publics. The easiest way 
activist publics is to say that activist publics have far stronger beliefs and actions. 
However, according to CAPS we can meaningfully and usefully distinguish the two, 
active and activist publics, the most important targets of communication in public 
relations. The newer dimensions of information transmission and selection
conceptually distinguish between an active public and activist publics. Previous
ld only distinguish activist publics as more active in problem solving than active 
. However, now we can conceptually articulate that activist publics are more 
n that they are more selective and more emissive. Activist publics attempt to 
transfuse their way of problem definition as well as a solution proposal. In contrast, 
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active publics are selective but relatively less emissive. They tend to approach problems 
individually rather than collectively.  In short, active publics are those communica
who are more effortful in information acquisition. Thus, they are in the inquiring phase in 
the sequential continuum. In contrast, activist publics are those communicants who are 
more effortful in information transmission. Hence, they are in the effectuating phase w
stronger transmission and selectivity than active publics (Table 2). 
Table 1  
Phases of Communicant Activeness and Active and Activist Publics 
  Type of Public (Communicant) 
nts 
ith 
 Active Public  Activist Public 
Inquiring Yes No 
Phases of Acting 




Selectivity in the Inquiring and Effectuating Phases 
 We tend to believe that obtaining some information obligates a communicant to 
believe, feel, or behave in the way the information dictates (Thayer, 1987). However,
exposure to some information does not always elicit informed behavior consistent with 




ly are people told that taking drugs and smoking are ultimately bad for 
alth, they can observe this fact in the world around them; those 
 
observations, however, often do not result in less consumption of harmful 
substances. As Sears and Freedman pointed out, failure to act on information is
often due less to selective exposure than to a rejection of information with which 
we disagree: Perhaps resistance to influence is accomplished most often and most 
successfully at the level of information evaluation, rather than at the level of 
seeking and avoiding of information. (pp. 93-94).  
 
I explain such inconsistency in communication effect as a difference between what 
information content suggests and what the information acquirer would interpret or how 
he or she would behave by the communicant’s selectivity—specifically selective 
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evaluation or interpretation. When a problem holder concludes that a solution, regardless 
of its choice from merits or from effects, she or he is more likely to communicate with 
clarity (i.e., specific information) than with confusion. A communicant with a chosen 
problem solving method tends to assign cognitive and communicative resources toward 
effectuating rather than inquiring about a solution. He or she shifts problem solving 
efforts from constructing a workable solution to enacting it. Hence, we often find that 
communicative selectivity is more salient in the dimension of information transmission: 
unicants who are more forwarding are also more forefending. Communicants 
attemp
n 





given information as consistent with a personal referent criterion (e.g., the patient would 
interpret his doctor’s serious warning as indicative of a professional cliché.). For example, 
i.e., comm
t to effectuate—forward a problem paired with their preferred solution—by 
forming a collective around the problem. This happens because communicants can share 
the cost of problem resolution with other problem holders. In addition, communicants ca
facilitate the problem solving process by mobilizing more resources fr
ate a solution is in essence to produce and propagate a set of information so as to 
mobilize other problem solvers’ potential resources by information selection and 
transmission. 
 Relative to salience of communicative selectivity in information transmission, 
communicant selectivity is less noticeable in information acquisition. A primary reason
because information acquirers have little control over providers of content materials. 
During the information acquisition period, information solicitors have little influen
information contents (e.g., a patient cannot hear what he wants to hear from his
about his illness.). Instead, information acquirers can control the way of interpreting the 
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audiences have little power when they are watching TV programs even if some contents 
are distasteful. Thus, active liberal voters and active conservative voters are not differen
in the way and extent of information acquisition—e.g., diligently watching the same TV
debate. However, they often express their views differently in their interpretations
drawing starkly different conclusions about who won a presidential debate.  
Summary 
Information selection refers to one’s selectiveness in dealing with—consuming
producing, and propagating—information. Specifically, I conceptualize that information










ant activeness in problem solving (CAPS) predicts that heightened motivation 
will lea n) 
ssion will be more selective during forwarding than sharing.6  
The more a communicant becomes active, the more one would become selective 
in his or her communicative behaviors. In addition, I postulate that selectiveness should 
be stronger in information giving than information taking. Next, Information transmission 
refers to the extent of imparting information about a problem one perceives. At some 
point of information consumption, one is likely to develop a good deal of inform
inventory about a problem. This in turn motivates a communicant to have a greater sen
of informative connoisseurship and opinion strength. A communicant’s endeavor 
increases self-confidence and commitment to the solution one has developed. 
Communic
d a person to transmit information (e.g., about a problem with a loaded solutio
willingly and voluntarily to others. Information transmission can be a functional act to 
                                                 
6 Information sharing and forwarding are used here in a slightly different way from common usages of th
words. In brief, forwarding is proactive communicant behavior (e.g., voluntary and willful transmission a
e 
nd 
transfusion to an intended segment of people) regarding a certain problem, whereas sharing is reactive 
communicant behavior (e.g., simply being responsive when solicited).  
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resolve a problem directly (e.g., mobilization of resources). Or it can be a humanitarian 
act to reduce negative consequences among neighboring communicants. Finally, 
information acquisition refers to extent of one’s desire to accumulate information re
to a problematic state. A communicant is more likely to satisfy his or her information 
appetite corresponding to the level of his or her epistemic motivation. The situational 
theory of publics has set this aspect of communicative behavior as default endogen
variables to be accounted for. 
CAPS postulates two phases of situational communicative activeness as the 
inquiring phase and effectuating phase. The inquiring phase is highlighted by informa
acquisition to carve out a workable solution(s) as its feat of communicative action. Yet,
information transmission and information selection are not salient at this period. How











The commun is, a period in 
which he or she translates preferred beliefs, opinion, or solution into action. At this phase, 
one experiments with a chosen solution or belief (e.g., an opinion) to the problem and 
becomes an exponent, although not permanently, to the epistemic conclusion resulting 
from a prior inquiring phase. One can still amend a favored solution even when it is put 
in force. However, consuming information for amendment in the effectuating phase is not 
uiring phase becomes dominant features at the effectuating phase. Early 
indulgence to relevant information will elate the communicant enough to apply one’s 
alleged solution to the problem. A certain level of self-confidence from the knowledge
accumulation ends one’s need for more information before doing something ab
ation.  





or the role 
                                         
o be permissive or indiscriminant as in the inquiring phase. Now, one has a 
preconceived view. Communicants are now prepossessed by a chosen solution and are 
likely to forefend—i.e., to be selective—in acquiring information until experimentation 
provides irresistible evidence of the malfunction of the favored solution—another 
problem recognition. At the effectuating phase, increasing the communicant’s 
selectiveness is more rewarding to him or her than a balancing neutral effort, in contra
to in the exploratory, inquiring stage. It would be easier to find a flaw in a composed 
solution by being partisan to it,7 by recruiting helping hands and resources to work out 
the solution, and magnifying “acting-out” energy in translating a composed solution 
within one’s situational constraints. 
Next, I turn to another new variable, cognitive entrepreneurship in problem 
solving. With it, we can observe that problem solvers use different mental approaches 
following different problem perceptions across situations. I offer a model to describe
those differential mindsets in problem solving in next section of this chapter.  
A MODEL OF COGNITIVE ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN PROBLEM SOLVING 
Life is lived forward but understood backward. 
Søren Kierkegaard  
We believe our will or intention precedes an act. We would be bewildered if 
someone told us that “we first did a certain action and next understood what we did.”  
Why is such a claim so offensive to us?  Perhaps it is due to our deep respect f
        
7 In the effectuating stage, we tend to develop more contents for conjecturing (to be tested) carrying from 
the inqui ind 
must con res 
selectivity. Molding a proper and durable solution to a problem requires being painstakingly persistent in 
repeating such an ostentatious experimentation until reaching an irrefutable state.  
ring stage. As a consequence we are likely to practice selective communication. The human m
jecture to know the utility or veracity of an idea. This conjecturing procedure inherently requi
our minds to commit or feign commitment to an idea as though useful and veracious at least momentarily, 
even though not assured and unknown. Such a commitment, although momentary or pretended, is 
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of our will in an act.  We dwell on the thought that we are the master of our own life and 
that we take control our own actions.  We live so deeply in a rational decision-making
tradition that it seems that every important decision we make must be intended by us 
beforehand.  The decision-making process flows unilaterally from a deliberative pro
concerning what we will do to a subsequent action (decision), not vice versa.  Altho
could be extremely short or even unconscious, any given conclusion of judgment ought to 
be preceded by some degree of will or intention.  
However, in this section I will theorize our mental process with a counterintuitive
assumption that our action or judgmental conclusion made during a problematic situation












choice [italics added],” little research effort has been made to study the phenomena of 
tualize a bilateral sequence between cognitive efforts and decision making (e.g., a
decision precedes cognitive efforts about the decision).  Even further, I contend not only 
that intention at times has no place in our cognitive working process, but also that such
counterintuitive sequence from an action to cognitive working (e.g.,  intention) is our
default cognitive approach, which we take routinely.  In what follows, I will discuss how 
the sequence of cognitive efforts and decision making can often be reversed.  
Inferential Order in Problem Solving  
I conceptualize two directional flows between decision-making and cognitive 
working in problematic situations as forward reasoning and backward reasoning.  Brehm 
(1956) once raised the issue of understanding “what happens after the choice” (p. 38
Although much research has been done regarding “the phenomena that lead up to the 
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reversal (Brehm, 1956, p. 384).  More recently, Frey (1986) in his classic review
selective exposure to info
 of 








oning.  For this reason, both reasoning 
strategies play a functionally equivalent role in the mind.  A person who suffers from an 
tion does not cease once a decision is made.  Rather, this search continues durin
a postdecisional period during which the person confronts and weighs the various 
decision alternatives and their respective advantages and disadvantages [italics added]” 
(pp. 41-42).  As Brehm (1956) and Frey (1986) said, research on the phenomena of 
problem solvers are cognitively working before and after a choice made is a significant 
area of inquiry.  
Underlying the common research focus on predecisional cognitive efforts is t
normative belief that people should behave in a rational way.  R
ly the wisdom that “there is no use crying over spilled milk”—i.e., little can be 
done after making a decision.  However, regardless of such normative influences on 
theorizing about choice situations and cognitive working, we often observe that we are 
“crying over spilled milk.”  People make cognitive efforts after making a choice. Such 
postdecisional mental elaboration has no effect on the given choice, especially when a 
problem solver enacts a chosen solution for the problematic situation.  Putting aside the 
issue of how we can make a better normative theory, in the present section of this chapte
I will conceptualize both approaches of predecisional and postdecisional cognitive 
working.   In other words, I build a descriptive theory—i.e., sketch a process—about
illative orders between a problem solver’s cognitive labor and the drawing of a 
judgmental conclusion.  
Human beings are pragmatic in their reas
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urces and efforts in 
relation ognitive effort to construct, 
define, t among possible solutions 







ion of mice at home does not discriminate between the colors of his 
long as they reduce the number of mice. In a similar sense, the directionality of the 
reasoning process does not matter to problem solvers as long as it generates a work
solution.  However, to devise a way to improve problem solving in general, we need to
know under what conditions one adopts which reasoning strategy and how well the
chosen cognitive strategy supports effective problem solving.  
What is the major distinction between backward and forward reasoning sequen
I answer that it is how a problem solver uses his or her cognitive reso
 to a conclusion.  In the forward strategy, one invests c
 and compare solutions as broadly as possible, and selec
gard to their merits.  Thus, one’s selection of a solution
t of one’s available cognitive resources.  In contrast, in the backward strategy, one 
invests cognitive effort to construct, define, and select a best justification for an already
chosen conclusion.  Thus, one’s selection occurs before using up most of one’s cognitiv
resources.  In other words, a backward reasoner invests most cognitive resources to 
reinforce an a priori conclusion.  To better understand these two reasoning strategie
need to understand how we make decisions during problematic situations. 
A Syllogistic Illustration of Cognitive Working  
Before I conceptually elaborate the focal construct of the cognitive 
entrepreneurial mindset in problem solving, I will take some time here to describ
m process of cognitively working toward a situational conclusion in problem 
solving—i.e., how we perform cognitive tasks during a problematic situation.  Here, a 
syllogistic reasoning process is a useful frame within which to explain the human 
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judgmental process (Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999).  In brief, a syllogism is a deducti
argument consisting of two premises and one conclusion (Hurley, 1997).  It takes the 
form of major premise minor premise conclusion.  For example: 
No painters are sculptors. [Major Premise | Evidence] 
Some sculptors are artists. [Minor Premise | Evidence] 





at contains the major term: e.g., “No painters are sculptors.” The 




known  fact, 
 
(Evans, 2002).  For example, we stop our car when we see a red light—e.g., if I see a red 
Depending on their positions in the argument, we distinguish three terms with
syllogism.  The major term is the predicate of the conclusion (i.e., painters); the minor 
term is the subject of the conclusion (i.e., artists); and the middle term, which becomes 
the conceptual bridge between the two premises (i.e., sculptors), is the one that occurs 
once in each premise and does not occur in the conclusion.  The major premise, by
definition, is the one th
remise is the one that contains the minor term: e.g., “Some sculptors are artists.”
The conclusion is the derived argumentative result from the combination of major and 
minor premises: e.g., “Therefore, some artists are not painters” (Hurley, 1997). 
 This formal categorical syllogism provides a baseline to discuss any routinely 
drawn human judgmental conclusion.  However, our everyday reasoning processe
more pragmatic and probabilistic than such a rigid framework of logical steps (Ev
2002).  Lay thinkers often draw judgmental conclusions using a more basic
 as the if—then—rule.  Lay people who are not trained in formal logic do, in
exhibit a rudimentary deductive competence when confronted with judgmental tasks
 76
light, then I should stop my car.  This does not require us to set up a strictly formal 
categorical syllogism argument to reason a proper action.  
For another example, we may routinely use incorrect rudimentary syllogistic 
reasoning when stereotyping others: e.g., if a person is an Asian, then she or he must be 
good at mathematics.  One may see an Asian student in a math class and predict that 
or she must do well on exams.  We can almost always restate such basic pragmatic a
probabilogistic syllogistic reasoning examples into more formal and categorical 




f formality or logicality, however, lay thinkers conduct judgmental 
process en)8 
 judgmental conclusion.  
We not
es via a more implicit and simpler syllogistic reasoning process (i.e. if—th
(Evans, 2002; Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999; Over & Evans, 1997; Evans & Over, 
1996).  Therefore, I assume that the human reasoning process can be best illustrated by a 
pragmatic and probabilogistic syllogism in conceptualizing the focal construct of 
cognitive entrepreneurship in problem solving.  From now on, I will use the term 
syllogistic reasoning to denote the method that lay thinkers routinely use.  
Directionality between evidence and conclusion.  As mentioned, we make 
decisions through a simple and pragmatic process of syllogistic reasoning (i.e., if—
then—).  Within the syllogistic reasoning frame, people recollect, collect, or elaborate 
information to deploy it as supporting evidence toward a given
 only use the rules that we are carrying from prior situations by a form of the if—
then rule (e.g., [if] children watch violent movies, [then] they behave aggressively); but 
                                                 
8 We do inferential tasks by implicit, not explicit, application of the if—then—syllogism. We ma
explicitly use the words, “if—” and/or “then—” in performing an inferential tasks.  Simple assoc
y not 
iation 
linkages between “terms” are often sufficient to making inferences: e.g., “red light—stop.” However, we 
can almost always reconstruct the syllogistic reasoning process by using the if—then—format.   
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we also perform current inferential tasks by a deductive processing of an if—then—
syllogism (e.g., [if] I saw a very aggressive kid, [then] he must have watched many 
violent movies in the past).  Here the extent of association (the strength of connection) 
between the if—component and the then—component is called “relevance” (Kruglans









We confer a certain amount of relevance to the inferential association in 
corresponding with the relevance we can draw from the decisional referent rule (e.g
children watch violent movies, [then] they behave aggressively).  That is, the confidence 
that we have in our judgmental conclusion (e.g., confidence about “the aggressive k
who had watched many violent movies”) is commensurate with the strength of the 
associative link between if—then—rule we use as a decisional referent frame (e.g.,
extent of one’s belief that ‘watching violent movies causes aggressive behaviors for 
children’).  For example, consider that you observe a very aggressive act of a child. 
Subsequently, you might take that act as evidence to draw a judgmental conclusion that 
ild must have watched many violent movies/games.”  
Evidence intuitively precedes a conclusion.  However, initiation and completi
of the judgmental process between evidence and a conclusion in problematic situatio
can occur in any direction.  One may start from a conclusion and proceed to seeking 
evidence.  Or, one may start from seeking evidence to proceed to a conclusion.  
Sometimes people benefit, consciously or unconsciously, by following the forwar
direction (i.e., evidence dictates a certain conclusion).  For example, one might think that 
“if someone is a Harvard graduate and working in top management for a large business, 
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then she must be smart.”  At other times, however, people find merit, conscio
unconsciously,
usly or 




ords, a conclusion directs the individual to seek certain evidence that justifies the 
hastily drawn conclusion.  It is important to understand that the drawing of a conclusion 
does not exclude active cognitive working or elaboration in a retroactive way.  Even 
though we make a decision, we might feel it is necessary to elaborate our chosen 
itive 
fore, 
lusion and connecting evidence to it is 
bidirectional.9
                                                
One draws a conclusion first by applying a salient rule—i.e., a prime decisional 
referent—and next collects evidential information that warrants the predetermined 
conclusion.  For example, a person with a terminal illness might draw a quick judgm
conclusion such as “I am OK” and collect evidential information that indicates and 
reinforces his physical well-being.  Or, a group of political leaders might quickly dec
to go to war for a salient reason (e.g., the political regime of that country has been 
uncooperative with us) and next seek out additional supporting decisional referents and 
information (e.g., the leader of the country is a dictator; he made his people h
have made weapons of mass destruction; he provided support for terrorist groups etc.).  
In the example, the conclusion (e.g., we are going to war) precedes substantial 
evidence (e.g., the whys for war) that warrants and justifies the conclusion.  In other 
w
conclusion.  We conventionally assume that a drawn conclusion completes our cogn
working process.  However, quite often we go backward in problem solving.  There
the direction between drawing a conc
 
9 Although we almost always describe the judgmental process as a forward and unidirectional manner (e.g., 
I decide so for such reasons), we often go backward but do not explain so because of our reconstruction of 
a judgmental process to report to others.  
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Forward reasoning vs. backward reasoning.  Now I will elaborate two directional 
flows of syllogistic reasoning.  Assuming an equal amount of cognitive resources and 
motivation in solving a problem, a problem solver can take two contrasting mental 
approac ng 
ng frame, 
he process of a forward reasoning approach, I offer the following: 
be selected as a best decision.  
that merit and favor this conclusion 
among the others.  
T refo
warrants this specific conclusion.  
 In contrast, I define backward reasoning as a cognitive approach when a 
conclusion directs evidence.  The following is an illustration of a backward reasoning 
approach: 
I selected option A for an important reason. 
evidence) for the option A (possible evidences) would be a, b, c, d.   
conclusion.  
 a good decision.  
 
Here, th le and 
 
hes in expending cognitive capacity and capability.  One is the forward reasoni
and the other is the backward reasoning.  First, forward reasoning is the commonly 
conceived way of problem solving. In terms of the syllogistic if—then—reasoni
I define forward reasoning as a cognitive approach when evidence directs a solution.  To 
illustrate t
If information a, b, c, d (i.e., evidence) tells this, then option A (i.e., conclusion) should 
I found some antecedent conditions (i.e., evidence) 
he re, I choose this course of action (or a solution) because preceding evidence 
 
(If) I selected option A (i.e., conclusion), (then) the acceptable justifications10 (i.e., 
I found some antecedent conditions (i.e., evidence) which fit well with the chosen 
Therefore, I made
e thinker quickly reached a judgmental conclusion by a prime decisional ru
then sought out rationales that make the selected option more conclusive and convincing.
This is an optimization process for an a priori conclusion.  
                                                 
10 Justifications can be possible consequences (merits or harms) associated with a chosen option. Such a 
case is forward reasoning rather than backward reasoning. 
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Notably, in both cognitive approaches, a chosen solution for a problem should 
first contain the observational contents that best fit the major premise chosen within a 
syllogism model.  Then, the chosen solution will produce a level of confidence 
commensurable to the degree of relevance between “if” and “then” contents in the major 
premise.  
 Figure 7 summarizes the two distinct cognitive reasoning approaches in problem solving.









Certitude of a given conclusion.  By using the syllogistic reasoning frame, we can 
attitude as a judgmental conclusion drawn about a certain social object or issue 
nski, 1989).  The attitude—an evaluative judgmental conclusion—might be
supported by evidential materials.  However, the certainty one can draw from eviden
toward a conclusion is not determined by the frequency or amount of information 
connected, but by the subjective “relevance” of prior belief or decisional referent rule(s
in making the given judgment (usually, as another form of an if—then rule that be
major premise.)  
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A person under pressure to make a quick judgment would draw a referent 




.   




issues, however, have found some consistency in the cognitive strategies 
es.  
Grunig and Ipes (1983) also found that active publics have more organized 
d 
Ipes (1983), showed that passive publics are more likely to hold attitudes than 
Less active publics express attitudes even when they have no cognitions on which 
 
and applicable to the given problem.  Next, she or he seeks out some analogous evidential 
material from the current situation (via observation).  When new evidence collected is 
similar to the evidence in the activated referent criterion toward the conclusion, he or she 
then confers the given certainty (relevance in the major premise or referent criterion) in 
the old premise to the newly drawn conclusion, which is tantamount certitude attac
a fit (relevance) between the old if-then rule (the referent criterion one is now deploying). 
In other words, when a person is under pressure to make a quick decision, he or she look
for evidence similar to that which supports his known experience or referent criterion
The exte
ll be associated with the new decision. 
This can solve a puzzle that many public opinion researchers encounter.  Pu
opinion researchers often have found that people who express a strong attitude about 
something would lack cognitive knowledge that supports a given evaluative conclusi
toward the attitudinal target.  J. Grunig and Hon (1988) reported and summarized such 
affective publics without cognitive counterparts on attitudinal objects: 
Several studies of publics arising from environmental issues and corporate policy 
constructed by members of active publics and in the nature of their attitud
cognitions than do passive publics.  Two studies, Grunig (1982a) and Grunig an
cognitions.  Active publics are equally likely to hold both attitudes and cognitions.  
to base them. (italics added, J. Grunig, & Hon, 1988, pp. 5-6). 
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ve an internal preference or directional expectation 






tion of a judgmental task, an explanation of why passive publics often have 
unreasonably strong attitudes (conclusions) in the absence of cognitions (evidence).  As
most dual models of social influence (e.g., the Elaboration Likelihood Model, Petty &
Cacioppo, 1986) suggest, under some conditions people with  limited judgmental 
motivation and capability become cognitive economizers.  People draw a quick 
conclusion using an activated previous judgmental rule (referent criterion or schema) a
match easily identifiable evidential materials.  
 However, when individuals ha
he outcome that the decision might produce, backward reasoning is more likely to
happen because the preferred outcome exerts influence in selecting a referent cri
prior rule.  This is the way wishful thinking happens and why many decisions that a lay 
person makes are unrealistically biased.  People adopt a referent criterion that best 
warrants the preferred end state regardless of its actual likelihood.  This happens becau
a preferred outcome state powerfully influences an individual to activate a certain prior 
judgmental rule that more successfully warrants the preferred outcome state among 
others.  
Parallel syllogistic reasoning processes.  At the same time, drawing a conclusion 
first is not necessarily limited to a single conclusion.  It is possible for a person to 
nally (and often thoughtfully) select multiple, conflicting conclusions.  Problem 
solvers may want to be scrupulous or wish to reduce possible errors and risks in the 
judgmental task.  The forward reasoning strategy requires considering a relatively l
number of alternative courses of action (i.e., the larger number of solution candid
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reviewed).  In contrast, the backward reasoning strategy would consider relatively fewer 
alternative courses because of the readymade solution or because of strong prior 
motivation that leads one to a specific course of action.  Although backward reasoning 
problem solvers can be cognitively hard working enough to construct multiple syllogisms, 
problem





 To be selected, a solution proposal 
should us 
 solvers with a forward reasoning approach are more likely to construct and go 
through a more scrupulous multiple syllogistic reasoning process.  
Cognitive Strategies and Behavioral Molecules 
In terms of the syllogistic reasoning framework, I described a backward reasoning 
process (i.e., a conclusion comes first and seeking information (evidence) follows
strong major premise—a prime decisional referent—would compel the lay thinker to 
draw a syllogistic conclusion pertaining to a problem.  Once a hasty conclusion is dr
the person looks for information that increases the fit between the observed minor 
premise and the preferred major premise.  The enrichment provided by observational 
information that increases the relevance of the if—then rule of a major premise increa
confidence in the given conclusion.  
The forward reasoning process, in contrast, suspends drawing a conclusion until 
reaching a certain level of subjective confidence—i.e., a feeling of information 
saturation—to make a better decision (i.e., seeking evidential information comes first a
drawing a conclusion follows).  Here judgmental rules and proposed solutions compete
demonstrate their merits over the competing sets. 
demonstrate superiority by its merits.  Problem solvers thus undergo the laborio
iterative process of what-if thinking to examine merits and pitfalls associated with given 
pieces of information until one solution emerges as the best.  These two cognitive 
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approaches provide a simple way to summarize the multiple differential decision-mak
approaches described in J. Grunig and Hunt’s (1984) behavioral molecule model. 
Behavioral molecule.  Drawing from Richard Carter’s (1973) behavioral molecule,
J. Grunig and Hunt (198
ing 
 
4) proposed a behavioral molecule that illustrates how people 
(e.g., an  about what to do in problematic 
situatio of several segments that capture the processes 
individ rder: 
detect, s are 
describ oretically endless and if followed thoroughly will lead to 
hink 
a 
In this segment, he or she tries to be totally 
objectiv ere is 
.  
ative.  Select is the step in the sequence during which one chooses the best 
plicable prior decision rules (i.e., referent 
criteria
 
 organizational manager) make decisions
ns.  The molecule consists 
uals or systems go through to plan and select behaviors.  Its segments are in o
construct, define, select, confirm, behave, and detect.  The segments or step
ed as sequential and the
more successful problem solving.  
Detect is the segment in which a person discovers a problem and begins to t
about a solution.  Construct is the segment in which a person begins to formulate 
solution to the problem he or she detected.  
e and abstains from making a judgment about what to do.  The major task h
to be effortful in cognitive processing to define the problem, choose appropriate 
objectives pertaining to a problem, and formulate alternative solutions to the problem
Define is the step in which a person specifies distinctly how each alternative can be 
implemented.  The define segment ends when a single plan of action has been elaborated 
for each altern
alternative in solving the problem.  Here ap
) or one’s values or attitudes exert greater influence to favor (or eliminate) one 
against the others.  Next, confirm is the step in which a person reviews the reasonableness
of the selected solution and finalizes it before enacting it.  Behave is the segment in 
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which one translates the chosen course of action (solution) into action for problem 
resolution.  Finally, the last segment is, again, detect to evaluate whether the intended 
effect—problem resolution—has been achieved. 
J. Grunig and Hunt (1984) suggested that ideally the segments should occ
sequence because that maximizes the potential to make the best behavioral decision abou
a problem.  However, in real life, the full sequential order might be shortened because o
situational constraints.  The steps of the behavioral molecule provide a useful way to 
describe some common mistakes in decision making.  Often decision makers omit some 
of the segments in the behavioral molecule or change the sequence from the model. Some






















Grunig & Hunt, 1984) 
 
in the previously described framework of the entrepreneurial cognitive approach an
AOS terminology, dogmatism, rationalization, and habit are special cases of 
ward reasoning, whereas indecision, procrastination, and perfectionism are 
ples of a forward reasoning strategy.  
The sequence between information collection and decision-making can be 
rchanged in some cases. In the forward reasoning approach, information helps to 
truct and define the alternatives—i.e., a prospective use of information.  In the 
ward reasoning approach, information is used to justify the omitted steps (i.e., 
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construct and define) and to reinforce the selected alternative—i.e., a retrospective use of 
information.  
Temporal Order between Will and Action 
In the present model of cognitive entrepreneurship in problem solving, I postulate 
that human cognitive strategy in judgmental situations is a variant, rather than a constant 
(e.g., an enduring personal trait).  That is, the temporal order between conclusion and 
evidence is bidirectional across situations.  The problem of discerning the temporal order 
between our will and an act is analogous to the problem of discerning the temporal order 
between our evidential reasoning and drawing a conclusion.  Because of the similarity of 
the problem sets, I look to the past half century of research in psychophysiology 
regarding the problem of discerning the temporal order between intention and action to 
bett
have g 
em, Libet, Gleason, Wright, and Pearl (1983) found a perplexing pattern that shattered 
our conventional beliefs about the order between “will” and “action.”  He found reversal 
time sequence between one’s will to act and our movement preparation.  That is, our 
subjective will for moving is preceded by brain movement preparation, so called, 
“Readiness Potential (RP).”  
Experimental finding.  Obhi and Haggard (2004) summarized the groundbreaking 
finding from Libet et al., (1983) study on the “source of control” as follows:  
…participants watched a small clock hand that completed one full revolution in 2.56 
st at a 
time of his choosing.  After the movement, the clock hand continued to rotate for a 
ck 
hand at the time when she first became aware of the will to move….this subjective 
n 
er understand the problem of judgmental sequence.  Many cognitive psychologists 
 investigated the temporal order between “intention” or “will” and “action.” Amon
th
seconds.  While fixated on the clock, a participant voluntarily flexed his wri
random time and then stopped.  Then, a participant reported the position of the clo
judgment W, for “will.”  In other parts of the experiment, participants judged whe
 87
they actually moved…this judgment M, for “movement.”  The timing of the W and 
and actually moved.  In add
the M told…when—subjectively speaking—a participant formulated a will to move 
ition, Libet’s team measured two objective parameters: 
the electrical activity over the motor areas of the brain, and the electrical activity of 
the  a 
well-known psychophysiological correlate of movement preparation called the 
electrodes placed on the scalp overlying the motor areas of the frontal lobe, and 
n by 
about 1 second.  By also recording the electrical activity of the muscles involved in 
d 
to the RP. (Obhi & Haggard, 2004, pp. 358-359) 
Libet et al. (1983) studied the temporal order of conscious experience and neural 
activity by comparing the subjective W (will) and M (movement) judgments with 
objective RP and muscular activity.  Their finding first showed that W came before M.  
This means that the participants in the experiment “consciously perceive the intention to 
move as occurring before a conscious experience of actual moving,” which is consistent 
with our common conception (Obhi & Haggard, 2004, p. 359).  However, Libet et al. 
found an intriguing temporal order that “actual neural preparation to move (RP) preceded 
conscious awareness of the intention to move (W) by 300 to 500 milliseconds” (Obhi & 
Haggard, 2004, p. 360).  Obhi and Haggard (2004) restated the meaning of this surprising 
finding:  
Put simply, the brain prepared a movement before a subject consciously decided to 
motor preparatory activity in the brain rather than a cause…this finding ran directly 
2004, p. 360). 
Libet et al.’s (1983) finding, however, did not totally upset the relationship between 
intention and action, that is, that conscious processes such as intention cause actions.  
Subsequent findings suggested that “conscious processes could still exert some effect 
over actions by modifying the brain processes already under way” and thus it would be 
 muscles involved in the wrist movement.  Over the motor areas, Libet recorded
readiness potential (RP)…[RP] is measured using electroencephalographic recording 
appears as a ramplike buildup of electrical activity that precedes voluntary actio
the wrist movement, Libet precisely determined the onset of muscle activity relate
 
move!  This result suggests that a person’s feeling of intention may be an effect of 
contrary to the classical conception of free will [italics added]. (Obhi & Haggard, 
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more accurate to call “free won’t” rather than “free will” [italics added]  (Obhi & 
Haggard, 2004, p. 360).  The temporal order between intentions and actions can be 














model.  As in Libet et al.’s (1983) findings, in many situations, our intention or will to 
bidirectional—
 and Haggard (2004), our brain feels the intention of an action when the 
prediction of movement fits well with the actual movement.  Thus, when the fit takes
place—e.g., the past examples of the similar action can guide current action well,
person might feel a euphoric sense of control. In addition, a strong sense of intention ca
script an action subsequently.  
In addition, a mental illness known as utilization behaviors in which “patients 
uncontrollably interact with and use every object that they come across,” provides a piece
of interesting evidence that the cognitive backward approach can be found in som
cognitive neuroscience studies (Obhi & Haggard, 2004, p. 364).  Utilization behavior
patients are not aware of what they are going to do until after the action has been made
In such a case, there is “no awareness of intention before the movement;” and thus “th
patient is left to rationalize the behavior afterward” (Obhi & Haggard, 2004, p. 365).  
The bidirectional reasoning conception (i.e., backward and forward reasoning) in 
the present model explains that a person flexibly situates oneself on either a co
 strategy or cognitive backward strategy by one’s situational-perceptual variables.  
As psycho physiologists have found, at times our actions are followed by our will and 
vice versa at other times.  Similarly, our problem solving acts (a conclusion for a 
judgmental task) are often done first and followed by a certain intention of why we did it. 
This is a case of backward reasoning that is one of the cognitive approaches in the presen
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perform a certain action is reconstructed backwardly.  Often we are asked by others (e.g., 
experimenters) to explain our actions.  Quite often in our routine life, the intention has 
little use until it becomes necessary to explain our acts to others.  It is often 
reconstructed—reasoned backward—to make sense of our action (conclusion) to 
ourselves and others.  Very often, intention is situated within a subjective time sequence 





HSM or the 
occurred ahead of an action (e.g., asked to reflect prior action).11
Delimitation 
If the main focus in theorizing about the routes that human problem resolution 
takes toward a decision or chosen solution, the resulting theory would only reiterate 
cognitive routes already described in popular social psychological theories (e.g., 
Heuristics Systematic Model, Chaiken & Eagly, 1989; Elaboration-Likelihood Model, 
Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).  Typically, such theories contain either an expre
tics—i.e., a decisional shortcut) or an effortful route (elaborative or systematic 
cognitive working) in reaching a judgmental conclusion.  However, in the present theor
I deliberately focus on the roles of cognitive efforts occurring before and after a 
judgmental conclusion (decision) is made. The previous theories implicitly assumed 
predecisional cognitive working or at least were mute, about postdecisional cognitive 
working. Because their theoretical goal was narrowly aimed to feature a typology of 
cognitive efforts (e.g., amount of cognitive elaboration) by the parameters of motivatio
and cognitive capacity toward a decision (Kruglanski et al, 2003), those theories (e.g., the 
ELM) were only interested in predecisional cognitive processes. 
                                                 
11 If Libet et al’s (1983) finding is a robust fact, then the theory of reasoned action and the theory of 
planned behavior have a problem because of the behavioral intention construct.  If intention is often 
reconstructed, the theories have a serious limitation. 
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 In contrast, I am introducing a model that encompasses not just predecision
cognitive efforts (how problem holders mentally invest their cognitive resources toward a 
given conclusion) but also postdecisional cognitive efforts (justification of a previously
drawn conclusion). Consequently in the present mo
al 
 
del, it is unnecessary to assume that a 
problem
nor HS
of cogn  




 and a cognitive process within a 
problem es 
 of 
 solver ceases to make cognitive efforts once a decision is made.  Neither ELM 
M, the two most popular theories of cognitive processing, conceives of the notion 
itive retrogression in their conceptualizations. Yet, we observe often that problem
 mentally linger on or keep “elaborating
ng solution (e.g., diligently reading about the great features of a product after 
purchasing it.).  
Although one may have decided on a solution to a problem, arriving at the 
solution does not necessarily indicate the end of the problematic situation.  Therefore, 
people under problematic situations could still be cognitively active and effortful even 
after making a decision.  For that reason, we experience that decision making is not the 
end of our cognitive efforts in problem solving.  I have moved the theoretical scope from 
decision-making to problem solving.  Consequently, the reversed order cognitive w
(conclusion evidence seeking) becomes another key cognitive feature.  
To summarize, current cognitive processing theories describe the decision process 
and put little theoretical emphasis on post-decisional thinking.  In contrast, the presen
theoretical model describes a problem-solving process
atic situation.  Thus, I propose a model of our mental approaches that featur
the role of cognitive efforts during a problematic situation. It postulates distinct roles
two different sequences in cognitive efforts.  One is to reach a better solution—thereby 
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being characterized by predecisional cognitive efforts; the other is to reach subjectiv
confidence in the chosen solution—being highlighted by postdecisional cognitive efforts.  
Conceptualizing Cognitive Entrepreneurship in Problem Solving 
We respect those who are entrepreneurial in their work.  They endeavor to 
progress and make desirable changes for themselves and for others.  Thus, we train 
ourselves and our children to maintain an entrepreneurial life.  However, the term
entrepreneur or entrepreneurial mindset, needs to be explicated further.  J. Grunig (1968
conceived of entrepreneurs as those who drive individual and social development.  He 
described the entrepreneurial problem solver as a: 
strategic decision maker who skillfully manages the resources at one’s command
looking for the most efficient way of doing things.  The entrepreneur is “ratio





which means she or he is more than a routine manager; she or he is always 
nal” 
not in the sense that he is always a profit maximizer or seeks always to maximize 
ut rather in the sense that he recognizes alternative solutions to 







cognitive alpha strategy, wherein we find more cognitive entrepreneurial features, and the 
[italics added] (J. Grunig, 1968, p. 4)  
I conceptualize cognitive entrepreneurship in problem solving (CEPS) here as a 
unidimensional variable. Cognitive entrepreneurship is a human cognitive feature used 
cope with problematic life situations— in other words a mental approach to reduce a 
perceived discrepancy.  It varies from an extremely entrepreneurial mindset to the
entrepreneurial mindset across problems.  The absence of entrepreneurial cognitive 
for convenience, can be called the cognitive omega strategy, whereas the strong presenc
of entrepreneurial cognitive effort in dealing with a problem is called the cognitive alp
strategy.  To make the concept theoretically more useful, I break down the single 
construct, cognitive entrepreneurship in problem solving, into two dichotomies: the 
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cognitive omega strategy, wherein we find fewer cognitive entrepreneurial features. 
These are 
 











stinguished two decisional approaches such that: 
“Most ns 
We typically construe entrepreneurship as a personal trait that varies across
individuals and not within an individual mind.  However, there is no reason for
tual limitation.  I conceptualize entrepreneurship here as changing across different
life situations, that is, as a variable that fluctuates with changes in one’s situational 
conditions (e.g., situational constraints).  Thus, I define cognitive entrepreneurship
problem solving as a situational mindset one opts for in a problematic situation wh
one’s mental effort for
eneurship 1) one’s cognitive sequence progresses from evidence to a conclusion 
following the syllogistic reasoning process, 2) one increases cognitive effort by 
increasing the breadth of evidential knowledge and solution alternatives considered, 3
one is more likely to cognitively commit to ideas and alternatives under review (i.e., on 
average, entrepreneurs show more enthusiasm to the proposed ideas and solutions that ar
allegedly viable than non-entrepreneurs do), and 4) one has more cognitive heedfulness 
in finalizing a proposed solution—i.e., makes another confirmatory evaluation after 
selecting a solution.12  
This new construct has a conceptual root in J. Grunig’s (1966) distinction of 
decisional approaches called habitual and genuine decisions.  Following Katona (1951, 
1953) and Carter (1965), J. Grunig di
economic decisions…are made on the basis of habit, genuinely rational decisio
are made in new situations where the decision maker has little previous decision 
                                                 
12 In the behavioral molecule, one would “stop to confirm that the selected behavior will work and is the 
best alternative” (J. Grunig & Hunt, 1984, p. 107). This is a double checking effort for the decision-maker 
to assure the solution selected is the best available for the given problem before finalizing the decision.  
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experience and in important, ‘crossroads’ decisions” (J. Grunig, 1966, p. 93).  The 
concept of cognitive entrepreneurship in problem solving is analogous to the “ge
decisions” (Katona, 1951, 1953) or “crossroads decisions” (J. Grunig, 1966), when a 
habitual decision is unsatisfactory.  To make a workable crossroads decision, a problem 




imensions to further delineate cognitive entrepreneurship in a problematic 
ip 
ng and 






Conceptual Dimensions of Cognitive Entrepreneurship: Cognitive Retrogression, 
Cognitive Multilateralism, Cognitive Commitment, and Cognitive Suspension 
I theorize four conceptual subdimensions to highlight cognitive entrepreneursh
under an extraordinary problem situation.  They are cognitive retrogression in illation, 
cognitive multilateralism in considering solutions for problem solving, cognitive 
commitment to the identified solution proposals, and cognitive suspension before 
finalizing a solution.  
The cognitive alpha and omega strategies, which I elaborated earlier, have their 
conceptual origins in part from what J. Grunig and Stamm (1979) called hedgi
wedging.  Hedging is a cognitive strategy that reduces risk from devotion to a single 
option by dividing one’s commitment to the op
ment to a certain option.  The backward cognitive strategy shares its conceptual 
root with wedging, whereas the forward cognitive strategy shares its root with hedging
Problem solvers who hedge expend more effort during the illative process.  Thus, they
tend to build and consider more solution options than those using a wedging strategy.  In
contrast, problem solvers using the wedging strategy take advantage of achieving a 
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cognitive certainty quickly.  Thus, they abstain from increasing cognitive complexitie
considering fewer soluti
s by 
on options.  
’s 
ore 
ers.  I 
y 
rs 
ached.  The 
referen
ents in 
For these reasons, wedging is close to the cognitive backward strategy, while 
hedging is close to the cognitive forward strategy.  Each strategy either satisfies one
desire to  be quick and firm or to be deliberate and take risk.  In conceptualizing  
cognitive entrepreneurship in problem solving, I expand the hedging and wedging  
concepts to understand different cognitive strategies for problem solving.  This 
conceptual specification of hedging and wedging will result in a construct that has m
empirical content (Popper, 1999) as well as  practical implications for problem solv
will now elaborate upon each dimension of cognitive entrepreneurship in problem 
solving. 
Cognitive Retrogression 
 Previously, I conceptualized two cognitive strategies in judgmental situations; a 
forward illation strategy and a backward illation strategy.  A backward illation strateg
occurs when a problem solver reaches a conclusion quickly and engages in cognitive 
labor primarily after drawing a conclusion.  In contrast, a forward illation strategy occu
when a problem solver makes more cognitive effort before a conclusion is re
t point to decide backward or forward is when a conclusion is finalized.  Human 
default decision-making is a non-entrepreneurial approach until a person faces an 
extraordinary, problematic situation (J. Grunig, 1968).  Most of our routine judgm
non-problematic situations follow a backward reasoning strategy, whereas in 
extraordinary situations a forwarding reasoning strategy is required.  What then is the 
merit of taking a backward reasoning mode?  
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To every living organism, living means a series of problem findings and certain 
ways of solving them (Popper, 1999).  Some problems are not so difficult for a livin
organism when a solution is available from past problem solving experience.  Novel 
problems can be very threatening if one has never experienced them previously.  When 
confronted with a novel probl
g 
em, one must exert extraordinary effort to find a solution.  
Hence,
nt 




 when we identify a problem, we immediately begin an internal search—i.e., 
knowledge activation.  
If there is a solution or decisional referent available and applicable to the curre
problem, our problematic situation ends fairly quickly.  However, if no applicable 
knowledge is available, we initiate an external search for knowledge and information—
i.e., knowledge action—until we reach a threshold of subjective confidence in dealing 
with the problem.  In the first case, by applying a readymade solution immediately we 
can take a fast track to closure of a given problem situation.  In that case, we take a 
backward reasoning approach to reach a conclusive solution by sea
g a decisional referent immediately.  We then need only to check evidence 
subsequently to confirm its utility for solving a given problem: i.e., cognitive 
retrogression that goes from conclusion to evidence.  In contrast, forward reason
requires sacrificing agile adaptation to a judgmental situation to some extent.  Although
increases one’s ability to reduce risk from potential problems, the forward reasoning 
approach heavily taxes cognitive resources.  Thus, every living organism tends to use a 
problem-solving mode that allows for cognitive idleness so that one can invest surplus 
cognitive resources in alternative priorities (c.f., “cognitive economizer”).   
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Backward reasoning and the problem of sunk costs.  Quite often problem solvers 
are lazy in seeking counter-examples to evaluate the soundness of an alternative solu
This happens more commonly when a congenial conclusion can be found that is 
consistent with the premises (Oakhill & Johnson-Laird, 1985).  Problem solvers using a 
forwarding reasoning approach are more willing to change their mind (e.g., pr
a certain solution proposal) in the presence of contradictory evidenc
tion.  
eference on 
e.  Because they 




ive less desirable than 
e was made]” (Brehm, 1956, p. 384).  
 
me 
orward from evidence to conclusion, they can change their course of action ra
easily even when they find some countering evidence against a preferred solution
However, problem solvers who take a backward reasoning approach are less likely to be 
flexible because their conclusion makes it difficult to withdraw their commitment.  This 
is the problem of sunk cost.  
What dissonance studies have found over the last half century is closely related to 
the problem of sunk costs.  Dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957) is centered on the 
recurrent human tendency to reduce experienced dissonance.  According to Fest
(1957), people prefer “reinforcing” cognitive elements (information) that favor the
chosen alternative, whereas they avoid reinforcing information that favors the “unchosen 
alternative” because of its dissonance arousal against the past choice.  Brehm’s (1956) 
study found that once a choice is made, participants try to reduce dissonance “by making 
the chosen alternative more desirable and the unchosen alternat
they were before [the choic
To be more adaptive, our cognitive commitment should be flexible and capable to
shift among tasks to handle a stream of problematic situations.  However, at the sa
time, our judgmental conclusion, regardless of its enactment status, ought to be 
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unshakable once finalized.  To revoke a choice already made or to reverse a co
action to which one is already committed is prohibitively costly and laborious, especi
when something interrupts our necessary transition to concurrent problems.  Because of
this, it becomes attractive and less costly to make the drawn conclusion more desirable
and make the dropped conclusions less desirable.  Under such conditions, we
of our cognitive labors to support the already drawn conclusion after a decision has b
made.  We go cognitively backward.  Also, we similarly go backward when we engage
strong wishful thinking or willful thinking about the end state within a problematic
situation.  A strong desire for a certain outcome, despite obvious undesirabil
long term, drives one to pick a course of action that fits with the wished or willed a prior
conclusion.  In this case, we assign our cognitive resources to postdecisional 














Although sunk costs “should not affect decisions about the future,” decision 
makers are often tempted to favor one alternative over others mainly because of 
irrevocable prior costs we have paid (Dawes, 1988, p. 22).  As Dawes (1988) argued,
tendency to honor sunk costs and make a decision that preserves a prior investment m
be rational or wise at the time.  Yet, it becomes irrational in that it replaces the current 
and future consequences with past consequences.  People honoring sunk costs in making 
a decision, then, are likely to pursue a backward reasoning approach for a most salient 
alternative—an option that has the most prior investment.  The decision maker 
cognitively reasons backwardly to honor a favored alternative (conclusion).  One 
searches internally and externally to justify, support, and honor a given solution candid
with the highest nonrefundable sunk costs.  In sum, the more problem solvers employ an 
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entrepreneurial mindset in problem solving, the less likely they are to use backward
reasoning or to honor the nonrefundable deposits (sunk costs). 
Cognitive Multilateralism 
From the first day, education preaches to us that we be should be more op
willing to tolerate even somewhat distasteful ideas in dealing with important life 
problems. A mindset that is open and willing to tolerate even distasteful ideas when 
considering alternative solutions to important life proble
 
en and 





ed that we are capable of constructing multiple mental 
models
eneurship.  J. Grunig (1968) conceptualized “the second stage of the decision 
process” in problem solving as “a process of discrimination” (p. 26).  He reasoned that 
the number of discriminations that problem solvers make “among competing relevan
alternative courses of action” is a critical quality with which to measure the 
entrepreneurial cognitive process (J. Grunig, 1968, p. 26).  Entrepreneurial problem 
solvers are willing and capable to “discriminate” available solution proposals by their 
merits. In doing so, entrepreneurial problem solvers first identify and increase the 
potential solutions (information) relevant to the problem.  Hence, cognitive 
entrepreneurship in problem solving is closely related to the problem solver’s cognitive 
breadth. This breadth is measured by the number of alternatives one generates 
tolerance of rival information during the problem-solving process. 
Within the syllogistic reasoning framework, we illustrate such cognitive breadth 
as the number of syllogism models one would bear in judgmental situations.  John
Laird and Bara (1984) propos
 to make syllogistic inferences.  Johnson-Laird and Bara (1984) reviewed 
psychological theories of syllogistic inferences and presented the theory of mental 
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models.  Their theory proposes that logically competent reasoning is feasible without any 
use of rules.  The way people reason is through attempting to test whether a conclusion 
must be true given that its premises are true.  The specific steps in this process are 1) 
construct a mental model of the premises; 2) formulate an informative conclusion tha
true in all models of the premises that have been constructed; and 3) if able to make a 
conclusion, try to construct an alternative model(s) of the premises that renders it false
there is such a model, abandon the conclusion. Otherwise, the conclusion is valid.) 
(Johnson-Laird & Bara, 1984).  Ordinarily, people attempt to build multiple models and 
to “search for counterexamples to putative conclusions.” They have “no machinery for 
making the search in a systematic way, and consequently often 
t is 
 (if 
lapse into error” 
 Bara, 1984, p. 51).  This implies that people vary in their reasoning in 
er of models constructed and their degree of effort in conducting an 
aluative search for counterexamples to the premises. 
we seek out or construct a large number of alternative models, whereas 
t other times, we do not.  More deliberate problem solvers (i.e., entrepreneurs) are more 
 u iple syllogistic models that consist of multiple sets of major and 
 conclusions.  By doing so, they increase the potential to produce 
fective solutions.  During the syllogistic inference process, entrepreneurial problem 
nalized a conclusion at the expense of dropping alternatives.  Instead, 
ir confidence in 
their finalized solution.  This becomes a rite of passage for the selected— the value of 
which is measured by how many rivals it has encountered and overcome to be crowned 
as the final one.  I postulate here that the more a problem solver is cognitively 
(Johnson-Laird &




likely to set p mult
minor premises and
ef
solvers have not fi
they utilize multiple fully constructed syllogistic models to increase the
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entrepreneurial, the more one becomes effortful to increase the number of solution 
options (i.e., syllogistic mental models).  With breadth of knowledge, information, rules, 




13 ents, or 
 
 
isagreement) with a 
set of c ir level 
statement 2 (     ) 
and abundance of propos
al to solve problems.  
Measurement strategy.  A problem solver with a more entrepreneurial m
likely to increase his or her breadth of information, knowledge, decisional referents, and 
solution proposals.  As a consequence, entrepreneurial problem solvers not only h
accept —a greater number of cognitive beliefs (e.g., information, decisional refer
solution proposals) but they also tolerate somewhat conflicting and even incompatible 
beliefs in their cognitive inventory.  We can use these tendencies as a “yardstick” to 
distinguish non-entrepreneurial problem solvers from entrepreneurial problem solvers for
measuring cognitive multilateralism.  Thus, to delineate the two types, it is necessary 
measure the degree to which an individual is familiar with and will tolerate incompatible
information.  By letting respondents review and express agreement (d
ompeting or contradictory statements about a problem we can measure the
of cognitive multilateralism regarding that issue. For example, 
statement 1 (     ) 
: 
: 
statement i (     ) 
                                                 
13 It is important to note that “even if one is aware of some contradictory view points” if not “accepting” it, 
then it is not considered “to have cognitive breadth” about the issue. J. Grunig and Hunt (1984) provided a 
useful taxonomy of objectives regarding communication effectiveness (p. 134). Retention of messages or 
efforts, problem solvers would increase their cognitive inven
expect problem solvers with high cognitive entrepreneurship
acceptance of cognitions is not necessarily to lead a behavioral intention or behavior. By communication 
tory to facilitate problem solving. Here, I 
 to have cognitive breadth and tolerance for 





(Followings are contradictory or competing statements to the former set of statements
 i+1 (     ) 
statement i+2 (     ) 
: 
: 
statement j (       ) 
The following formula computes one’s cognitive multilateralism:  
Cognitive Multilateralism =  
( )
StatementsofNumber
|)st   st  st ( - )st   st (st | - )st   st  st  st   st (st j 2i1ii2 1j 2i1ii2 1 +…+++…+++…++++…++ ++++
Cognitive Commitment 
Cognitive multilateralism conceptually taps an entrepreneurial pro
tolerance to somewhat incompatible ideas or proposals.  In contrast, cognitive 
commitment conceptually taps an entrepreneurial pr
 
blem solver’s 
oblem solver’s degree of enthusiasm 
atronizing the proposed solution for a given problem solving.  
trepreneurial problem solvers are typically excited by new ideas.  They have a 
e for information that will help them solve a problem they face.  At the 
 
s they increase the potential to solve a problem.   They welcome and 
courage unconventional thoughts and can leave commonsensical assumptions behind.  
blem solvers value challenging ideas, fresh approaches, and original 
at might be considered distasteful to others.   
and the ex ent of pt
En
voracious appetit
same time, entrepreneurs are energetic and enthusiastic about a wide range of ideas, even
wild ones,  long  as a
en
Entrepreneurial rop
concepts, even those th
Entrepreneurial problem solvers are more committing—i.e., enthusiastic, 
patronizing, and incubating—to any ideas under consideration until they reach a final 
solution.  Although there may be stark contradictions and incompatibility between rival 
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proposed solutions, most share the common quality of viability or feasibility.  Thus, at 
least temporarily, entrepreneurs show a higher level of commitment toward ideas under 
consideration than do non-entrepreneurs.  On average, their level of commitment to the 
ideas—as if they will be useful—are stronger than non-entrepreneurial problem solver
Thus, the more the problem solvers become cognitively entrepreneurial, the more one is, 
provisionally, committing to the proposed ideas.  
Measurement strategy.  Problem solvers with a more entrepreneurial mindset t
to be more cognitively committing to or patronizing of thos
s.  
end 










 toward problem resolution.  They become more motivated to problem solving so 
that their level of cognitive energy and enthusiasm to the potential solutions increase 
situationally.  In addition, to be deliberate in selecting and evaluating solution propos
problem solvers have to patronize any potentially useful pieces of information until they 
finalize their decision to choose one solution over the others.  Hence, a more 
entrepreneurial problem solver shows a greater level of cognitive commitment to the 
ideas and thoughts around the problem.  Thus, the degree of attachment to pieces of 
information around a problem regardless of their interrelationships (e.g., 
incompatibleness among rivalry solution proposals), has to be higher for entrepreneuri
problem solvers.  We can compute it as following: 
statement 1 (     ) 
: 
nt i (     ) 
(Followings are contradictory or competing statements to the former set of statements)
statement  i+1 (     ) 




statement j (       ) 
Commitment = 
StatementsofNumber






t, most routine decisions “seldom take more than the simple 
discrim al with 
 
thinking).  Therefore, some period of extended cognitive labor is required to fully 
++  
Cognitive Suspension 
Although an entrepreneurial problem solver is more enthusiastic, incubating,
patronizing toward the proposed ideas for problem solving, he or she will withhold fina
commitment to any single idea/option until all the necessary steps of scrutiny have been 
taken.  Successful problem solving is closely related to the discriminatory power one
exert in a given problem solving period. Cognitive entrepreneurship in problem solving, 
thus, closely correlates with one’s heedfulness in drawing a final conclusion.  In problem
solving, it is one thing to welcome and patronize many different ideas and another to 
discriminate and finalize (i.e., select and confirm in behavioral molecule terms) a specif
solution from a set of rivaling options.  In successful problem solving and decision-
making, “a relatively large number of discriminations are normally required…except 
when decision rules are formed” (J. Grunig, 1968, p. 31).   
In contras
ination of recognition of a single alterative” (J. Grunig, 1968, p. 31).  To de
a “genuine problem,” not a “routine problem,” problem solvers should discriminate 
between available solutions by considering the problem solving potential of each.  Their 
high level of patronage and enthusiasm does not mean a blind commitment.  
Entrepreneurial problem solvers discriminate the virtue and viability of a given solution
by merits, not by any affection they might have incidentally developed (e.g., wishful 
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evaluate and confirm a solution. Even after a solution is isolated, an entrepreneur will 
take one additional step of scrutiny—i.e., finalizing it by evaluating what can go wrong if 
I select 4)—
ination in that 
inaction caused by too much procrastination can actually worsen a situation.  In other 
words, sometimes no decision is worse than a less than optimal decision.  Inaction 
brought on by too much cognitive processing is as non-entrepreneurial as backward 
cognitive processing.  I delimit cognitive suspension as focusing on the cognitive process, 
not to encompass the behavioral process of problem solving.  Entrepreneurship requires a 
problem solver to be agile in translating a selected solution into action (agility in the 
behave stage in terms of the behavioral molecule or in the effectuating phase in the 
APS).  Thus, behavioral suspension—one’s abeyance to act on a chosen solution, is 
he steps of 
ten 






 this option (checking the possible “Murphy’s law,” J. Grunig & Hunt, 198
before taking action.  
However, cognitive heedfulness is different from cognitive indeterm
C
non-entrepreneurial. However, cognitive suspension—defined as taking all t
generating, evaluating, selecting, and finalizing a solution— makes problem solvers 
reach better problem solving outcomes.  Thus, suspension of an action after a conclusion 
(a confirmed solution) is problematic because it delays problem resolution.  This of
prohibits early problem solving and
contrast, cognitive suspension as mental heedfulness to take all steps of the behav
molecule before finalizing a solution increases problem-solving effectiveness.  Co
suspension en route to a finalized solution is thus part of an entrepreneurial approa
problem solving, whereas behavioral suspension en route to problem solving is non
e
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In summary, cognitive suspension refers to a problem solver’s heightened 
willingness to invest discriminatory efforts in evaluating options and reevaluating a
selected option before finalizing it.  The behavioral molecule captures this subtlety
the confirm step, which occurs after select and before behave.  I characterize a problem
solver with high cognitive entrepreneurship as having stronger cognitive suspension in 
problem solving.  Entrepreneurial problem solvers give closer consideration in drawing 




usion; therefore, they are more willing to take extended steps of 
ing and discriminating before making a final choice.  
ns of cognitive entrepreneurship in problem solving in Figure 8.  
Figure 8:  model of cogni blem solving
scrutiniz
Summary.  I have constructed a conceptual model that highlights the four 
dimensio
 A tive entrepreneurship in pro . 
 
 m solver becomes cognitively 
entrepreneu ore one 
vies for  and 
the more one is heedful in drawing conclusions and finalizing  proposed solutions. 
Thus, I summarize the hypotheses: 
Figure 8 shows that the more a proble
rial in dealing with a problem, the less one reasons backward, the m




e multilateralism.   





e higher the cognitive entrepreneurship in problem solving, the lower the 
cognitive retrogression  




he higher the cognitive entrepreneurship in problem solving, the higher the 
cognitive suspension. 
 
Cognitive Alpha and Omega Strategies (CAOS) 
 From the model of cognitive entrepreneurship in problem solving, I conceptually
derive the cognitive alpha approach as the heightened state of situational cognitive 
entrepreneurship and the cognitive omega approach as the diminished situational 
entrepreneurial mindset toward a given problem.  The two conceptual strategies differ 
only quantitatively but not qualitatively.  Table 2 summarizes the relationships be
cognitive alpha and omega strategies and four dimensions of cognitive entrepreneurship 
in problem solving.  
Table 2 
Cognitive Alpha and Omega Strategies and Cognitive Entrepreneurship in Problem 
Solving 
 Cognitive Alpha Strategy Cognitive Om
Retrogression More forward reasoning More backward reasoning 
Multilateralism More cognitive tolerance Less cognitive tolerance 
Commitment More committing Less committing 




rial Cognitive More entrepreneurial Less entrepreneu
Behavioral molecule and CAOS.   J. Grunig & Hunt (1984) used the beha
molecule to classify common managerial mistakes in problem solving. CAOS provi
simpler typology to explain the differential problem solving approaches. They are: 




Rationalization: detect—select—behave—construct [omega: justification—a 
more sophisticated omega approach] 






Default cognitive strategy.  I postulate that the human default cognitive strategy i
cognitive omega rather than cognitive alpha.  People generally only adopt a cognitive 
alpha approach when they face a problem without a readily available solution—i.e., no
routine or








 a given 
s 
nking 
from a cognitive omega to 
a cogni
approach when they have a problem with a readymade solution—i.e., routine 
problems.  This gives us an intuitive explanation for why the cognitive omega app
becomes the default mental approach. Problems are always fewer than non-problems.
The cognitive omega strategy lessens cognitive effort for the present problem to 
economize problem-solving capacity for other concurrent or more urgent tasks at
moment.  When encountering familiar problems, the cognitive omega approach increase
one’s ability to adapt to other problems by speeding up the problem-solving process.  
However, when encountering unfamiliar problems, we cannot maintain our non-thi
and minimal cognitive investment.  Then, we are likely to shift 
tive alpha strategy to compose a new solution and to restore one’s default 
cognitive idleness (c.f., Carter, 1965, “evaluative mode” and “reinforcement mode”).    
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To summarize, the cognitive omega approach could be described as the shortest 
path through the behavioral molecule using the fewest steps, that is, “detect—behave,” 
whereas the cognitive alpha approach is the longest path using all the steps and 
completing the full process of the behavioral molecule, that is, detect—construct—
define—select—confirm—behave until a problem situation has ceased to be problematic 
(J. Grunig & Hunt, 1984).  Many human motor behaviors (e.g., blinking if a person 
detects a sudden movement near the face) are done by the cognitive omega strategy.  







—i.e., a cognitive ambidexterity in changing one’s mental 
approac
imes, we do not have any intention regarding a certain behavioral decision beyon
simply acting itself.  However, if we detect an out-of-the-ordinary situation for which 
motor-behavior-like response will be ill-suited, we are likely to make a transition to 
cognitive alpha approach to better adapt to the new problem.  Here the model of cogn
alpha and omega strategies (CAOS) captures the human tendency to establish and recy
certain knowledge that allows us to extend the use of the cognitive omega state.  Thus, 
when perpetuation of a readymade solution is difficult, our cognitive working goes in
an ‘extraordinary cognitive mode’ until we have decided upon a novel solution.  Such a
extraordinary cognitive modus operandi is the cognitive entrepreneurship in problem 
solving. 
A normative implication of CAOS is that it is problematic if a person does not 
have cognitive aptness
h from cognitive alpha to omega and vice versa.  For instance, many serious 
health problems become worse because of the problem holder’s cognitive ineptness (e.g., 
maintaining a cognitive omega approach to a new problem either deliberately or 
otherwise).  At the other extreme, many people also suffer from unnecessary cognitive 
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stress by employing a cognitive alpha approach even though a cognitive omega approach 
would adequately deal with the problem.  Therefore, neither cognitive alpha nor a 
cognitive omega strategy is invariably superior over the other. 
Rationality assumption in cognitive alpha and omega strategies.  J. Grunig (1968)




dered a rational person to be a “profit maximizer” or one who “seeks 
always
968) seemed to equate high entrepreneurial decision-making with 





 to maximize a pre-set goal” (p. 4).  Against such a presumption, he extended the 
meaning of rationality to be construed as one’s ability to find out and evaluate alternative 
solutions to a problem and to choose one by its merits.  Thus, he studied the conditions 
under which a person becomes a rational entrepreneur.  His conceptualization of the 
entrepreneur paved the way for decision-makers to become more rational in problem 
situations.  In contrast, I conceptually separate rationality from entrepreneurship in the 
model of cognitive alpha and omega strategies.   
J. Grunig’s (1
tionality in tackling a problematic situation.  However, the model of cogn
alpha and omega strategies considers the highly entrepreneurial approach—i.e., the
cognitive alpha strategy—and the low entrepreneurial approach—i.e., the cognitive 
omega strategy—as orthogonal from judging one’s rationality in problem solving.  In 
other words, to be more entrepreneurial is not always to be rational.  For example, with 
situational constraints in a problematic situation such as low cognitive capacity (i.e.
lacking cognitive resources)—“hardware aspect”—and high cognitive capability (i.e., 
having a ready solution)—“software aspect” (Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999), a probl
holder would be considered more rational by adopting a cognitive omega strategy (e
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backward reasoning strategy) with a well rehearsed conclusion (prior solution applicable 
to current problem).   
To determine what is considered rational problem solving requires thinking about
unique situational conditions (e.g., constraints) in problem solving contexts.  Specifically
the cognitive alpha and omega model no longer equates an entrepreneurial approac
rationality in problem solving.  The less entrepreneurial approach can actually be m
rational if it reaps the reward of economizing cognitive capacity for the problem solv
With this concept, I identify a key problem from which many decision-makers suffer.  






 holder’s ineptness to make flexible shifts from cognitive alpha to 







ne decision-maker is inept at this changing, the less the person is able to adapt to 
the environment.  
CAOS as a descriptive and normative theory.  Rational decision-making theory is 
a normative theory in that it extracts a portion of the phenomenon of the human decisio
making process.  In contrast, CAOS is a descriptive theory in that it encompasses both 
notions—i.e., rational and (somewhat) irrational aspects of decision-making.  In Carter’s
(1972, September) terms, most theories derived from the rationality assumption are used 
to construct a procedure—to make a practice better—whereas the CAOS concept
 construct a conceptual narrative toward a process—i.e., to describe a 
phenomenon better. 
In the cognitive alpha and omega model, I conceptualize that either the 
entrepreneurial alpha approach or the less-entrepreneurial omega approach can be 
rational or irrational.  The prime factor demarcating the boundary between rational or 
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irrational in cognitive strategy is the problem holder’s choice made with consideration of 
his or her situational constraints (e.g., internal and external such as knowledge necessary
and resources necessary to deal with the problem).  If one keeps procrastinating in
making a decision even with an applicable prior solution (i.e., referent criterion), his or 
her over-deliberativeness (i.e., cognitive alpha approach) should be called irrational.  
Likewise, if someone hastily completed a problematic situation without creating an 
applicable solution but used only strong wishful thinking (i.e., cognitive omega approach),
his or her lack of due consideration would also be considered irrational.  Problem solver









oblem solution; 2) 
general g 
nal constraints.  We can describe a problem solver’s incapability of changing as 
lacking meta-rationality—that is, rationality about rationality during the problem 
resolution period.  The lack of meta-rationality causes a meta-problem—that is, a 
problem in dealing with a problem.  Thus, the CAOS dichotomy offers a normative 
lesson for problem solvers by decreasing meta-irrationality, hence making them better 
problem solvers. 
Summary 
Cognitive entrepreneurship in problem solving and the cognitive alpha and
models describe different mental approaches under problematic situations.  A problem
solver with heightened cognitive entrepreneurship tends to 1) generate a large number of 
mental syllogistic models before he or she finally selects one for pr
ly commits more to proposed solution proposals, as if they are a solution, durin
evaluation; 3) is more heedful in finalizing a conclusion; and 4) is more likely to invest 
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cognitive labor prior to finalizing a conclusion (i.e., an evaluation purpose) rather than to 
spend cognitive efforts after finalizing a conclusion (i.e., justification purpose).  
To define the situational variations of cognitive entrepreneurship in problem 
solving, I introduced the alpha and omega cognitive strategies.  Sometimes, problem 
solvers internall dge and 
evaluate its “situation e identified 
evidence.   some 
situations, proble  conclusion  






r behavior precedes any cognitive elaboration—i.e., cognitive omega 
(or even absence of it), such as whe n (action) and subsequently 
justify the preceding des any overt 
action—i.e., cognitive alpha.  A prob  the cognitive alpha strategy is 
vying f
y and externally scrutinize available and applicable knowle
al relevance” in warranting a conclusion from th
Thus, one follows a process of reasoning  conclusion.  However, in
m solvers take an alternate approach such as (reasoning)
y quickly and
tifies the hastily made decision.  In such an instance, external and internal 
evidence seeking compensates for an ill-conceived prior decision.  I distinguish the latter 
reversal approach called a backward cognitive strategy from the former, which I cal
forward cognitive strategy.  The backward reasoning strategy is likely to result from
willful or wishful thinking to achieve a certain decision outcome (the inclination to take a
stand without just grounds or sufficient information) or from premature engagement
influential prior decisional rules. 
At times, ou
n we make a decisio
action.  At other times, our cognitive effort prece
lem solver using
or a perfect solution selection for a problem, whereas a problem solver using the 
cognitive omega strategy is vying for a perfect justification for a preceding decision.  A 
cognitive omega problem solver may have lower aspirations for information but has no 
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lower aspiration for problem resolution.  However, determining the rationality of 
problem solvers by their choice of cognitive strategy is futile without considering th
situational conditions under which the decision was made.  Rationality should be judged 
only through the eyes of the beholders—i.e., the problem solvers. 
Evans (1989) noted that human reasoning has many variations.  He wrote that 
one’s “apparent competence in…reasoning exhibited under one set of circumstances is s
frequently absent in others” (p. 7).  Across various problematic situations they encounter, 
problem solvers take different mental approaches in dealing with the problems.  Then, w
should question how and why such situational variations occur. In the remainder
chapter, I will turn to antecedent conditions to account for such situational variations in
communicant behavioral patterns and cognitive strategies under problematic situations.







AND COGNITIVE ENTREPRENEURSHIP:  
AN INTRA-INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNT OF PROBLEM SOLVING 
All organisms are problem finders and problem solvers. 
Karl Popper 
The objective of this chapter is to build a theoretical account of the antecedent 
conditions that explain two new constructs: CAPS and CEPS.  These two communicative 
and cognitive features are recurrent phenomena that bear important theoretical and 
practical implications to problem solving.  The two previous sections identified the 
phenomena to be accounted for—i.e., conceptualizing two dependent variables—by the 
independent variables I am going to elaborate here.  In what follows, I describe the 
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conditions that precede communicant activeness and cognitive entrepreneurship in 
problem solving.  
Human Perception 
We see a map of the world, not the world itself. 
Albert Einstein 
Our universe dives into a sea of our perceptual experience.  Once we perceive th
something is problematic, that we are not constrained from doing something about it,
that we feel close connection to a problem, we act on our perception.  We do not a
directly on the actual sources that trigger perception.  In the situational theory of proble
solving, I delimit the scope of antecedent variables to perception, not to sources of 
perception.  In other words, what prompts our actions to do something about a problem is
our subjective perception of feeling problematic, unconstrained, and connected, not the 
objective things that trigger such senses.  Therefore, to gain conceptual coherence, we
need to theorize from our internal perceptions to our action rather than to theori
the external or internal sources of those perceptions to our action.  In the latter theorizing 












 seriousness) explain the dependent variables of action (e.g., a public’s 
information seeking about a problem).  In contrast, in the former approach, subjective 
variables as independent variables (e.g., a public’s perception of problem seriousnes
explain the dependent variables of action (e.g., a public’s information seeking about a 
problem).  
Problem solvers will not initiate a communicative behavior or perform any 
cognitive labors unless they perceive a reason for it.  For that reason, a message (a source
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of perception) cannot trigger action unless it triggers a sense of problem recognition 
(perception).  Our perception is often biased and inaccurate.  However, regardless o
seriously our perceptions are flawed, people consistently respond to their own subjective 
perceptions.  Therefore, knowing about people’s perceptions can help in predicting their 
subsequent behaviors.  For example, some people mistakenly overestimate current 
obstacles against them to do something about their perceived problem.  Even if a b












 “the eyes 
of the beholders” perceive the situations that confront them.   
y, but their consequences are substantial. 
Suppose that a doctor knows that her patient misperceives and overestimates 
barriers to improve his health.  The doctor may not understand why her patient canno
something to change a problematic situation.  To use a doctor’s more objective evaluati
of the actual level of constraints cannot necessarily predict the likelihood of the patie
taking action to do something about his problem.  Rather, despite being pathetically 
inaccurate, people’s own misperceptions will become stronger predictors of their 
subsequent behavior in dealing with the problem, even if less than optimal.  What this 
suggests to us is that many theoretical efforts in communication behaviors adopt, more or
less, the objective criteria of non-perceptual variables (e.g., education level, income, an
psychographics) rather than subjective criteria dealing with matters of perception (e.g., 
problem recognition, constraint recognition, level of involvement).  We perceive and 
construct our own reality, and then behave on that subjective reality.   Thus, to 
understand how people approach their problems, we need to explain better how
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Therefore, I delimit the following conceptual efforts to apply to the situational 
perception found in “the eyes of problem beholders.”  Drawing a conceptual boundary in 
 because, without such a delimitation, external versus internal 
distinct e 
 
  By 
us.  








hierarchical model of problem detection that provides a conceptual basis for concepts and 
this way is necessary
ions can complicate the resulting account.  For example, in a prior study of th
situational theory of publics, the temporal order of involvement and problem recognition 
questioned whether problem recognition precedes involvement or involvement precedes
problem recognition (J. Grunig & Childers, 1988).  It remains a chicken-and-egg debate 
unless we can delimit our conceptual boundary to only the perceptual variables.
demarcation of independent variables to perceptual ones, we can solve the debate.  
Without a perceived problem state, there is nothing to evaluate how it is connected to 
We never evaluate the importance of something until we know its existence.  Therefore, 
our perceptual awareness of a problematic state pre
ife. Next, I will construct a perceptual account of what kind of situational 
ions would prompt our problem-solving efforts within cognitive and 
nicative dimensions. 
A Hierarchical Model of Problem Detection 
How do we learn that a problem exists?  Or, when do we notice that there is 
ing so problematic that it subsequently initiates our problem-solving efforts? 
cally, how do we begin to pay attention to something as being problematic in a 
of alternate candidates vying for our attention?  Here, I propose a conceptual 
a verbal theory14—that answers these questions.  This theoretical account is a
                                                 
14 In terms of Popper’s (1999) terminology, the verbal theory I introduce in this section is a theory with 
high “logical content” rather than “empirical content” that lead me to a testable study (Popper, 1999, p. 19).  
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propositions of antecedent parameters within the situational theory of problem solving 
(STOPS).  A hierarchical model of problem detection originates from what Karl Poppe
called “conjectural knowledge” (1963).  Popper (1963, 1999) said in his evolutionary 
epistemics that all perceptual knowledge presupposes a priori knowledge for an
organism.  Conjectural knowledge may or may not be valid.  Regardless of its validity, it 












seek no 1996, p. 377). 
t 
 
dissatisfied state from which we struggle to free ourselves and pass into a state of 
do not wish to avoid, or change into a belief in anything else.”  The struggle to 
d 
closure.  According to Dewey (1938), this process of turning indeterminate 
ate ones, of turning a state of inconstancy to one of 
constancy, “like all activity is stimulated by discomfort, and the particular 
 cognizant of something problematic when they perceive a perceptual 
discrepancy—“the clash between hypotheses and reality” (Popper, 1999, p. 47).  In the 
following, I will discuss in detail how we come to perceive something as problematic.
Problem Detection 
How do we know when something is problematic?  Most psychologists an
philosophers agree that 
 of social psychology (e.g., Associationists) believed in “data as strictly driving 
ion and humans as seeking accurate knowledge (truth)” (Gollwitzer & 
. 377). However, Instrumentalists such as C. S. Peirce and John Dewey 
ged the assumption of accurate knowledge-seeking by pointing out that “peop
t truth, but simply an end to doubt” (Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, 
Gollwitzer and Moskowitz (1996) made a comprehensive historical review about the shif
of the assumptions.  They succinctly summarized: 
Peirce states (1877, p. 66) that the irritation of “doubt is an unhappy and
belief, while [the feeling of believing] is a calm and satisfactory state which we 
end doubt was labeled as a process of Inquiry that produced what Gestalists calle
situations to determin
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discomfort concerned is called ‘doubt,’ just as hunger is the discomfort that 
stimulates eating and thirst is the discomfort that stimulates drinking.”  Thus, the 
seeking meaning and reducing doubt (similar to what Festinger, 1957, labeled 
oubt, 
sets the person off on to what Dewey (1929) called a quest for certainty. This 
any knowledge that will end doubt quickly and produce closure (so long as it is 
(Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, 1996, p. 377) 
A need to do something arises when a living organism perceives a doubtful 
situation, because an indeterminate situation is problematic to a living organism.  Unless 
the “doubt” or indeterminacy turns into a determinate state (i.e., “closure”), the living 
organism will avoid this situation of “discomfort.”   This imposes a most fundamental 
problem—to live on.  Thus, a living organism initiates a “quest for certainty,” maybe 
through “accurate knowledge” or through “any knowledge” that can achieve a 
satisfactory degree of closure.  Naturally, any living organism evolves to have an internal 
detection mechanism to anticipate a potentially doubtful or discomforting situation. 
Related to this detection mechanism, Simon (1967) proposed a model of dual 
mechanisms–goal-terminating and interrupt mechanisms–in the human nervous system.  
He reasoned that the human mind needs an interrupt mechanism to redirect cognitive 
resources to the most important tasks.  Marcus, Neuman, and Mackuen (2000) reviewed 
Simon’s model of the working of the nervous system in proposing their model of 
affective intelligence.  
The human nervous system…is primarily a serial processor of information.  He 
emory 
to support this contention.  Such serial processors require two support 
 
redirect attention when goal-oriented behavior has reached a satisfactory state in 
environment requires an interrupt mechanism to redirect human attention to 
processing system operates in the service of needs to gain a sense of control, 
avoidance of dissonance).  An upset or imbalanced system, one beset by d
quest can occur through perusing accurate knowledge or through the pursuit of 
experienced as being a good enough or sufficient conclusion). [italics added]  
 
[Simon] reviews research on attention, temporal response intervals, and m
mechanisms, first a goal-terminating mechanism (Simon’s term is satisficing) to
terms of an initial goal.  Second, the human organism living in a demanding 
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higher priority real-time needs, no matter the ongoing effort to secure some 
 
antecedent goal. [italics added]. (Marcus et al., 2000, pp. 6-7) 















achine with a hope to get a jackpot, thinking the time for a 
jackpot has come after a series of losses.  Or it could be even genetically-coded inborn 
rganisms mobilize their limited problem-solving capacity (i.e., cognitive and 
nicative resources) to generate a better fit with their living conditions.  
cally, a perceptual detecting mechanism for impending problematic states allows 
ng of a time period.  
Expectation, Observation, and Unbearable Badness-of-fit  
 How do we detect a problem?  To understand this process, we need to kno
basic mechanism of perception.  Two key concepts that comprise the perceiving 
mechanism are expectation and observation (c.f., “conjecture”) and their joint interaction
the perceived degree of goodness-of-fits between two (c.f., “refutation”) (Popper, 19
We continuously expect something out of living.  At the same time, within the limits o
our perceptual capacity, we continuously test the validity of our expectations
ation tests the reasonableness of our expectations. By expecting something ab
what we are about to experience and by testing its fit with experiential objects or events
(i.e., perceived reality), we get an internal sense of experiencing.  
The content of what we expect can be anything.  It could be transferred from 
experiential knowledge—i.e., our past experience or learning in a very specific fo
as “after a cold winter, there comes a warm spring.”  It could be derived from simple 
inferential knowledge—i.e., a guess or a wish about something to experience such a
pulling the arm of a slot m
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knowledge in a living organism such as a newborn baby who expects to be fed by its 
mother (Popper, 1963). 
However, without expecting something or some state of conjectural a prior
knowledge, no matter how crude its content, we cannot experience anything (Popper,
1963, 1999).  A biological research finding suggests that the role of expectation-
observation-refutation would be essential in our perception of the world (Radnitzky & 
Bartley, 1987). According to McCulloch (1965), frogs register only four kinds of visual 
effects because only four types of signals can be sent to their brains.  McCulloch (1965) 
summarized: 




stationary parts of the world around him.  He will starve to death surrounded by 
movement.  He will leap to capture any object the size of an insect or worm 
meat but by any moving small object…. His choice of paths in escaping enemies 
is darker. (p. 231) 
To live, frogs only need four kinds of visual effects that enable them to 
accomplish such tasks as catching small moving objects (e.g., flies) and leaping towards 
dark spaces if they encounter a predator.  To frogs, the world consists only of the 
contrasts, the small dark objects, the moving shadows and sudden dimming of light that 
they perceive.  A frog’s knowledge of the world is not given (i.e., data drive perception 
like the Associationists’ claim), but is the product of the evolved sense organs and 
conjectural knowledge that only reflect some, but not all, aspects of the world (i.e., a 
priori conjectural knowledge drives us to perceive some aspects of world).  
Why cannot frogs perceive things other than four objects in this world?  Our 
experiential world, obviously, consists of many more than four things.  Irrespective of 
food if it is not moving.  His choice of food is determined only by size and 
providing it moves like one.  He can be fooled easily, not only by a bit of dangled 
does not seem to be governed by anything more devious than leaning to where it 
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their presence, frogs have difficulties in perceiving them because they have no matchin
internal theory to be used for expecting the immediate environment they face.  Like fro
other living organisms cannot perceive without the available content material of 
expectations and the very act of expecting toward the immediate world.  Unlike frog









 the world we are about to experience.  Experiencing an object or an event 
ental pulse we project and the rebound that we 
perceive through our xpect consciously 




We constantly apply and evaluate the adequacy of content we are expecting via 
observing the areas of experience that are defined by content material of an expectation. 
We are “anticipation machines” (Dennett, 1991, p. 177) that project the beams of 
expectation onto our environment in the same way a sonar or radar would.  Withou
transmitting a pulse of sound and receiving its rebounding echo, we cannot ever detect 
anything regardless of its presence to us.  The pulse of sound in sonar or radar is 
mental scan of
presented to us is only possible by the m
sensory organs—the act of expecting.  We may e
nnot perceive withou
In addition, just as we load bullets into a gun, we can load anything into our 
expecting gun, from pleasant events to boring routines, or from very general ideas to ve
specific knowledge. We are able to perceive by our act of expecting.  Moreover, we
able to expect many things at the same time.  The perceptual gun in our mind h
outstanding capacity to load and shoot multiple and seamless mental pulses 
simultaneously.  
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By way of analogy, we are like a turned-on projector loaded with various slides or 
films (conjectural hypotheses or lay theories about our living).  We select and lo
contents into our mental projector corresponding to the life tasks we have to deal with at 
a given moment.  Our continuous pro
ad 












experiencing) is then compared with what is on the screen.  The lack of fit 
between what will be and what is redirects our cognitive resources to it.  As mentioned,
expecting an a priori theory/hypothesis is a necessary condition for any perceptual 
process and experience.  However, a variance—a psychological distance—is created 
when our cognitive recycling attempt (expecting by applying a hypothesis of what
(should) be) yields a failure of fit to what is.  Once a person identifies a variance, he or 
she tries to explain the variance by mending conjectural hypotheses (i.e., changing 
cognitive knowledge) or by modifying observational contents (i.e., changing reality 
through action).  
To summarize, the expectatio
d state (e.g., “The meeting will be pleasant”), which is the content of expectati
turing), is found to be discrepant from the observed state (e.g., encountering 
remarks from others), one detects a problem.  This is a problem in that one 
nces a failure to confirm the adopted hypothesis (e.g., pleasant meeting)—i.e., a
ry about a present state.  This is how we begin to perceive something as 
atic.  
 Emotion in Problem Detection 
A problem must be felt before it can be stated.  
John Dewey (1938) 
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Studies about information seeking draw heavily on the notion of uncertainty, 
 it as if it istreating  a triggering mechanism for the subsequent pursuit of information. 









tem.  What causes us to draw our attention from 




f two distinct systems consisting of a 
disposi 0) 
evaluation.  That is, it demands an assessment of the effort, the prospects of 
success and failure of the sequence of actions.  For humans, these strategic 
Uncertainty perceived by a person would lead to
.  Anxiety can be described as “the affective (emotional) equivalent of 
inty” (Gudykunst & Nishida, 2001, p. 59), and it tends to motivate a person to 
formation to reduce the experienced negative psychological state (Afifi &Weiner, 
 Thus, affective states such as anxiety are commonly used to account for bridging 
ceptual distance between uncertainty and motivation in information seeking (A
er, 2002).  However, in the present study, I adopt a more general view, 
ring affective states other than anxiety.  In essence, any affective state can allow 
tect a problematic situation.  
Dispositional vs. surveillance sys
nt mental task to a new one?  What kind of “interrupt mechanism” redirect
attention to a newly emerging problem?  Simon (1967) pointed out that, in general
theories of human information processing are muted about the interaction of cognit
and affect.  Simon foresaw some role of emotion in cognitive systems (e.g., goal-
terminating systems and interrupt systems), but he himself did not work on it (Marcus, 
Neuman, & Mackuen, 2000).  Marcus et al. (2000) found a few theoretical works on t
affect-cognition interaction and developed a model o
tion system and a surveillance system in cognitive processing. Marcus et al. (200
explained the dispositional system:  
Strategic action, behavior designed to achieve a purpose, requires an ongoing 
success, the current stock of physical and psychic resources, and feedback on the 
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considerations are only occasionally governed by conscious calculation.  Mor
emotions of the disposition system provide precisely this guidance.  When our 
tell us that we are bursting with confidence, energy, and eagerness.  Alternatively
exhausted and beaten.  Shifts in the direction of increased elation strengthen the
e 
often these executive functions are done subconsciously.  Importantly, the 
feelings are focused on ourselves, changes in mood from gloomy to enthusiastic 
, 
when our mood changes in the direction of depression, we conclude that we are 
 
motivation to expend effort and strengthen confidence in a successful outcome. 
d 
effort and undermine confidence that the outcome will prove successful. 
toward the action… the disposition system relies on emotional assessment to 
enthusiastic and we abandon those that cause us despair. The disposition system 
 
that are already in their repertoire of habits and learned behaviors. [italics added] 
 
he surveillance system, acts to scan the environment for 
novelty and sudden intrusion of threat.  It serves to warn us when we cannot rely 
 
and some people are powerful and dangerous.  This system uses emotion to 
of its ongoing analyses.  It generates moods of calmness, 
on the one hand, and anxiety, on the other.  Here we focus on its attention-related 
y on 
… So long as the comparison shows no discrepancy 
etween expectation and reality, the system generates a sense of calm and remains 
r, 
it evokes increasing anxiety, it interrupts ongoing activity, and it shifts attention 
d] 
(Marcus et al., 2000, pp. 10-11) 
A key contribution of their model is that emotion plays not only a role in 
managing routine tasks but also in redirection toward an emerging task.  This is a 
straightforward extension of Simon’s (1967) model of the workings of the human 
nervous system (i.e., goal-terminating vs. interrupt mechanism).  However, to make a 
Shifts in the direction of increased depression weaken the motivation to expen
Accordingly, this emotional calculus is translated into a summary disposition 
control the execution of habits: we sustain those habits about which we feel 
provides people with an understanding, an emotional report card, about actions
(pp. 9-10) 
About the surveillance system, they described:  
The second system, t
on past learning to handle what now confronts us and to warn us that some things
signal the consequences 
properties.  Identifying two systems in the limbic region of the brain suggests that 
people rely on their feelings to assess how well they are doing, and they rel
their feelings to scan for signs of threat and uncertainty.  What is interesting 
about this second emotional system is that the onset of increased anxiety stops 
ongoing activity and orients attention to the threatening appearance so that 
learning can take place
b
unobtrusive.  When the system detects unexpected or threatening stimuli, howeve
away from the previous focus and toward the intrusive stimuli. [italics adde
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more general accounting of the roles of emotion, their “emotional report card” conce
should include more than “anxiety” or “calmness.”  As I discuss next, any emotional
states can play the role of an emotional report card.  
Trade cognitive complexity for simple affective knowledge.  We must adapt 
handle multiple life problems simultaneously.  For example, breathing, seeing, listening, 












the future of the environment: that is, all future states of the environment.  
be adapted to the future conditions of the environment; and in this sense general 
knowledge comes earlier than momentary knowledge, than special knowledge. 
[italics added] (p. 49) 
 and apply certain ways of behaving, responding, and adapting to such recu
situations in an efficient way. Once we get used to maneuvering through a common 
problem, we find few reasons to maintain our cognitive investment to supervise each
solution application.  This is “automaticity”—defined as “capable of operating by itself
without any need for conscious guidance, once put in motion” (Bargh, 1996, p. 173).  
To handle multiple specific tasks simultaneously (which is a mandate for any
living organism), we need to devise some way of “efficient supervision.”  This r
some simplifying mental mechanism to reduce the complexity of handling multipl
Prototype hypotheses can simplify by trading complexity for a certain type of simpler 
cognitive information, often in the form of affective information (e.g., confidence in 
dealing with the problem, good or bad, pleasant/comfortable vs. 
unpleasant/uncomfortable). 
Prototype hypothesis.  Popper (1999) described our epistemic hypothesis testing 
about future states to life itself: 
So we reach the conclusion that life must from the start anticipate in some degre
Perhaps it is just a question of hours, or perhaps of millions of years.  Life must 
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Anticipating with a general knowledge such as affective knowledge allows us to 
test our hypotheses about current and impending future states.  Unless the general 
knowledge is invalidated, our mental process has no reason to be interrupted.  The 
prototypic hypothesis testing is, thus, managing and supervising multifarious living tasks.  
We are routinely challenged by a number of mental tasks arising at the same time. 
We need a meta-cognitive function that guides and manages routine tasks.  Meta-
cognition supervises how we are doing, rather than what we are doing.  Hence, we have 
evolved to deal with such a juggling problem by trading cognitive complexity for a 
simple affective state.  By lumping various forms of meta-cognitive feedback into a 
single piece of affective state—i.e., “emotional report card” (Marcus et al., 2000), we can 
condense and load them as one bullet into our mental gun of expectation.  We can 
effectively test our hypothesis of “going well” by summarizing the status of many mental 
tasks with a single prototypical content such as “feeling pleasant.” 
A fishing analogy can illustrate the role of general knowledge and special 
knowledge in managing multiple cognitive tasks efficiently.  Suppose that we throw out 
many fishing lines (e.g., ten) simultaneously.  How can we efficiently handle these 
multiple fishing lines without sacrificing our need for other mental commitments?  Of 
course, watching them individually makes us busy, indeed too busy to handle any other 
work (e.g., reading books).  A way to control multiple fishing lines is knotting them 
together.  By merging all the lines into one and holding them as a bundle—i.e., 
lumping—we can reduce the necessary mental resources in supervising all of the 
individual lines.  Until this system fails, we can efficiently meet our need for managing 
multiple tasks through the cheapest expenditure of cognitive resources.  Once the bundle 
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as a whole is in motion, we next look for which specific line causes the movement.  We 
economize our cognitive work until a sudden move arises.  Similarly, a human being 
recognizes a problem and its source, first by lumping manifold life tasks together.   On
we detect a strike—experiencing a betrayal of our expected content by observa
then investigate the causes of the betrayal.  Indeed, just a few mental knots (i.e., ma
clusters of prototype hypotheses) can handle numerous mental supervisory tasks. 
betrayal of such a prototype hypothesis is experienced, it is quite conveniently detectable 
and the person can look for which part caused the problem.  




 Once a 





ell with observational knowledge, it 
then tri , an 
explana  
situatio
t), we can efficiently abstract many physiological, physical, and psychological 
tasks at any given moment.  Any malfunction in any area of these life tasks will refute 
our expected mental hypothesis of “affective knowledge” (e.g., sense of being plea
This will break into our mental placidness—i.e., perceptual arousal.  It then redirec
cognitive resources until we found a cognitive solution for the perceptual problem.  If we
are not able to find a solution (e.g., an explanation of why the “unpleasantness” happened 
and/or how to deal with it), then we enter into a situation that is a meta-problem—i.e., a 
cognitive problem.  Emotion is a kind of “general knowledge” (e.g., pleasantness will be 
continued) that is supervising other mental tasks (Popper, 1999).  Once general 
knowledge that is loaded in expectation does not fit w
ggers a subsequent search for and identification of “special knowledge” (e.g.
tion about how it arises and how to behave in response).  Before a problematic
n, we can manage many critical living tasks with very simple, general, and 
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abstrac  
affective knowledge is sufficient to supervise other mental tasks. 
General knowledge is very primitive, but it provides substantial cues to detect an 
eruption of a problematic state.  However, we subsequently demand more specific 
knowledge about what causes the discrepancy and how we can narrow the gap.  Our 
prototypic knowledge evolves from primitive conjectural knowledge (e.g., emotion) to 
comprehensive special knowledge as we continue our problem solving efforts.  When a 
situation is over, we seal the problematic situation by means of the primitive conjectural 
knowledge (e.g., emotion such as pleasantness of confidence).  By reloading the affective 
state right after a situation (e.g., expecting to be pleasant again), we reduce cognitive 
complexity that we generated from problem solving.  We are trading meaning 
(confidence that we can handle such a problem) for complexity.  In summary, our 
repertoire of expected knowledge moves to and fro along the general-to-specific 
continuum in corresponding to opening and closure of problematic situations.  We travel 
a hierarchy of abstractness in conjectural knowledge from “general” to “specific” 
sequentially in a problematic situation.  
Entering and closing a situation. We not only start a problematic situation with a 
tradeoff between a meaning and complexity (e.g., unpleasantness), but also end it with a 
tradeoff between a meaning and complexity (e.g., pleasantness).  Once we build a 
solution successfully, we seal the problematic situation again by trading cognitive 
complexity for a certain meaning (i.e., a simpler prototype state such as confidence).  If 
we are satisfied with the new solution, we then confidently trade the complexity (i.e., the 
procedural knowledge of how to deal with such a problem) for a simpler affective state 
t knowledge.  The general conjectural knowledge that often comes in the form of
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such as restoring pleasantness or feeling competent in dealing with a problem.  Ear
Cvetkovich (1995) keenly captured our aspiration for achieving simplicity out of 
cognitive complexity in dealing with life problems:  
Men, endowed with limited human capacities, are troubled by the complex 
complex simple, that will give meaning to the complexity—trade meaning for 
distinction between a key and explanation.  A key is meaning and requires no 
of reason.  It is only the result—simplicity—that counts.  The force of an 
evidence. [italics added] (1995, p. 34) 
We are always struggling to cope with complexity.  After our problem-solving 
efforts, a solution, a procedure suggesting what to do, may result.  Yet, it taxes our 
mental resources to maintain these details.  Thus, epiphenomenal mental work is
necessary to close or se
l and 
environments into which they are thrown.  They seek the key that will make the 
complexity—and thus allow them to forget it…. And Veyne stresses the crucial 
argument, no evidence. It works because it reduces complexity, not for any matter 
explanation, in contrast, depends on the quality of its supporting arguments and 
 
 






Subsequently, we trace back what specifically triggers such a disruptive feeling.  
 solving capability while letting one forget about technical details (complexity)
In other words, the person now summarizes the details in problem solving by making it
into affective knowledge.  
Summary. People go through the steps of trading affective knowledge for 
cognitive complexity from the opening of a problematic situation to its closure.  Em
(affective knowledge) enables one to detect what goes wrong as an interruption 
mechanism.  With the perceptual mechanism of expectation, affective knowledge makes 
it possible to conduct prototypical hypothesis testing—i.e., a detection mechanism (c
“attention operator,” Simon, 1994).  By an eruption of some emotion, such as uneasiness 
in a given moment, we recognize that something is falling outside of our expected sta
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Additionally, emotion plays a role in cognitive closure of a problematic situation. 
It finalizes and seals the mental chasm.  If one successfully learns and understands the
details of what to do in a problematic situation (e.g., information), people then assign
 
 an 
affective summary about o e.g., confidence).  After 
making effo ly updated 
expected state or a renewed o forts at problem solving 
(e.g., ch
 
otion plays an indexing 
role tha bel of 
a given
betwee nal 




n (i.e., cognitive details) to construct a 
                                                
ne’s competence in problem solving (
rts to come to an end of a situation, the end state should be the new
bserved state that reflects our ef
anging conditions in and around the problem).  Whereas a situation arises 
through an emotional signal, a problematic situation is resolved, again, with some 
emotional sealer.  It is a compression of information that plays a functional role as a
mnemonic device 15 and an interruptive mechanism that diverts our mental concentration 
to other emergent tasks—i.e., new problems.  In other words, em
t summarizes and sorts out cognitively complex information.  It is a tag or la
 set of detailed information contained within a solution.  Here, a tradeoff occurs 
n complicated cognitive contents of how to deal with a problem and an emotio
sion that summarizes one’s competence in deali
ric feeling such as pleasantness, high self-esteem, or confidence regarding the 
problem).  Therefore, the closure of a problematic situation occurs with a tradeoff 
between cognitive complexity (information) and the relatively simple affective 
knowledge (emotion). 
However, in some situations, people cannot solve a problem because of sever
constraints, despite their strong desire for problem resolution.  Under such con
they might skip the process of accruing informatio
 
15 Mnemonic device refers to “an active, strategic kind of learning device or method, a rehearsal strategy” 








on?  J. 
antecedent situation or he finds himself in a new situation.  The situation then 
ension 
in the individual and “motivates” him to find a solution to his problem. 
t 
situation into a problematic situation, in that recognition of a problem is the first 
 
 but turn instead to alternate fillers—i.e., negative emotion seeking.  Wherea
information helps to close the gap between expected and observed states by fixing 
appropriate new expectations and/or improving observational states, emotion can create a
similar state of closure by filling up the gap with emotional content (e.g., anger).  That is, 
emotion can become a solution of discrepancy that reduces the perceived gap from 
badness-of-fit between expected and observed states.  In such a case, affective knowledge
becomes a special form of information that is functionally equivalent to information 
about a situation.  Thus, when one perceives a problem and feels a strong connection to
yet also feels strong constraints against doing something about it, one may enga
emotion seeking rather than information seeking (i.e., not by cognitive complexity).  
Definition of Problem and Situation 
For there is nothing either good or bad but thinking makes it so. 
Hamlet, William Shakespeare 
What is a problem?  Are problems always negative?  And what is a situati
Grunig (1968) viewed a problematic situation as “a function of a change in the situation” 
(p. 52).  He explained environmental factors (e.g., economic resources), individual 
factors (e.g., psychological attributes), and their interactions as antecedent conditions of a 
situation.  He explicated problem solving and situation as such: 
Problem solving behavior begins when a change occurs in the individual’s 
becomes lacking or indeterminant.  The lacking situation creates a state of t
Recognition of the existence of an indeterminacy converts the indeterminan
step in solving it. (J. Grunig, 1968, pp. 32-34) 
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Problem recognition occurs right after an observation refutes the content of an 
expectation.  The situational theory of publics defines problem recognition as “detec
that something should be done about a situation and stop to think about what to do” (J. 












moment, nothing can be perceived as change or difference and thus as problematic.  In 
ess and cognitive entrepreneurship in problem solving, I will explicate in the 
following section conceptual meanings for problem, meta-problem, situation, 
problematic situation, and problem recognition.  
First, I confine problem to those only already perceived.  It is of little use to 
extend the range of problem definition to something unperceivable to a decision-maker. 
Let’s take an example of poor minority residents who are exposed to high levels of lead 
in their houses, but who have not yet perceived how serious the situation is.  Governm
officials may initiate a massive health campaign to do something about it.  Howev
the most of the affected residents are heavily constrained by mo
 a daily living), the lead problem would not be a problem to the residents.  Despi
the danger, they do not perceive themselves to be in a problematic situation.  They s
feel happy and secure.  The problem of lead contamination exists in the health 
communicator’s mind and not yet in the residents’ minds.  Putting aside the normative
issue of the urgency of doing something about it, a problematic situation will not ex
until the residents perceive its consequence themselves (e.g., illness from the lead). 
Human beings can perceive changes in their environments (a change in the 
situation) only when one has adopted a frame of reference that gauges degree of 
departure from it.  Without a state to compare with what we psychologically carry at the 
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terms of the situational theory, people perceive something missing or sense a change in a 









                                                
em, a difference or change, when they experience such a betrayal of content 
material on an expectation.  I define problem as a perceptual discrepancy between 
expected and observed states to the unbearable extent of badness-of-fit.  This is a 
perceptual problem in that it arises when an assumed hypothesis about a current state and 
perceived reality collides.  In Popper’s (1963, 1999) terminology, a problem is the 
occurrence of which conjectural knowledge is refuted by reality.  Problem detection is 
the moment that a living organism perceives the refuted conjectural knowledge.  A 
perceptual problem triggers subsequent cognitive efforts to mend the discrepant caus
conjectural knowledge or to change or deflect perceivable reality.  
In the past, we considered the term situation as an identical concept with the term
problem.  However, here I distinguish the terms situation or problematic situation to have 
exclusive connotation of a temporal period from the point of time at which one detects a
meta-problem to that the po
ancy by any means.16  In other words, a situation refers to the temporal distance 
between the refuted conjectural knowledge and the establishment of an irrefutable ne
conjecture—i.e., a period of recovery from badness-of-fit to goodness-of-fit between 
expected and observed states.  Whereas a problem is about a perceptual aspect, a 
situation or a problematic situation is about a cognitive aspect. 
Although problems may arise, situations may not occur.  I make this distinction 
because a situation starts only when a meta-problem occurs, not when a perceptual 
problem occurs.  We deal with an almost infinite number of problems throughout our
 
16 The reduction of perceived discrepancy—i.e., problem solving—can be reached in several ways. 
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lives.  At every moment, we encounter more than a manageable number of perceived 
discrepancies between our expected states and observable states.  However, not all 
problems lead us to desperate situations that make us “stop to think about what to 
We learn from past problematic situations and thus anticipate and carry a past solution fo




unter, we attempt preconscious problem solving by applying an available 




, is a 





lution.  In case we experience a special moment in which our solution cannot solv
the problem, we experience a problem in dealing with a problem.  This is a meta-problem.  
I define a meta-problem as a perceived discrepancy between expected states (e.g
“I think I have a solution for this kind of problem”) and observed state (e.g., “I have no
idea what to do for this problem”), specifically when the anticipated state is one’s belief 
that one has a readily accessible, available, and applicable new hypothesis pertaining to 
problem. This problem, the absence of a readymade solution to a problem at hand
ve problem.  When we fail to do preconscious problem solving and experience
meta-problem, we then enter into a problematic situation.  A problematic situation thus 
requires two prerequisites.  One is problem detection and the other is meta-problem 
detection.  The closure of a problematic situation occurs when one establishes an 
applicable solution and one can successfully effectuate it enough to restore goodness-o
fit between an expected state and an observed state.  I will thus limit my theoretical focus 
to problematic situations (i.e., only problems coming with a meta-problem) rathe
all problems from now on. 
Analogy for problem and situation. To illustrate, I compare problem and situation
with the notion of time and space.  A problem is analogous to a geographic 
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ormation forwarder and information processor.  Two 
commu ognition. 
nt (e.g., a 
whereas a situation is analogous to a time concept, period.  As noted, the STP did 
not distinguish between problem and situation.  Researchers have used the two concepts 
interchangeably and synonymously.  However, I illustrate the differences between the 
two terms as follows.  A problem is a mental space that is opened in a subjective field of 
experiential interest.  This mental space takes up the area between the ex
state and the observation of certain state in the perceiver’s mind.  The chasm 
between the two states creates a temporal mental space.  In other words, a problem is a 
mental space that is temporarily opened in a perceiver’s psychological field, which i
defined as a domain of experience at a given moment.  In contrast, a problematic 
situation is a subjective time period that is demarcated and exists when a meta-problem 
occurs.  To close a mental chasm (problem), a perceiver makes efforts in narrowing the 
mental space.  
te the period of thinking of something as problematic by leaving the mental space 
(e.g., avoid thinking about the problem on which he or she feels little difference can b
made).  It may be through fixing the expected state (e.g., setting up a new expectation 
regarding the problem) or through subjectively deflecting the observed state (e.g., 
thinking or selective information seeking).  In brief, problem recognition is a summ
construct encompassing the opening of mental space over a certain time period.  
The field conception of a problem is useful in accounting for the differential 
contents of problems between inf
nicants may be in the same field but existing with or without problem rec
Perhaps the problem content for the information giver on some issue is differe
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pick-up truck salesman under pressure to meet the minimum quota for monthly sales) 
from the problem content for the information taker (e.g., a browser who may buy
the remote future but not immediately).  The contents are different, but the field 
(subjective field of interest) is the same—that is, car buying.  By the fit between the 
expected and observed states of each perceiver, a problem may exist on one side but not 
the other side (e.g., the car dealer is active but the customer is not active).  
Correspondingly, one may become very active in giving information, while 
another is not active in seeking information (e.g., potential customer is lukewarm bu
salesman is desperate in promoting his car).  Problems can often present differently even
in the same field (e.g., car trade) by the function of fit between the individual perceiver’s











phase, there is no reason for it to garner more attention than positive information. 
content of expectation and observation implied by the expected content. 
Problem and negativity.  We assume that negative events are easier to notice than
positive events.  For example, Slovic (1993) in his asymmetry principle of trust-buil
and trust-destroying suggested that negative events carry much greater weight than 
positive events when events come to our attention.  However, this is not necessarily so,
least in problem detection.  If some series of event history consists of a larger number of 
failures than successes, the failures (negative events) will be more visible. Likewise, once
attention is drawn, negative information gets more weight in judgment than positive case
do.  
However, we need to distinguish the salience of negative information between th
attention phase and judgmental phase.  Although, in the judgmental phase, negative 
information naturally carries more weight for its potential consequence, in the attention
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Because attention depends on context, rather than on severity of consequence, th
noticeability of negative and positive information at the attention-phase h
e 






nt.  We 





sful and the other player feels defeated.  Although the strategic move 
is perceived as a tive problem 
In other words, attention is not content-sensitive, but context-sensitive—how 
conspicuous it is among others. 
The way I define problem pertains to the attention phase rather than the 
judgmental phase.  Hence, this frees the concept of problem from its content 
characteristics (e.g., negativity).  Problem is a detection of ill fit between expected state
and observed state.  For problem detection, the content of expectations does not 
necessarily play a role in perceiving something as problematic.  For example, if one
receives notice from a doctor that one has a terminal illness, a negative problem is li
to be perceived.  However, if the poor person is again notified that the prognosis was in 
error, he must experience a pleasant surprise—that is, a positive problem.  The person 
had detected problems similarly in either case, in that they betrayed his expectation
the moment.  His doom problem and delight problem were equally discrepa
perceive any pleasant problem through an identical detection process as we do for any 
unpleasant 
In addition, what makes a problem from the attention phase continuously 
problematic in the judgmental phase is not the content of observation, but the content of 
expectation.  To clarify, I offer the example of chess players.  In a chess game, on
player’s strategic and successful move against the competitor’s queen can be perc
starkly different ways.  Although two chess players share a single identical event, o
player feels succes
 negative problem for the threatened player, it is not a nega
 138
for the winning play e 







.   The last way is flight from the problem—i.e., leaving 
the pro t two 
mega 
 
er. Likewise, one team’s scoring of a touchdown in a football gam
will likely be perceived
 is a subjective state if and only if it presumes, intentionally or unintentionally, 
consciously or unconsciously, some state of being within the situation. For that rea
change of situation from normal to problematic happens because of the discrepancy o
expectation from what the person observes now.  To be precise, nothing can be 
necessarily considered problematic solely because of observed content.  
Problem-solving strategies.  Generally speaking, the proposed hierarchica
of problem detection suggests three strategies for dealing with problems once a pers
perceives a psychological distance between the expected and observed states in one’s 
domain of experience.  A problem solver’s strategies in dealing with a problem vary f
1) revision strategy, 2) deflection strategy, to 3) flight strategy.  The first strategy is to 
remedy the contents of the expectation—i.e., revision of expectation content (e.g., lower 
one’s aspiration).  The next strategy is to fix the contents of the observation—i.e., 
changing or deflecting the observed content (e.g., being selective, such as avoiding 
discrepancy-causing information)
blem field (e.g., avoiding thinking about the problematic situation).  The firs
approaches directly intervene into either of the sources that cause the discrepancy. 
Specifically, one may look for revising or reinforcing information through 
communication behaviors by taking a certain cognitive strategy (e.g., cognitive o
strategy).  
A problem solver’s subjective perception about the problematic situation will 
influence what kind of problem-solving strategy one would subsequently take.  Thus, it is
 139
necessary to inquire what kind of perceptual antecedents influence the choice of 
subsequent problem-solving strategies. They are problem recognition, constraint 
recogni
 
hesion or collision between the contents of 
expecta
 is the 
 to what extent one is competent 
this kind.  
d 
tion, level of involvement, referent criterion, and situational motivation in 
problem solving.  
Antecedent Parameters of Communicant Activeness and  
Cognitive Entrepreneurship in Problem Solving 
Problem Recognition 
No problem exists until we recognize it.  We do not discover a problem external 
to us.  It is born and lives inside of us.  Thus, a problem is not independent of our 
individuality in thinking.  A problem is a joint product of our mind-working and the 
perceived world in which we reside.  The interaction between what we expect and what 
we observe jointly creates a problem.  The size and characteristics of a new-born problem
are solely defined by the extent of co
tion and observation.  I have explicated the differences between perceptual 
problem (problem) and cognitive problem (meta-problem).  A perceptual problem
early and necessary part of a problematic situation that mainly involves the attention 
phase in a problematic situation.  In contrast, a cognitive problem is the latter part of a 
problematic situation.  It primarily concerns the judgmental phase of what to do about the 
perceived psychological discrepancy.  The judgmental phase concerns the perceiver’s 
evaluation of what caused it, how it can be resolved, and
in problem solving of 
Definition. The situational theory of publics adopts a definition of problem 
recognition as when “people detect that something should be done about a situation an
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stop to think about what to do” (J. Grunig, 1997, p. 10).  In the previous section, I
conceptually illustrated how we detect something as an unbearably poor fit by a 
hierarchical model of problem detection.  Following the introduced concepts, I define 
problem recognition as one’s perception that there is something missing and there is n
immediately applicable solution to it.  It is, thus, a meta-problem following a perceptua
problem—i.e., a perceptual state one experiences after the failure of preconscious 
problem solving.   
It is not only a perceptual problem, but also a cognitive problem in that one 









anism to narrow the perceived psychological discrepancy) then enters into a 
problematic situation.  As a result, the person is likely to stop one’s current routines to 
think about a solution. However, it increases only the probability of “stop to think about 
what to do,” not determine it. There are other factors such as the extent of perce
connection to the problem and perceived obstacles in doing something. These ad
factors jointly influence whether one “stops” things one is doing “to think about what to 
do.” In other words, a person may or  may not stop to think about what to do even with
high level of problem recognition   
To conceptualize problem recognition, thus, we need to incorporate two aspects 
of a problem simultaneously—the perceptual problem and the cognitive problem 
(attention phase and judgmental phase).  Without a precedent perceptual problem, we 
never feel a modicum of reason to “stop to think about what to do” (J. Grunig, 1997, p. 




recognize what is currently missing: detect a discrepancy between what we expect a
what we observe 
nd 
and experience absence of a solution. 
Level of Involvement 
Communication and marketing research heavily uses the concept of involvement 
(Salmon, 1986).  The involvement concept demonstrates its utility in segmenting and 
discriminating between people with varying levels of involvedness. The level of 
involvement correlates with the differential behaviors regarding products, issues, or 
problem solving behaviors (J. Grunig, 1989).  Specifically, when we know one’s le
involvement, communicators can predict how an individual would behave differently
regarding problems, products, and ideas.  Singling out a cohesive but distinct group of 
people from a general population almost always rewards communicators with its 
economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in pu
vel of 
 





d involvement as a 
m” (1965) and Rothschild and Ray (1974) saw it as a 
charact
 much confusion that arises from overuse of the concept among communication 
researchers.  Therefore, I next delimit the conceptual meaning of involvement adopted in 
the present study. 
Definition.  Lovelock and Weinberg (1984) gave a “common-sense” definition o
involvement as “degree of importance or concern” that a product or behavior generates in
different individuals (p. 73).  Previously, the involvement concept carried meaning 
non-perceptual way.  For example, Krugman (1965) define
characteristic of a “mediu
eristic of a “product.”  However, J. Grunig (1976) defined it as a “perception” that 
people come to have within a given situation.  He defined level of involvement as “the 
extent to which people connect themselves with a situation” (J. Grunig, 1997, p. 10). 
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People enact their communicative action by their perceived connection—involveme
of self to the problematic situation.  When their perceived connection is low, they are
likely to be passive in communication behavior.  When they perceive a close connection, 
they are likely to be active in communication behavior.  Thus, it is better to capture th
notion of a perceptual variable of involvement, rather than capturing the notion of 
triggering variables of perception.  Even if the actual connection of some events or 
problems to us is important, we will not initiate behavior to do something about the 









gnition.  It is only after he recognizes his health problem that he 
rtant this problem is to him (i.e., a perceived connection).  Thus, to 
underst ant 
Without awareness of an existing problem, a situation will never start.  We nev
feel something needs to be done without a preceding perception of something missing. 
Knowing what is missing is a logical a priori step to estimating how closely we are 
connected with it.  We should see there is a significant leap from one’s actual connection
to one’s perceived connection.  We do not live in an objective world, but live in a 
perceived world.  We construct our reality subjectively, not taking a single standard 
version of reality.  We thus translate our perception of the world, not the world itself.  W
cannot do anything at all before we happen upon this perception.  Actual connection is
thus, different from perceived connection.  
A person who is not aware that he is terminally ill (i.e., actual connection to the 
health problem) will not do anything about it until he finds abnormal signs of his ph
condition—problem reco
evaluates how impo
and, explain, and predict subsequent problem-solving efforts (e.g., communic
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activeness), we need to delimit our conceptual scope to what we perceive as being 
connected rather than to what we are actually connected.  
Constraint Recognition  
Unlike the concept of involvement and problem recognition, few commu
and marketing theories use a concept like constraint recognition explicitly (J. Grunig
1989).  Constraint recognition is one of two original conceptual variables developed b
Grunig (1968) in the earlier version of the situational theory of publics.  Constraint









constraints of resources available to a decision maker (J. Grunig, 1968, 1989).  Later in 
social psychology, Bandura (1977) proposed “personal efficacy” in his social learning 
theory, which is a very close concept to J. Grunig’s (1968) constraint recognition.  
Definition.  The situational theory of publics defines constraint recognition as 
when “people perceive that there are obstacles in a situation that limit their ability to do 
anything about the situation” (J. Grunig, 1997, p. 10).  From studies about large land 
owners and peasants in Colombia, J. Grunig (1969, 1971) found that “people have little 
need to communicate in situations where constraints prevent people from making 
choices” (J.  Grunig, 1997, p. 10).  Constraint recognition discourages communication 
behavior such as information seeking and processing even if communicants have high 
problem recognition and/or level of perceived involvement.  As noted by J. Grunig’s 
(1969, 1971, 1972) studies of Colombian peasants and landowners, people are less likely 
logy, unlike many variables in communication theories.  A close parallel concept 
traint recognition from economics and management is a discounting factor in 
rogramming, a statistical process that can be used to maximize profits within the 
 144
to communicate about “problems or issues about which they believe they can do little
about behaviors they do not believe they have the personal efficacy to execute” (J. 
Grunig, 1989, p. 212).  
Referent Criterion 
People approach their problems by recalling relevant experiences of success 
similar to a current problem.  If their search for prior experience is fruitless, they will tur
to external sources for a so
 or 
n 
lution.  Originally, J. Grunig (1968) described a referent 
criterio iteria 
y 
lead to a generalized query of the following kind: “what criteria can I discover 
experienced fire fighter asks, “Are there any underlying principles of fire fighting 
] 
(p. 97)  
Thus, J. Grunig (1997) formally defined a referent criterion as “a solution carried 
from previous situations to a new situation” (p. 11).  We can also construe referent 
criterion as a cognitive “schema” and “cross-situational attitude” to those bits of 
cognitive and attitudinal knowledge that guide problem-solving and decision-making (J. 
Grunig, 1997).  It generally reduces the need for a problem solver to search for additional 
information.  However, the referent criterion as an independent variable has not been a 
n as a “gross criterion” or “general guide” in which other more specific cr
will be required to fit (e.g., maximum profits, maximum sales, and survival of the 
organization) (pp. 27-28).  According to J. Grunig (1968), a referent criterion is 
“determined by the antecedent condition, especially from the social contacts of the 
individual and from his past behavior which has partially determined the antecedent 
conditions” (p. 27).  J. Grunig (1968) illustrated the need of a referent in repeated 
problems by Simon’s (1957) explanation.  Simon (1957) explained such a need: 
When a problem of a particular kind has several times arisen for decision, it ma
which can be used whenever a problem of this kind arises?”  For example, the 
which can be applied to the many fire situations with which I deal?” [italics added
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good predictor for communication behavior as intended (e.g., J. Grunig & Disbrow, 
1977).  J. Grunig (1997) thus dropped it from the situational theory of publics.  He 
omitted it because he concluded that referent criteria would be “more of an effect of 
communication than a cause” (J. Grunig, 1997, p. 11).  
Although dropping the referent criterion has conceptual and empirical merit
find that the notion has some conceptual utility in explaining the new variables in this 
dissertation.  In the earlier chapter on communicant activeness in problem solving, I 
developed a set of new dimensions of communicant activeness such as information 
forwarding, information sharing, information forefending, and information permitting.  I 
reason that the referent criterion a solution carries from previous situations would e
little variance for information seeking and processing empirically.  However, I reason 






will refine its conceptual meaning in detail. 
es to some extent.  
For example, we can run four more regression equations beyond the two 
conventional regression equations for information seeking and information processing (J.
Grunig, 1997, p. 12).  Should a referent criterion—a solution toward a given problem—
be available to a communicant, we can logically predict that she or he would forward or 
share it with others, would forefend more and permit less in taking and giving newly 
available information.  If the dropped variable, referent criterion, removes some variance 
in explaining those dependent variables of communicant behavior, keeping it out of 
situational theory should be a loss, not only in the empirical sense but also in terms of 
theoretical validity.  In the following section, I 
 146
Definition.  Although it has some perceptual aspect, referent criterion is closer to 
cognition because it conceptually taps and measures the available knowledge and 
inferential rules from one’s prior problem-solving experiences.  I define referent criterio
as any knowledge or subjective judgmental system that exerts specific influence on the 
way one approaches problem solving.  This can include decisional guidelines or decision 
rules perceived as relevant to a given problem. Problem solvers bring them over from
prior problematic situations.  However, I discriminate between decisional referents on-
duty—that is, applicable and workable referents of which a problem solver is aware—a
off-duty ones—those which are applicable and workable but not yet recognized for th
value to the given problem-solving situation.  Even if we store some useful knowledge 
decisional referents in our memory, unless they are available and evaluated for their 
workability within a given problem, they are of no use.  By the success of internal 







ee of cognitive entrepreneurship and communicant activeness in problem 





 as wishful 
solving varies.  If a problem holder finds a r
s less likely to have an entrepreneurial mindset and less eager to seek for 
information in dealing with a current problem.  In contrast, if one has difficulty in 
retrieving a workable solution from internal storage, then one is more likely to ta
entrepreneurial mindset and communicant activeness to compose a novel solution.  
In addition to the knowledge aspect of a referent criterion, I now include
presence and extent of wishful thinking and/or willful thinking toward an end sta
problem solving.  Generally speaking, such self-fulfilling decisional referents
thinking or willful thinking lower one’s problem solving effectiveness because of their 
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tendency to result in misdiagnosis of problem characteristics and self-fulfilling solution 
building and evaluation.  Once a problem holder retrieves such a self-fulfilling referen
(e.g., a goal, a desire, or a preference), this will strongly influence the interpretations and 
selection of the data encountered during problem solving.  The stronger presence of suc
self-fulfilling decisional referents 
t 
h 







erceptual variables and the referent criterion one activates after detecting a 
eneurial approach in problem solving.  
In summary, problem solvers do carry referent criteria from previous proble
situations.  Or they instantly improvise by configuring available knowledge, experience, 
or judgmental rules derived from similar problems.  In the latter case, problem solv
often use subjective decisional referents such as wishful or willful thinking about the end 
result.  However, irrespective of the differential contribution to problem solving 
effectiveness, any decisional referent is functionally identical in that problem solvers 
deploy it to gain closure on a problematic situation.  They become a major premis
syllogistic reasoning in a given decision-making or problem-solving scenario.  In case 
one adopts a more self-fulfilling referent (e.g., a terminally ill patient may think my 
illness must not be that serious), subsequent choice and drawing of the minor premise 
would be a more self-fulfilling one that corresponds with the subjective major premise 
components (e.g., sampling of observational reality that is more compatible with self-
fulfilling referent: “Look, most of my physical conditions are not different from norma
people”). 
Situational Motivation in Problem Solving 
Situational theory offers a means to predict publics’ differential responses with its
three p
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problem. One’s perception is subjective to the individual perceivers (individual 
differences with the same perceptual object and event), situational across time periods
(they dissipate and no longer exist after problem resolution), and antecedent to 
motivation (may or may not do something about the perceived state), cognitive 
processing (one may or may not think further about the perceived state), and 
communication behaviors (one may or may not seek, forward, and forefend informatio
People act on their perceptions, whereas motivation and cognition (i.e., referent crit
are enacted by the perceptions. We can say that the perception of a problematic state, 
perceived capacity or capability regarding problem, and perceived connectedness are t
prime movers at least in our mind that trigger subsequent adaptive behaviors about the 
perceived states (i.e., problems).  
Source of redundancy in problem recognition and level of involvement. J. G
(1997) has defined problem recognition as a situation wherein “people detect that 
something should be done about a situation and stop to think about what to do” (p. 10). 
He defines level of involvement as the perceived “extent to which people connect 
themselves with a situation” (J. Grunig, 1997, p. 10). The measurement item for problem 
recognition is “how often do you stop to think about” the issue; whereas for level of 
involvement the measure is “to what extent do you see a connection between yourself, 






runig, 1997, pp. 45-47). These two 
constructs are com mmunication 
 
plementary but independent in predicting different co
behaviors. However, we need to take a finer look at how we come to “stop to think.” Our
perceptual mechanism detects countless “discrepancies” or cases of “something is 
lacking” routinely. Whenever we detect a lack, we instantly judge whether and how it 
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would affect (i.e., connect to) our current or future state of being (e.g., “Will this ruin m
interest?”). By instant judgment (i.e., preconscious problem solving), we tend to keep 
only a handful of “lacking situa
y 





rtain state as problematic when our current expectation about things turns 
nitial point at 







a problematic situation (detect), the perceived connection close enough to keep our mind 
ns.” The resulting “stop to think about” state is, thus, an end state from our 
judgment about relevance—to the extent of connection between ourselves and a
state.  
 Even if we detect a problem, unless it affects us significantly, we will soon leave 
the situation. There is a sequential cognitive process that people lead themselves to a 
certain communicative behavior. To illustrate, we need to look at the behavioral m
that dissects the developmental stages for the human decision-making process. We
perceive a ce
out discrepant from it. The detect of the behavioral molecule is thus an i
m recognition represents the detect segment of the behavioral molecule…people 
do not stop to think about a situation unless they perceive that something needs to be 
done to improve the situation” (J. Grunig & Hunt, 1984, p. 149). Even if we momen
“stop to think about” something that has a close connection, we will not continue to pa
cognitive taxes in sustaining us to keep us “stopping to think.” We are under 
nal demands from more closely connected problems. We are cognitive investors
who selectively distribute our limited cognitive resources in terms of some prioritization 
principle. “Stop to think about” is thus the outcome of a cognitively active state resulting 
from a joint function of three perceptual prerequisite conditions: the internal presence
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alive to think about the problem, and the perceived obstacles prohibiting us from do








dditionally, three of the independent variables in the situational theory are 
perceptual variables such as “perceived lacking,” “perceived connection,” and 
“perceived obstacles that limit one’s ability to do anything.” To enhance the conceptual 
coherence among the independent variables, the situational theory needs to eliminate the 
“stop to think” notion from its conceptual definition of problem recognition. Again, one’s 
state of stop to think is not perceptual, but motivational.  The following diagram 
illustrates the conceptual sequence between situational perception and situational 
motivation.  
Figure 9. Situational motivation and perceptual antecedent conditions. 
Stop to think = f (detection, connection, constraint). 
on that something is missing in a situation alone is not sufficient to stop to think. 
tection and connection are two perceptual necessary conditions for “the state of 
think” about the discrepancy further. Putting it differently, when people “stop to 
about something then there would be a sufficient level of “perceived missing,” 
ved connection,” and “perceived lack of obstacles” that make cognitive efforts




Three perceptual variables jointly predict one’s “heightened cognitive readin
and “augmented epistemic motivation” as cognitive and motivational outcomes during a 
problematic situation. The situational perceptions and the epistemic motivation are 
confounded in the current definition and operationalization of problem recognition. It 
contains a built-in confoundedness that is tapping the level of involvement.  
We are cognitive economizers who selectively “stop to think” about only those 
problems that are closely connected with us. For this reason, “the extent to which people 
connect themselves with a situation” is already incorporated into the concept of problem 
recognition. As a natural consequence, the questions used to measure two constructs, 
problem recognition and level of involvement, become conceptual Siamese twins; 
measuring one thing unavoidably taps the other. To summarize: 
People do not stop to think unless they perceive that something is lacking in 
situation (problem recognition), unless they perceive that their connection









In this section, I reviewed and elaborated key independent variables to account for 
communicant activeness and cognitive entrepreneurship in problem solving.  I first 
explained the concepts of problem and situation by introducing conjectural knowledge 
and its testing—i.e., expectation and observation of a living organism. In so doing, I 
a lack of barriers that prohibit one’s problem-solving efforts. Thus, stop to th
about tendency is defined as a situational motivation—i.e., a situational need fo
cognitive working to fill out the discrepancy between expected and observed 
problematic states and to improve the problematic situat
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discussed the role of emotion (e.g., knotting) in managing multiple cognitive tasks. That 
is, a piece of general and abstract affective knowledge (e.g., pleasantness) becomes the 
content  
a 
ext, I reviewed and refined four situational antecedent variables from the 
situational theory ecognition, level 
of invo
 that there is 
ly applicable solution to it.  This reworks 
the pre
ink” 
 of a conjectural hypothesis to be tested by observation.  I called this prototype
hypothesis testing. It gives a supervisory summary of many mental and physical tasks at 
given moment. Once we experience a refutation in prototypic hypothesis testing, we 
subsequently pursue more specific knowledge to explain what happens, why it happens, 
and how something should be handled.  Entering and closing a situation is thus signified 
with conjectural affective knowledge that trades cognitive complexity for simpler 
affective meaning.   
N
of publics (J. Grunig, 1989, 1997).  They are problem r
lvement, constraint recognition, and referent criterion. I distinguished problems as 
emergent in two different phases: perceptual (attention phase) and cognitive (judgmental 
phase) problems.  I refined problem recognition to be one’s perception
something missing and there is no immediate
vious definition of problem recognition, “people detect that something should be 
done about a situation and stop to think about what to do” (italics added, J. Grunig, 1997, 
p. 10). Although one detects discrepancies between expectation and observation, not all 
detected discrepancies make one “stop to think” about what to do. One’s “stop to th
tendency is the outcome of situational perceptions such as detection, connection, and 
constraints. Thus, I remove the notion of “stop to think about what to do” from the 
definition. Conceptual refinement resolves the multicollinearity problem among 
situational antecedent variables (Kim, Downie, & De Stefano, 2005; J. Grunig, 1997). 
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I also delimited involvement to a perceptual scope—that is, only perceived 
connection, not an objective or actual connection that is not yet perceived.  Constraint 
recognition refers to any perceived obstacle or barrier that a problem solver perceives in




subj hinking on an end state after problem solving) 
that r as 
lem 
tasks. I argued that the motivation toward 
 fluctuates across problems. S tecedents such 
 constraint recognition fect the extent 
problem solving. I hese 
t variables with the new dependent variables (i.e., CAPS and 
endent and Independent Variables 
he antecedent and consequent variables that have been 
developed thus far.  These integrated variables consist of a new version of the situational 
lving  
Next, I reintroduced a dropped variable, referent criterion, as a potentially useful 
tional antecedent parameter.  I modified its conceptual meaning to include any 
ctive knowledge (i.e., a solution carried from past success in problem solving) and/o
ective beliefs (i.e., wishful or willful t
 becomes a decisional referent.  Decisional referents could be any knowledge as fa
they are perceived as relevant to problem solving.  
Finally, I introduced a motivation variable, situational motivation in prob
solving. People differ across problems whether they are willing to invest their cognitive 
capacity and capability to the problem-solving 
problem solving pecifically, the situational an
as problem recognition, , and level of involvement af




In this section, I integrate t
theory of publics.  I call this a situational theory of problem solving.  
The Situational Theory of Problem So
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Up to this point, I have taken a backward approach to building a situational theory 
of problem solving.  In the first two sections of this conceptualization, I tried to establish 
two dependent variables.  Dependent variables are the most important and often the most 
problematic variables in any theory.  Finding or establishing a dependent variable 
therefore means problem recognition to the theorist.  After constructing two dependent 
variables or two focal phenomena of interest, I attempted to construct the how and why—
i.e., independent variables—of the two phenomena: communicant activeness in problem 
solving and cognitive entrepreneurship in problem solving.  To summarize, I put them 
into a single theoretical framework.  One good way to summarize a theory is to specify a 
mathematical system of equations with key variables.  J. Grunig (1968) noted the utility 
of such a formal system and the limitation of estimating the mathematical relationships 
among variables at his original theorizing of situational theory. He (1968) wrote, 
The system is presented here primarily for its summary and general summary power. 
Some day it may be possible to determine the exact functional nature of the 
alue. 
In this study we are primarily concerned with determining whether the equations are 
 independent variables—as 
measured for Colombian latifundistas—have a positive, negative, or neutral effect on 
the
 
aches.  Because of this, researchers can 
propos
the 
mathematical relationships; then the model would have tremendous predictive v
valid in their present crude form, and, if so, whether the
 dependent variables. (pp. 50-51) 
Since the time the original situational theory was proposed, theorists have made 
impressive progress in methodological appro
e and test mathematical systems of equations to test the viability of their 
theoretical propositions fairly easily.  I here summarize the variables and systems of 
situational theory of problem solving.  
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S = Situation; 
OS = Observed State; 
PP = Percep
PR = Problem Recognition; 
LI = Level of Involvement; 
ES = Expected State; 
t = time, one given process; 
tual Problem; 
CP = Cognitive Problem; 
 
CR = Constraint Recognition; 
SM = Situational Motivation; 
CE = Cognitive Entrepreneurship 
CA = Communicant Activeness 
ws: 
 
1. PP = f (dSt/dt) = f (ES-OS)  




AS = Absence of Solution;  
The system is as follo
3. SM = f (PR, CR, LI | RC) 
CE = f (SM) 
5. CA = f (SM) 
I illustrate the sequential process from situational perception to subsequent problem
solving acts in the following figure.  
Figure 10: Sequence illustration of the situational theory of problem solving. 
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Situational Theory of Communicant Activeness in Problem Solving and Situational 
Theory of Cognitive Entrepreneurship in Problem Solving 
We can break down the structural model of the situational theory of problem 
solving to highlight each dependent variable.  Each derived model can stand on its own as 
an independent theory. They are as follows: 
A model of the situational theory of communicant activeness in problem solving 
(SITCAPS).  The first dependent variable I have thus far elaborated is communicant 
activeness in problem solving.  It takes six subdimensions related with information 
selection, transmission, and acquisition.  Four situational antecedent variables explain the 




The following model summarizes the valences of causal paths from problem recog
level of involvement, constraint recognition, and referent criterion to communicant
activeness.  




H11: The higher the problem recognition, the higher the situational motivation in 
H12: The higher the constraint
problem solving.  
 recognition, the lower the situational motivation in 
problem solving.  
H13: T
problem solving.  
roblem 
solving. 
communicant activeness in problem solving. 
A model of the situational theory of cognitive entrepreneurship in problem solving 
(SITCEPS). The second dependent variable I introduced was cognitive entrepreneurship 
in problem solving.  This construct has four subdimensions: cognitive retrogression, 
cognitive multilateralism, cognitive commitment, and cognitive suspension.  The 
following model summarizes the theoretical relationships between four situational 
independent variables and cognitive entrepreneurship as a dependent variable.  
Figure 12: A model of the situational theory of cognitive entrepreneurship in problem 
solving (SITCEPS). 
he higher the level of involvement, the higher the situational motivation in 
H14: The higher the referent criterion, the higher the communicant activeness in p





H16: The higher the problem recognition, the higher the situational motivation in 
H17: The higher the constraint recognition, the lower the situational motivation in 
problem solving.  
H18: The higher the level of involvement, the higher the situational motivation in 
problem solving.  
H19: The higher the referent criterion, the lower the cognitive entrepreneurship in 
problem solving. 
H20: The higher the situational motivation in problem solving, the higher the cognitive 
entrepreneurship in problem solving. 
 
SITCAPS and SITCEPS set the CAPS and CEPS as dependent variables 
explained by situational antecedent variables. Both models consist of a family of the 
situational theory of problem solving. However, it is interesting to integrate two models 
into one by setting CAPS and CEPS as dependent variables simultaneously.  However, 
from the empirical model testing perspective (structural equation modeling), combining 
the two d 
es ahead 
unicative behavior, and CEPS, featuring the 
cogniti
est relative 
problem solving.  
 models into one will create a model identification problem. Both CAPS an
CEPS constructs are accounted for by the same situational antecedent variables. When 
merging the two models of SITCAPS and SITCEPS, the resulting model becomes just-
identified or under-identified (if specifying bidirectional causality between CAPS and 
CEPS) and thus not testable.  
Despite testing difficulty, it is interesting to speculate which variable com
of the other. CAPS, featuring comm
ve approach in problem solving, seem to explain each other to some degree. 
However, it is hard to define which comes first. A plausible relationship is bidirectional 
causality between the two constructs. This requires a nonrecursive model to t
effects from each other simultaneously. Such a nonrecursive model testing is desirable 
but often methodologically difficult (e.g., the non-converging issue in model solution). 
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To test simultaneous causal relationships between CAPS and CEPS, I construc
the model in Figures 13 and 14. 
As noted, a nonrecursive model is hard to solve empirically. To ide
ted 
ntify the 
ch an exogenous variable to identify the model. Surely, it is arguable that a referent 
criterion affects both CAPS and CEPS. However, as noted, simultaneous causal paths 
from referent criterion to both CAPS and CEPS as endogenous variables will not be 
identified. The primary interest in this test is how CAPS and CEPS would affect each 
other. Thus, for the model identification, I will specify that the referent criterion affects 
one over the other. Figure 13 and 14 are two possible models (N. B., both models contain 
the same hypotheses and predictions.). I will analyze both models and will compare the 
results.  
 Figure 13: A model of a nonrecursive relationship between CAPS and CEPS (Model I). 
bidirectional causality model, it is necessary to specify one exogenous variable as an 





Figure 14: A model of a nonrecursive relationship between CAPS and CEPS (Model II). 
 
A problem solver with high cognitive entrepreneurship tends to be high in 
communicant activeness.  Particularly, someone with high cognitive entrepreneurship is 
more likely to be more enthusiastic in broadening candidate solutions (more inform
seeking), more tolerant of competing or incompatible ideas (less information forefend










ing). Thus, I expect a positive effect from cognitive entrepreneurship to 
communicant activeness.  
In contrast, I expect a problem solver with high communicant activeness to be l
entrepreneurial in problem solving. As a result of heightened communicant activeness in
problem solving, a problem solver will be more selective, transmissive, and 
knowledgeable about the problem. Thus, the problem solver is likely to be more li
optimize his or her favored solution (high cognitive retrogression), show less tolerance
for incompatible solutions (less cognitive multilateralism), be less enthusiastic ab
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available solutions and ideas (less cognitive commitment), and be less heedful in 
evaluating new ideas and candidate solutions (less cognitive suspension). 
H21: The higher the cognitive entrepreneurship, the higher the communicant activeness 
H22: The higher the communicant activeness, the lower the cognitive entrepreneurship in 
 
in problem solving.  
problem solving.  
Summary. I claim that the situational theory of problem solving (STOPS) is a 
more general theory on the basis of its generality in subsuming variables of STP. The 
STOPS with the CAPS model takes a further step.  This study challenges the traditional 
sender/receiver dichotomy by treating communication as both a dependent and 
independent variable.  For example, a business communicator prepares advertising 
campaigns for promoting a new product (information transmission).  Here, the message 
sender not only initiates a communication process to solve a problem (i.e., information 
forwarding to increase sales) but also should learn about products and target segments of 
the population (e.g., information seeking to prepare messages).  In contrast, a father with 
an ill child vigorously seeks information about treatment of that disease.  Here, he 
initiates a communication process (information seeking to learn about the disease) to 
cope with his life problem.  Often, such accumulated knowledge for a specific problem 
leads a communicant to share or transmit information to others (information forwarding 
with forefending).  Communication is a coping mechanism that increases problem-
solving potential for problem holders.  The situational theory of problem solving 
accommodates both communicative directions and explains ill-captured aspects of 
informational giving with its general conceptualization of communicant behaviors.  
Furthermore, the situational theory of problem solving introduces a new variable, 
cognitive entrepreneurship in problem solving.  With this new construct, we can better 
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ntally approach their life problems.  A
eneurial mindset. We take in information to evaluate by its merits before selecting 
a solution. We value and tolerate incompatible ideas, become enthusiastic about n
ideas, and are eager to finalize a solution (i.e., cognitive alpha approach).  At other times, 
we are less entrepreneurial and use information not to evaluate, but to justify a decisi
that we have already hastily drawn. We value more ideas that are incompatible with a 
decision we made. We are less committed to new ideas, and we want to be firm and 
conclusive as fast as possible (i.e., cognitive omega approach).  However, our mental 
h should be best viewed as rational when we adopt a problem-solving strategy in 
a more dexterous way.  We simply become irrational when we are so entrepreneurial w
small problems (e.g., low-involvement problem such as what to have for lunch).  
Likewise, we become irrational when we are recklessly non-entrepreneurial with big 
problems (e.g., highly involved problems such as a risky behavior).  
In this chapter, I first proposed and explicated two new concepts of communi
activeness and cognitive entrepreneurship. Then, I refined the situational antecedent 
variables that affect our communicative and cognitive approaches in problem solving.
These are integrated and referred to as a situational theory of problem solving. The new 
situational theory consists of two models, the situational theory of communicant 
activeness in problem solving (SITCAPS) and the situational theory of cognitive 
entrepreneurship in problem solving (SITCEPS). The situational theory of publics (J. 
Grunig, 1997) now becomes a more general theory that describes unique human 
communicative and cognitive features in dealing with life problems. I expect the new
situational theory to host further normative theorizing in the areas related with human 
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problem solving. In the following chapter, I will discuss how I designed and conducted 
the tests for the new theory and constructs. In addition, I will discuss the methodologica




CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGY 
In the previous chapter, I first conceptualized two new variables of communicant 
activeness and cognitive entrepreneurship in problem solving. They become the 
dependent variables of the situational theory of problem solving. Next, I elaborated the 
independent variables from the situational theory of publics. Integration of two new 
dependent variables with the independent variables of the STP introduces a situational 






neurship in problem solving as 
sive model of the situational theory of problem 
ess and a situational theory of cognitive entrepreneurship in problem solving.  
The new situational theory includes a set of propositions and hypotheses that
subject to tests. Empirical tests can never prove any theoretical claims, they only add 
support for the inferred plausibility of the theory. Therefore, as the first step of testing, I 
generated measurement items for each conceptual dimension in communicant activenes
cognitive entrepreneurship in problem solving; and problem recognition, level of 
involvement, constraint recognition, referent criterion, and situational motivation in 
problem solving. Conceptual explications and definitions of each variable in earlier 
chapters guided the operationalization process (i.e., generating item pools). After t
operationalization, the derived measurement scales were submitted to analytic procedures 
of item analysis and the assessment of reliability and validity studies. Given that those 
measurement systems are reliable and valid for each key variable, I proceeded to test 
causal path models derived from the situational theory of problem solving. Speci
first tested the causal paths from situational antecedent variables to communicant 
activeness in problem solving and cognitive entrepre











when p h an 
explana ed 
(Weisb
number of participants (e.g., explanatory analyses), surveys make large samples feasible. 
In the present study, the purpose was to test a theory in which many variables need to be 
 wherein two new variables specified as bidirectional each causes each other. In 
the following sections, I will discuss the choice of research method (survey) to test the 
models, the data collection approach such as sampling strategy (non-probability 
sampling), estimation of sample size and power (Monte Carlo simulation), data collection
procedure, data analysis procedures (CFA and SEM), and ethical considerations in the
study. 
Survey Research 
A survey is “systematic data collection about a sample drawn from a specifie
larger population” by using questions (Schwarz, Groves, & Schuman, 1998, p. 14
Researchers use a sample and questions to make inferences about the population and 
concepts of interest. Thus, researchers sample populations and operationalize a concept 
instrumentally to infer from something observable to
research consists of 1) setting research objectives for information collection, 2)
designing the study, 3) preparing a reliable and valid survey instrument, 4) administering 
the survey, 5) managing data collection (e.g., making efforts to attain high response 
editing and coding), 6) analyzing survey data, and 7)  reporting the results (Fink, 2003).
Strength and Weakness of Survey Research 
Surveys generally are used to describe the characteristics of a large population 
robability sampling is used. Furthermore, surveys work well for a study wit
tory purpose, such as this study, even though nonprobability sampling is us












ibility and makes it impossible for researchers to change their 
initial design and research questions  survey makes serendipity 
h is only feasible when there are interactions between the researcher and 
particip
d simultaneously. Thus, survey research design was an appropriate choice for d
collection. Surveys are flexible enough to allow researchers to operationalize definitions 
from actual observations in a backward manner. Such flexibility is hard to attain in 
experimental design in which an operational definition is a manipulation of a variable o
interest. If the measurement items are well established (i.e., they are reliable an
measurement scales) with an adequate samp
to generalize.  
However, survey research requires the standardization of questions, which le
toward superficial results. Standardized measurement items often measure the least 
common denominator among the participants’ characteristics of interest (Babbie, 199
Survey research is inflexible and blind to natural processes inherent in a research set
Qualitative research methods not only allow and encourage a researcher to modi
elaborate theory, questions, and design; but they also provide in-depth contextual 
information (McCracken, 1988; Marshall & Rossman, 1995). In contrast, survey research
cannot provide such flex
 (Babbie, 1998). A
impossible, whic
ants. Finally, survey research cannot directly measure social action but can only 
measure the self reports of past action or hypothetical action (e.g., behavioral intention). 
For that reason, the data collected are often artificial and could misrepresent the 
participants’ characteristics of research interest. This, in turn, makes it difficult to 
establish the validity of measures (Babbie, 1998).   
Rationale for Choosing Survey Research 
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I have chosen the survey research method as the most appropriate approach
the purposes and specific constraints inherent in this study. I chose the survey me
because the purpose of the study was to test causal structures and hypotheses derived
from a situational theory of problem solving. If I could follow the necessary procedure








 and Bowen 
sented the advantage of survey research for such a study:  
 
be obtained by a survey. You cannot assume that people think in certain ways 
equivalent to individual data, nor can you use experiments as alternatives to the 
questions, you can gain much information about what they are thinking—and why 
play important roles in social science. (p. 20) 
To measure publics’ perceptions, cognitive approaches, and communicative behaviors, 
therefore, survey research was a most appropriate data collection method.  
, the experimental method would be the best research design to study causal 
propositions among the constructs of interest.  However, the number of causal variables 
in the systems of equations was more than five. This unnecessarily complicates the 
design and procedure (e.g., manipulations for independent variables) beyond the 
researcher’s control. Alternatively, survey research design allows the study of multiple 
variables economically.  A survey study can yield data of adequate size and quality for
causal analysis (i.e., structural equation modeling).  
Secondly, the present study aimed to explain publics’ perceptions of their life 
problems and their subsequent cognitive and communicative features in dealing with the 
problems. Thus, asking publics for their own perceptions about their problems was 
critical to testing the viability of the proposed theory. Weisberg, Krosnick,
(1996) cogently pre
The explanation of mass behavior often requires mass attitude data that can only
without asking them what they think. You cannot regard aggregate data as 
collection of data in the natural environment. If it is possible to ask people 
they do things. When public attitudes and mass behavior are of interest, surveys 
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The third consideration is the practicality of the scale-development procedure. 
Developing a measurement instrument requires a huge number of respondents. Necessary 
steps su
rs must be 
gned to assist public relations practitioners with applied 
commu rucial to 
s 
chapter, I theoretically specified the two variables to be explained by a set of antecedent 
variables, including problem recognition, level of involvement, constraint recognition, 
referent criterion, and situational motivation in problem solving. To test these concepts 
ch as pilot testing of initial item pools, item analysis for reliability and validity, 
and cross-validation all demand multiple and large samples.  Survey research makes it 
possible to collect a large amount of data through standardized questionnaires 
economically and quickly (Babbie, 1998).  
In addition, practical research situations for public relations practitione
considered. The situational theory of publics has been widely adopted for planning 
communication programs (e.g., public information campaigns). Practitioners segment 
relevant focal publics for their communication program not only through qualitative 
study but also through formative survey research. Because the situational theory of 
problem solving is desi
nication practices (e.g., health and risk communication campaigns), it is c
establish a set of reliable and valid measurement systems. To meet that purpose, survey 
research was desirable.  
Research Design 
Design of Study 
This dissertation research required two phases. The first phase was to develop a 
set of reliable and valid scale items for the two new variables of communicant activenes
in problem solving and cognitive entrepreneurship in problem solving. In the previous 
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and propositions (i.e., the specified inter-variable relationships), I first developed 
corresponding measurement systems for these consequent—“explanandum” an
antecedent variables—“explanans” (Hempel & Oppenheim, 1953). This task was to 
describe the phenomena in an empirical way for the purpose of making it possible to 
falsify the concepts and propositions proposed (Popper, 1963).  
The second phase was to test the viability of the newly developed situationa
theory of problem solving.  Researchers cannot test a theory directly, but they can test a 
derived model through empirical observations of the theoretical propositions. From the 
first phase of study design, I produced a testable measurement system with acceptable
levels of reliability and validity. With this measurement system, I proceeded to test caus
relationships between antecedent conditions and consequent phenomena. This was an 
attempt to falsify the models for the purpose of demonstrating the viability of the 
situational theory of problem solving. In testing logic, if the falsifying attempts fail, we 
can gain some confidence in the theoretical plausibility of the concepts and propositions. 
However, the tenability of the theory is only provisional. In the following sections
describe the procedure used in the first phase of this dissertational study.  
Scaling Procedure 





, I will 




public relations professionals or risk and health communicators can apply the scales to 
pose in this study was twofold. The first was to test the concepts and propositions 
in the situational theory of problem solving. The second purpose was to identify a sca
that could be used both for theoretical and practical research related to people’s prob
solving. Specifically for practical research, applied communication researchers such as 
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segment a population into more meaningful chunks based on their differential cognitiv







itself in s 
 rule of 
 three 
Netemeyer, Bearden, and Sharma (2003) presented a clear and efficient model to 
illustrate the process of scale development.  The first step is to define constructs clearly. 
The researcher should carefully explicate a construct and its dimensions. Otherwise, 
subsequent measurement scales have little use in theory and practice. Also, a scale 
developer should be concerned about construct dimensionality—whether it is 
unidimensional, multidimensional, or a second-order construct. Netemeyer, Bearden, and
Sharma (2003) recommended having an effect indicator (“reflective” items) rather than 
causal indicator (“formative” items) (Bollen, 1989). In the present study, the two new 
constructs, CAPS and CEPS, were hypothesized as a second-order con
fect indicators. 
The second step was to construct and choose the best items. Conceptual 
explication should precede the task of generating item pools so that theoretical meaning 
can guide the composing of measurement instruments. In doing so, “nontrivial 
redundancy” among items was necessary to allow the phenomenon of interest to manifest
 different ways (DeVellis, 1991, p. 56). Such nontrivial redundancy among item
was critical because “the content that is common to the items will summate across items 
while their irrelevant idiosyncrasies will cancel out” (DeVellis, 1991, p. 56).  A
thumb in item construction is clarity. DeVellis recommended having a pool of items
                                                 
Both constructs had enough conceptual generalness that allow further decomposition of the concepts.
example, whereas cognitive entrepreneurship in problem solving can generate knowledge to understand 
17 In developing CAPS and CEPS, I took a higher-order factor structure approach with a theoretical purpose. 
 For 
differential problem solving approaches among people, we can further segment it in a conceptually 
meaningful way. Theorists should explicate conceptual meanings and dimensions to the extent it generates 
understanding of the phenomenon. Indeed, I intended that researchers can use each subdimension of two 
constructs as an independent construct if necessary.  
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to four times larger than the final scales. He and other scholars suggested that good scale 
items should be unambiguous, relatively short (e.g., avoid wordiness), easy to 






ong agreement). Finally, the scale developer should ask 





ous pronoun references, and without misplaced modifiers (Netemeyer, Bearden
& Sharma, 2003; Specter, 1992; DeVellis, 1991). In addition, the researcher should 
choose items that prevent some common respondent biases such as acquiescence
affirmation, or agreement. Wording items both positively and negatively within the same
scale can be a good preventive strategy (DeVellis, 1991).  Following item construction, 
the researcher should choose a response format. In the present study, I used a 9-point 
Likert format spanning from “not at all” to “extremely.” I used a unidirectional fo
(e.g., from absence of agreement to extreme agreement) rather than bidirectional (e.
from strong disagreement to str
perts and laypeople whether the items match theory—i.e., to make item judgments.
This makes it possible to test content and face validity (Netemeyer, Bearden, & Sharma, 
2003). To get a laypeople perspective in item selection, I recruited three graduate 
students who were not familiar with the situational theory. To get an expert perspective
asked Dr. James E. Grunig, the developer of the STP, to review the fit between theory 
and the proposed items.  
The third step was to design and conduct empirical tests to develop and refine the
scale. By drawing a relevant sample, the scale developer can do item-trimming (e.g., 
rewriting items), test psychometric properties, do exploratory factor analyses (e.g., 
checking dimensionality), check internal consistency estimates (e.g., Cronbach’s alpha
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make initial estimates of validity, and sort out items for cross-validation (Netemeyer, 
Bearden, & Sharma, 2003).  
pers 
can des alyses 
consist
confirm equivalence). In addition, 
researc
, 
y related with each other (i.e., the nonrecursive 
 and construct validity—whether the scale has 
theoret
e 
The last step was to finalize the scale. By using several samples, scale develo
ign and conduct various types of reliability and validity analyses. These an
 of exploratory factor analysis (e.g., removing low or cross loading items) and 
atory factor analysis (e.g., checking factor structure 
hers should test conventional reliability statistics and validity testing procedures. 
In the present study, I first did a series of principal component analyses. I conducted an 
internal consistency test using Cronbach’s alpha. I also examined construct reliability
using coefficient H, and the variance extracted confirmatory factor analysis for CAPS 
and CEPS (Hancock & Mueller, 2001) to check as construct validity.  
Regarding validity, I checked face validity—whether the measurement items 
appear to represent well the construct to be measured; concurrent validity—whether two 
or more related measures were statisticall
model between CAPS and CEPS);
ically relationships with other relevant variables (e.g., SITCAPS and SITCEPS).  
Above all, construct validity was the most important testing procedure in scal
development. I tested construct validity of two new dependent variables by connecting 
their measures to other theoretical variables in the situational theory. Earlier, I 
theoretically specified a priori causal relationships among the key constructs in the 
situational theory of problem solving. The structural interrelationships between the 
situational antecedent variables and two new variables were tested against the data. 
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Should there be close fit between the specified model and the observed data, I could in








sample is not necessary if statistical generalization of the finding is not the goal. They 
emphasized that it is the theory that is applied beyond the research setting and thus “the 
research sample need only allow a test of the theory…any sample within the theory’s 
domain (e.g., any relevant sample), not just a representative one, can provide such a test” 
Rationale for non-probability sampling strategy.  For the present study, I have 
chosen a convenience sampling (i.e., a nonprobability sampling) strategy for practical and 
theoretical reasons. A nonprobability sample does not allow those members in a 
population to have an equal probability of being chosen. The choice of a nonprobab
sampling strategy makes it impossible to estimate unbiasedness and sampling variability
for a chosen sample. Thus, it does not allow the researcher to draw any inference about a 
population (Schwarz, Groves, & Schuman, 1998). In addition, data analysis with 
nonprobability sampling can result in statistical problems such as biased parameter 
estimates and standard errors.  
Nevertheless, a nonprobability sampling strategy is best for the research problem
in this study. The purpose of this study was to develop new variables and new theo
practice, “most early tests of nascent theories” adopt non-probability student samples, 
and such a strategy is, not ideal, but useful for initial theorizing and hypothesis testing 
with “multivariate relationships” (Caplan, 2005, p. 732).  Besides, I delimited the scop
to “theoretical generalizability” rather than statistical generalizability. Calder, Philips, 
and Tybout (1981) pointed out that to make theoretical generalizations, a representative 
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(Calder, Philips, & Tybout, 1981, p. 200).  In addition, Shapiro (2002) addressed the 
issue: 
[R]ejecting a study that seeks to expand theory and that detects a potentially 
important effect on the basis of a nonrandom sample usually reflects a 
important effect, no matter what kind of sample is used, it is clearly true for some 





which are nalysis 
misunderstanding of the nature of generalizability. If a study detected an 
group of people, in some setting, at some time, for some message. The next step 
the effect applies and to whom it does not. (p. 499) 
Sample size demands for relational analysis are often huge. Meeting the required 
number of participants using probability sampling would not be practical. Thus, in this 
dissertation, I combined the two most common nonprobability sampling methods of 
convenience sampling and multiplicity sampling (a.k.a., snowball sampling or network 
sampling) to test theoretical propositions. Multiplicity sampling consists of using 
previously identified members of a group to find other members of the population. This 
sampling method was useful to trace patterns of influence among connected participant
(Weisberg, Krosnick, & Bowen, 1996).  
Sample Size Estimation 
I have conducted a simulation study to estimate the minimum sample size for d
collection. In most empirical research methods, the researcher can use Kraemer and 
Thiemann’s (1987) classical guideline to estimate sample size and to determine power. 
However, they did not provide a procedure for estimating sample size for confirmatory 
factor analysis and causal path modeling, which are used in my dissertation. Hancock
(2006) advised that “a priori” power analysis is more desirable than “post hoc methods,” 
 often merely a “self-pitying” (p. 103). He reminded us that a post hoc a
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is “merely establishing what is already apparent” (p. 103)18. In this vein, I chose an a 
te sample size with 
onte Carlo 
2) illustrated how 
plus. Notably, the 
 and two 
APS and STICEPS) were of primary interest. To see the sample 
ombined 
ition, constraint recognition, level 
nt of missing data, reliability of the 
g the variables (L. Muthén & B. Muthén, 
ually by 
eights. Normality of data in SEM was a key assumption. I 
sting will 
priori Monte Carlo simulation approach to determine appropria
power .80 and a .05 level of significance.  
The necessary sample size for this study was estimated using Mplus M
Simulation option (2004 Version 3.01). L. Muthén and B. Muthén (200
to estimate optimal sample size and to determine power by using M
Mplus approach focuses on individual parameters within the model, not the entire 
model.19 In my study, two confirmatory factor models (i.e., CAPS and CEPS)
causal path model (SITC
size and a rough check for power for individual path estimates, I used a model c
with all the variables in one model (i.e., problem recogn
of involvement, referent criterion, CAPS, and CEPS). 
As a first step, I specified a priori conditions for key factors such as the size of 
the model, distribution of the variables, amou
variables, and strength of the relationships amon
2002). Then, each residual variance of endogenous variables is computed individ
considering a priori path w
presumed that data transformation (i.e., power transformation) before model te
satisfy the normality assumption. No missing data assumption was made. Although such 
                                                 
18 Hancock (2006) provided a general guideline for a priori power analysis: “when ε = .02 [ε = RMSEA] 
ve appear to be 
achieve power of π = 
.80, samples sizes of n = 500 or above appear to be sufficient for testing overall data-model fit” (p. 103); 
000 or above 
models assuming the models were specified correctly. Thus, I followed the Mplus simulation approach that 
hinges on the power for “parameters” within a model. 
and models have df  ≥ 60, to achieve power of π = .80, samples sizes of n = 300 or abo
sufficient for testing overall data-model fit; when ε = .02 and models have df  ≥ 30, to 
“when ε = .02 and models have df  = 10, to achieve power of π = .80, samples sizes of n = 1
appear to be sufficient for testing overall data-model fit” (p. 104). 
19 Hancock (2006) clarified two different foci in power analysis:  1) parameter(s) within a model and 2) 
data-model fit as a whole.  In the present study, I mainly focused on the structural parameters within the 
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an assumption was too idealistic, I considered the possibility of using imputation options 
strategy. Reliability of factor indicators, 
ior studies.  
tudies (e.g., 
past studies of the STP) provided rough approximations to generate 
, 
able estimation of sample size with preset power (.80) and significance 
 
o, I assumed the overall model had 
ould not guide any decision 
ntire model. Despite some inherent inaccuracy in a prior analysis, it 
g 
y analysis: “By choosing the values in models carefully and conservatively, 




ferent criterion, and situational motivation in problem solving. 
ment scale items for each variable. The instruments I used are as follows: 
(e.g., EM algorithm) as a possible compensatory 
factor correlations, and causal paths were all rough approximations from pr
Specifically two pilot tests for the STOPS in addition to prior STP s
regression weights in 
data in this simulation. Because the purpose of this Monte Carlo study was modest—i.e.
to check a reason
level, such gross estimation could be justified. Finally, I mainly focused on determining
power to detect individual path coefficients. In doing s
been correctly specified. Thus, the present simulation study c
regarding power for e
is desirable in this study to use SEM analysis. Hancock (2006) recommended conductin
preparator
researchers have the ability to ensure that they enter
prepared for the worst” (p. 104). 
Instruments. The key variables within the models derived from the sit
theory of problem solving were as following: communicant activeness in problem s
cognitive entrepreneurship in problem solving, problem recognition, level o
constraint recognition, re
Explication of each construct in the conceptualization chapter guided the process of 
drafting measure




ts about this problem are worthless.  
 I understand this problem. 
his problem. 
e to deal with this problem. 
en to opposite views and 
they are related to the problem.  
es from.  
d interests 
cepted conflicting information about this problem. 
ve conversations on this problem. 
 knowledge and perspective about this problem.  
spending some time to persuade others about this problem. 
 knowledge and thoughts about this problem. 
I actively seek out opportunities to participate in public opinion polls about this problem. 
espect my perspective about this problem because it is simple and clear.  
Some publicized statemen
I have invested enough time and energy so that
I know where to go when I need updated information regarding t
I have studied this problem enough to judge the value of information. 
I feel like resisting some persuasive efforts around this problem.  
I express my opinions confidently about what should be don
I am picky in choosing information sources when I think about this problem. 
Information Permitting 
To make better decisions regarding this problem, I list
information as long as 
For this problem, I welcome any information regardless of where it com
I am careful in accepting information about this problem because of the veste
of those who provided the information. (R)  
I listen to even opposite views on this problem. 
At times, I find that I have ac
Information Forwarding 
Sometimes I find I am engaging in aggressi
It is one of my top priorities to share my
If it is possible, I take time to explain this problem to others.  
It is worthy 
I look for chances to share my
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I love to start a conversation on this problem with others.  
I volunteer to inform others about the problem.  
rship role in initiating conversation about the problem. 
in passing on information related to this problem in 
riends and others come to learn more about this problem.  
egarding this problem. 
rn what kind of solutions 
I regularly check to lem on the Internet.  
ts containing relevant knowledge about the problem.  
roblem 
oblem. 
hat I will be quite active in passing on information related to this problem in 
y friends and others come to learn more about this problem.  
In the past, I researched about this problem seriously. 
I feel happy when I provide new information about this problem to others. 
I often play a leade
Information Sharing 
I am sure that I will be quite active 
the near future. 
I am a person to whom my f
In the past, I researched about this problem seriously. 
At times, I am asked to give advice r
Information Seeking 
From time to time, I contact people about this problem to lea
there are. 
I regularly visit Websites relevant to the problem.  
see if there is any new information about this prob
I would request bookle
I visit an online or regular bookstore to find useful information about the p
My friends think that I take too much time for learning about this pr
Information Processing 
I am sure t
the near future. 
I am a person to whom m
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Instruments for Cognitive Entrepreneurship in Problem Solving (CEPS) 
Cognitive Retrogression 
I know how I should behave for this problem. 
e spent too much time on this problem to change my position now.  
y decision on this problem. 
 position even if someone challenges it with contradictory evidence. 
pension 
think before I finalize my position on this problem. 
 all the evidence is in. 
ng Saddam Hussein while he 
orst in the world, was enough justification to 
It is too late to change the position I now have on this problem. 
I hav
It is too late to shake the conclusion I have drawn for this problem.  
I have made efforts to justify m
I will keep my current
I have found counter evidence that rejects the positions different from mine. 
I feel it is costly to change my mind on this problem. 
Cognitive Sus
I want to take more time before making up my mind for this problem. 
I hesitate to make up my mind about what should be done for this problem.  
I need more time to 
For this problem, I will try to suspend any judgment until
Pro-War in Iraq Statements 
The war in Iraq can be justified because the cost of controlli
was in power was higher than that of war.  
Saddam was connected with terrorists. 
Saddam's human rights record, among the w
go to war.  
Con-War in Iraq Statements 
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the current situation deviate from what you think it should be? 
Constra
e economic and domestic security problems the United States was facing, it wa
bad time to go to war in Iraq.  
A pre-emptive attack by the U.S. gives credibility to those who describe the U. S. as an
aggressive nation. 
The war in Iraq has increased anti-American sentiment.  
Pro-Affirmative Action Statements 
Affirmative action levels the playing field because minority students, generally speak
start out at a disadvantage.  
Diversity is desirable yet won't always occur if left to chance. 
Con- Affirmative Action Statements 
ative action demeans true minority achievement because success is labeled as a 
result of affirmative action rather than hard work or ability. 
Because of affirmative action, a wealthy minority student who doesn’t put in much effo
could be chosen over a poor white student who works harder. 
Instruments for Situational Antecedent Variables 
Problem Recognition 
To what extent do you think there is something missing in this problem? 
How much does the current situation differ from your expectation? 
How strong do you feel that something needs to be done to improve the situation for this 
problem? 
How much does 
int Recognition  
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Please think of whether you, personally, could do anything that would make a difference 
in the way these problems are handled. If you wanted to do something, would your 
efforts make a difference? (R) 
To what extent do you believe this problem is a problem that you can do something about
(R) 
To what extent do you bel
? 




t this problem? 
Referen
hink about each of these three problems? 
To wha
tter. 
solved if you wanted to? (R)
f Involvement 
In your mind, how much of a connection do you see between yourself and this problem? 
To what extent do you believe this problem could involve you or someone close to you a
some point? 
How much do you believe this problem affects or could affect you personally?  
How strong would you say your opinions or thoughts are abou
t Criterion  
I am confident about my knowledge about this problem. 
I strongly support a certain way of resolving this problem. 
I have a preference for how the problem should be settled.  
I am pretty sure I know how to solve this problem. 
Past experience has provided me with guidelines for solving this problem. 
Situational Motivation in Problem Solving 
How often do you stop to t
t extent would you say you are curious about this problem? 
Please, indicate how much you would like to understand each of these problems be
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Administering the survey instrument. The researcher may administer a survey 
instrument via a self-administered questionnaire, an interview, a structured record r
and structured observation (Fink, 2003). I chose a self-administered questionnaire. A
self-administered questionnaire is cheap, produces data fast, is free of interviewer bias, 
and provides confidentiality and privacy, which encourage candid resp
eview, 
 
onses (Fink, 2003; 
Babbie m: 




 should be used. In the 
present study, I omitted the no opinion option. However, participants were allowed to 
skip questions.  
Pilot test. To prepare a final version of the survey instrument, I conducted four 
waves of pilot tests in August 2003, December 2003, May 2004, and December 2004. 
, 1998). Participants completed question items through a Web-based survey for
i.e., computerized self-administered questionnaire (Babbie, 1998). Participants read 
questions and made choices on a screen by using a computer keyboard and mouse. 
Participants who did not have access to a personal computer or access to the Internet 
were offered a printed questionnaire, but no one requested one.  
No opinion options. Experts (Weisberg, Krosnick, & Bowen, 1996) on survey 
research recommend including no-opinion options to prevent respondents from giving 
meaningless answers. Often, participants feel pressured to respond even 
iliar with the issue. Thus, a no-opinion option makes participants more 
comfortable and accurate. However, the experts also advise some caveats for the use of 
no-opinion option. Specifically, less-motivated respondents use the no-opinion opti
avoid thinking about the question. Thus, survey experts recommend omitting no-opinio
options concerning well-known issues (e.g., legalization of abortion). If the issue of 
inquiry is obscure or unfamiliar to participants, a no-opinion option
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These p
g sampling strategy). Although I used the 








in the purpose of study is to understand better about information 
traffick
re. 
The researcher explained how to find the survey website (URL address and log-in 
retests tested preliminary item pools for the variables in the situational theory of 
problem solving (e.g., correlations between the testing items and social desirability scale 
items), determined response format (e.g., fractional scale vs. Likert-type scale), and 
tested the data collection method (a snowballin
 the final version of the survey instru
them in this diss
ollection Procedure 
Data were collected during April and May 2005 at the University of Maryland. 
Students registered for an introductory communication course were invited to participate
To encourage participation in the study, students were all provided with extra credits i
discussion with their instructors. The participation was voluntary, and they were given 
alternative assignments if they decided not to participate.  Because I chose a sn
sampling technique, I devised a clustering method as follows. 
First, I identified an initial contact person who was interested and volunteered for 
participation in exchange for extrapoints in the communication classes. Once the ini
contact person agreed to participate, participants were instructed in how to recruit other 
candidate participants from their personal relationships. Importantly, participants were 
advised repeatedly not to force participation in “snowballing.” Instead, participants
encouraged to expla
ing patterns among people and that the recruiting student would get some extra-
credit from participating.  
Next, participants were shown the website that contained a survey questionnai
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method)20  and illustrated how to complete the questionnaire directly. However, 





enter “ tial 
e 
te respondents and, most importantly, confidential. Once the acquaintances
agreed to participate, the initial contact person provided his or her own login code to the 
others to form a cluster under the initial contact person’s login code.   
To start the survey questionnaire, participants had to provide the first letter o
their last name with the last four digits of their social security number. For example, a 
participant whose name is John Smith (Social Security Number: 123-45-6789) entered 
“S6789” to login in the first page of Website. Similarly, participants who were recruited 
indirectly through the initial contact persons entered the initial contact person’s login
code (e.g., “S6789”) with their own code (e.g., Mary Adams with the 987-65-4321 wou
A4321”). This login method ensured that the participant’s identity was confiden
because no other identity information was asked in the questionnaire.21  
Once they successfully logged in, participants read the informed consent form. 
The consent form instructed participants that there was no foreseeable personal risk with 
their participation and that they had the right to withdraw participation at any time 
without any penalty and/or decline to answer certain questions. After participants read 
and agreed to the informed consent form by clicking an “agree” button, they started th
questionnaire. Every participant read an identical set of questions.  
                                                 
firm, CreateSurvey (
20 The website containing the questionnaire has been constructed by a professional online survey research 
http://www.createsurvey.com).   
21 For a confirmatory purpose to assign extra credits, the initial contact persons in the communication 
classes provided a confirmatory r
acquaintances after they learn the
eceipt that contained their names and the names of participated 
ir acquaintances have completed the questionnaires. The receipts was 
destroyed immediately once their participations are confirmed. Thus, there was no way to identify personal 
information with responses.   
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One possible risk that lowers the data quality was a multiple response by a single 
participant. To prevent such multiple responses, I used a “duplicate tracking function,” 
technical service provided by the CreatSurvey.  The CreatSurvey limited each respondent
to one entry by using a special cookie device. 
















The first research goal was to develop and validate reliable and valid 
measurement scales for two new constructs, communicant activeness in problem solv
(CAPS) and cognitive entrepreneurship in problem solving (CEPS). I here specified 
theoretical models and subdimensions under CAPS (six dimensions) and CEPS (four
dimensions). I adopted a two-step structural equation modeling approach (Kline, 1998
Byrne, 1994). In the first step, the measurement phase, I analyzed completely 
confirmatory models that allow covarying among all the latent variables and stand-alone
variables in the model. Then, I checked for correlated residuals and cross-loading
LM tests and removed low loading items for a given dim
ement items was identified for each dimension, I tested its goodness-of-fit to 
overall measurement structure. This required second-order factor analyses that subsum
subdimensions under the higher order constructs (e.g., communicant activeness in
problem solving).  
In the second step, the structural phase, I compared the final confirmatory models
with the proposed structural models. I then respecified the initial structural models with
applications of the LM test and Wald test, if necessary. It turned out that most of the 
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initial structural models were reasonable data-model fits based on multiple fit indices
Hence, most models were tested as th
. 
ey were originally specified. 
e proposed structural equation models, I adopted commonly 
adopted
c 








 model fit indices. They are χ2 and its degree of freedom, Comparative Fit Index 
(CFI), Root-Mean-Square-Error-of-Approximation (RMSEA), Standardize Root Mean 
Square Residual (SRMR), Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI), and Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC). Often χ2 values are sensitive to large sample size. Thus, the χ2 statisti
would be significant even if the differences between observed data and model-implied 
covariances were small (Kline, 1998). A common treatmen
 size sensitivity. Although there is no rule of thumb to use, researchers of
consider the minimally acceptable value of χ2 /df ratio to be less than 3 (Kline, 1998).  
CFI and NNFI are incremental measures of fit, and acceptable levels of fit are 
values close to 1.00. SRMR is a standardized summary of the average covariance 
residuals. When the average discrepancy between the observed and imposed covariance
is perfect, the SRMR value becomes 0. As the discrepancy grows, SRMR values increase
as well. SRMR values less than .10 are commonly accepted as indic
 RMSEA (Steiger & Lind, 1980) tends to correct for “tendency of the chi-square 
statistic to reject a model” with a large sample size (Netemeyer, Bearden, & Sharma, 
2003, p. 152). Its values of .08 or less are indicative of acceptable fit (Browne & Cudeck
1993). AIC is a parsimony index, and values close to 0 or lower are considered as 
indicative of acceptable model (Akaike, 1987). AIC is useful when a researcher needs to 
compare nonhierarchical models, thereby direct comparisons, using the differences of χ2 
and its degree of freedom.  
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Recently, Hu and Bentler (1999) recommended the use of multiple indices,
as CFI, RMSEA, and SRMR. With the joint-criteria approach (Hu & Bentler, 1999), 
model is considered viable when it has CFI ≥ .96 
 such 
a 
and SRMR ≤ .10 or RMSEA ≤ .06 and 
o interpret the individual parameter estimates to test hypotheses and explore 







ta. When a 
SRMR ≤ .10.  Once the models have met this proposed model evaluation approach, I 
proceeded t
In using a sample, I made sub-samples from the data set by using the rando
selection function in SPSS 11.5. Thus, I divided the first subsample (n = 457) as the 
developmental samples of CAPS and CEPS and the other subsamples as validation 
samples (e.g., n = 917). Finally, I ran the models by using the total sample size (n = 
1,380), once I reached the best models. For the CAPS model, I conducted a series of 
nested model tests among one factor, six factor oblique, and a second-order factor model 
to see its dimensionality. For the CEPS model, I directly proceeded to the second-order
structure testing and found acceptable data-model fits. For the causal models of 
situational theory, I used the total sample (n = 1,380).   
In addition to the tests of factor analysis structures, I analyzed conventional 
internal consistency and reliability measures such as Cronbach’s alpha and cons
ity. In addition, I computed coefficient H (Hancock & Mueller, 2001) and 
variance extracted for the latent variables used in the structural model analysis.  
At the next phase of analysis, I tested three models from the situational theor
problem solving. These specified models with a priori hypothesized causal paths we
subject to first overall model testing by checking their goodness-of-fit to the da
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model achieved a reasonable model-data fit, I interpreted its paths to evaluate the 









 derived from the situational theory of problem solving (STOPS). I 
erived three structural models from the situational theory of problem solving. Using 
CAPS, first, I constructed the model of situational theory of communicant activeness in 
problem solving (SITCAPS). Using CEPS, I constructed the model of situational theory 
of cognitive entrepreneurship in problem solving (SITCEPS). Both models had identical 
model specification in their structural relationships (see Figure 11 and 12 in the Chapter 
II: Conceptualization). Finally, I specified a nonrecursive model to test bidirectional 
Identification 
Communicant activeness in problem solving (CAPS). A measurement model with
four or more indicators for the construct to be measured is always identified. CAPS ha
second-order factor structure with six subdimensions under the construct of communicant
activeness. Each subdimension (e.g., information seeking) had at least three or more 
measurement variab
see Figure 5 in the Chapter II: Conceptualization). 
Cognitive entrepreneurship in problem solving (CEPS). CEPS has four 
subdimensions: cognitive retrogression, cognitive multilateralism, cognitive com
and cognitive suspension. Notably, cognitive multilateralism and cognitive commitment 
had been measured by a single measurement item because they were computed by 
conceptually derived formulas. However, the overall model was identified because the 
remaining two dimensions had four or more measurement items. Thus, the CEPS model 




causal influences between CAP t least one exogenous 
variable that affects one of ffecting the other. I 
created
ere 
rm (Bogdan & 
Biklen,
002) advised informing respondents, protecting respondents, 
and explaining benefits, if any, to , J. Grunig and L. Grunig (2000) 




S and CEPS. This requires a
 the endogenous variables while not a
 two nonrecursive models with the referent criterion as exogenous variable (see 
Figure 13 and 14 in the Chapter II: Conceptualization). Both nonrecursive models w
identified. 
Ethical Considerations 
In studies using human participants, two most dominant ethical issues are 
obtaining informed consent and protecting participants from potential ha
 1998; Babbie, 1998). I chose a survey for the current study. Survey research, like 
other scientific inquiries, has ethical responsibilities in treating human beings as objects 
of investigation. Fowler (2
respondents. Similarly
listed participant consent, prevention of decepti
thical issues in public relations research. In research with human subjects, there 
almost always is a “tension” between a researcher’s “scientific need” and participant’s 
“right to decline” of participation (Schwarz, Groves, & Schuman, 1998). To manage such 
tension, I paid attention for those major ethical issues throughout the research. 
After I finalized the research method and plan, I submitted the r
truments for review by the University of Maryland Institutional Review Board 
(IRB). Upon approval of the research, I contacted the faculty and instructors in the 
Department of Communication to get approval and make alternative assignments if 
participants refused to participate in the study. Thus, those participants or non-
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participants in the respondent pool had equal opportunity to get extra-credit (i.e., 20 
points). 
As participants agreed to participate, they were first presented with the informed 
consen as 
n 






mmarize what I found from the data analysis and 
hypothes
 
t form, in which they found the title and purpose of the study, procedures such 
time, assurance of confidentiality, possible risks and benefits, most importantly, their 
freedom to withdraw from study or decline for some questions. Respondents were give
the researcher’s name and
s to share.  
All of the responses were kept confidential as promised, although respondents 
entered a self-made individual code (e.g., last four digits of social security number w
first letter of their last name) for assigning responses to their clusters (i.e., who 
“snowballed” the participant). However, it was practically impossible for the researcher 
to connect the personal information with the individual responses. Thus, confiden
was secured. Notably, it was acknowledged clearly that participation would not br
possible harm and personal benefits to the respondents before they decided to participa
In the next chapter, I will su
is testing.  
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CHAPTER IV: RESULTS 
Descriptions of Survey Participants 
One of the main purposes of this study is to develop and test measurement item
for the new concepts of communicant activeness and cognitive entrepreneurship in 
problem solving. Because of the number of conceptual factors in the study, the le













ubdimensions. For the war in Iraq issue, the 
percentages of missing values varied from 3.8%-5.8%; for losing weight, the percentages 
individual and social issues). Thus, I removed basic de
ants (e.g., gender, income, age) to reduce participants’ fatigue.  
A total of 1,380 University of Maryland undergraduate students participated in t
survey. I invited students from an undergraduate communication course to partic
exchange for extracredit.  
Preliminary Analysis 
Missing Value Analysis (MVA) and Normality 
The survey instruments in this study consisted of 100 items regarding three
and individual issues: war in Iraq, losing weight, and elimination of affirmative acti
American higher education. There were 49 items to measure communicant activeness
its subdimensions, 20 items to measure the cognitive entrepreneurship and its 
subdimensions, and 22 items for the situational antecedent variables.  
I conducted missing value analysis (MVA) and found no significant difference 
between this data pattern and a random data pattern: i.e., Little's MCAR test: χ2 (115
= 1,380) = 35.204, p = 1.000. In addition, I conducted missing value analysis (MVA) for




etric variables did not seriously deviate from the 
In all of the structural equation model analyses, I used the maximum likelihood 
(ML) estimation method to reduce the undesirable effects from non-normal distribution 
of  Finch (1995
substantially nonnormal, ML or GLS should be used as an estim
th e nonnormal variables in the data et, I conducted s al SEM a alyses in 
whic the same models to two different data sets (i.e., transformed and non-
transformed data). The com ilar fits and s ame
estimat . Thus, I proce ith a non-tran ed data set with a “ML” estimation 
method in subsequent analyses.22  
Reliability Tests and Exploratory Fact onstructs 
In the present st  developed two
in prob m solving and cognitive entrepreneur ip in problem solving. Each construct has 
sub-constructs that they are correlated but possess unique conceptual meanings toward 
th nstructs. As a first step, I examined these new constructs and 
                                                
 3.8%-5.9%; and for elimination of affirmative action, the percentages varied 
from 3.9%-5.9%. Little’s MCAR tests showed that all of the variables had completely 
random missing patterns.  
Before analyzing the data, I examined the univariate outliers and kurtosis and 
skewness in the univariate distribution of each variable. The majority of variables looked 
symmetric, whereas those non-symm
symmetric distribution.  
 data. West, , and Curran ) suggested that given variables that are not 
ation method. To secure 
e use of som
h I fit 
 s ever n
 
parisons resulted in sim imilar par ter 
es eded w sform
or Analysis of the Key C




22 An alternative estimation method (i.e., ML, Robust) was run and gave comparable results. In general, 
ML, Robust estimation resulted in a similar estimation of parameters but more favorable model fit 
information (e.g., CFI and RMSEA) than ML estimation. Although I could report the ML, Robust 
estimation outcomes to highlight the better model fits, I chose ML outputs to be more conservative in 
interpretation. 
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subdim s of their effectiveness in measuring the intended constructs. 
Speci , I asses  and internal consistency of the data using the 
Cronbach’s alpha test. I also conducted an exploratory factor analysis (i.e., principal 
comp t analysis) to assess its loadings, dim Eigenvalues using the 
SPSS 11.5 program. The following section presents the items and the results of 
exploratory factor analyses the item t I po . 
Communicant Activeness in Problem Solving (CAPS) 
In Table 3, I summarize the result of the reliability tests and principal component 
 problem solving. I used three problems, 
or CAPS in three different problems showed acceptable levels of 
pha coefficients: .9 r w in Iraq, .94 for losing weight, and .95 for eliminating 
mative action. Although I treated CAPS as a ensional construct here, I 
nsions: information forefending, information 
itting, information forwarding, infor aring, inform
dim y, I conducted 
nsions for the 
inating 
mative action in term
.33% of variance correspondingly. In eliminating affirmative action, four dimensions 
cou  for 54.28% of variance. 
ensions in term
fically sed the reliability
onen ensionalities, and 
 and reliability tests for s tha  pro sed
analysis (PCA) of communicant activeness in
war in Iraq, losing weight, and elim
Cronbach’s alpha tests f
al
affir
proposed CAPS to have six subdim
perm
inform
principal component analysis. PCA showed th
war in Iraq and losing weight issues and f
affir
in Iraq and losing weight, five dim
55
ac
inating affirmative action, in this study. The 
3 fo
ing. To see whethe








r CAPS has m
our dimensions for the issue of elim
le (i.e., Eigenvalues higher than 1.00). In war 
 explained about 56.14% of variance and 
ation seeking, and 




ultidimensional structure under CAPS (i.e., subfactors were emerged 
from sis) s rther broke down CAPS into its six dimensions 
and examined its reliability and structure. I summarize the results and items in following 
tables. Table 2 reports the results from one facto alysis of all the variables as 
indicators of C able 4-9 report the results of the separate factor analyses in six 
subdim sion . 
 
Table 3 













































3.38 3.04 3.15 
1.63 1.41 1.69 

























Items, Factor Loadings, and Reliability for Information Forefending (n = 1380) 
War in LosiIraq ng Weight Eliminating 
Affirmative Action 















Others respect my perspective about this problem .57  .63  .61  
because it is simple and clear.  
Some publicized statements about this problem are .54    .50  
worthless.  
I have invested enough time and energy so that I 
understand this problem. 
.81  .81  .82  
I know where to go when I need updated 
information regarding this problem. 
.68  .73  .6     7




  .81  .8    1
I feel like resisting some persuasive efforts around 
this problem.  
.53    .59  
I express my opinions confidently about what 
should be done to deal with this problem. 









.49 .80 .50 .79 .46 .81 
 
Information 
I am picky in choosing information sources when I 
think about this problem.  
Eigenvalues  3.45  3.01  3.54   










Items, Factor Loadings, and Reliability for Information Permitting (n = 1380) 
 
 













To make better decisions regarding this problem, 
opposite views and information as long as they are rela
to the problem.  
I listen to 
ted 
      .74 .66 .70
For this problem, I welcome any information regardles
where it comes from.  
s of .42  .57  .46  
I am careful in accepting information about this problem -.60  -.59  -.60  
because of the vested interests of those who provided the 
information. (R)  







At times, I find that I have ted conflicting 
information about this problem.  
 .    accep .66 65 .71 .65 .68 .64 













Items, Factor Loadings, and Reliability for Information Forwarding (n = 1380) 











Alpha Factor Alpha 
Loading 
Sometimes I find I am engaging in aggressive conversations on this 
problem. 
    .65  .66  .69
It
a
.77  .75  .78   is one of my top priorities to share my knowledge and perspective 
bout this problem.  
If  to others.   it is possible, I take time to explain this problem .78  .76  .77  
It
pr









      actively seek out opportunities to participate in public opinion polls
bout this problem. 
.64 .72
I love to start a conversation on this problem with others.  .80  .74  .76  
I volunteer to inform others about the problem.  .76  .77  .78  
I feel happy when I provide new information about this problem to 
others. 













I often play a leadership role in initiating conversation about the 
problem. 
.78 .89 .73 .88 .78 .90 










   
 
Table 7 
Items, Factor Loadings, and Reliability for Information Sharing (n = 1380) 
 



















I am sure that I will be quite active in passing on
information related to this problem in the near future.
 
 
      .76 .74 .77
I am a person to whom my friends and others come to
learn more about this problem.  
       .82 .83 .81








.78 .81 .83 .8








Items, Factor Loadings, and Reliability for Information Seeking (n = 1380) 
War r L g gh liminating 
 













lph  F ctor 
L adin
Al ha Fac r 
Load ng 
From tim  to ti e, I onta
wh  kin of s utio  the
e m  c ct p o i b  t r
at d ol ns re  
 . 9   peo le ab ut th s pro lem o lea n 
 are.
.69  66  .6  
I re ularl  visi web tes rg y t si el t he b .   .  2  evan  to t  pro lem .80  80 .8
I re ularl  che k to e if 
this problem o the I tern
g y c se th s  n n ation about 
n n et
 . 3  ere i  any ew i form
.  
.77  83  .8  
I w uld r ques boo ets c
the problem.  
o e t kl o i el t w e ut  . 3  ntain ng r evan kno ledg abo  .76  74  .7  
I vi it an nlin or re ular
 
s  o e g  b st o  ul r
about the problem









 f d nk t e m ch tim o r  a   . 8  9 .87 
tion 
g 
My rien s thi  tha I tak
this problem.  
 too u e f r lea ning bout .81 73 . 5 .7  




2  5 4    56.5 
ce 
ed 
7.65  61. 5
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Table 9 




War in I n i Eliminating 
Affirmative 
Action







A a  
a  
pha 
ons uct  







I am sur  that  will e qu te ac
in rmation related o thi prob
e  I  b i ti n in  
fo  t s l ut
7  .64  ve i pass g on
em in the near f ure. 
. 8  .75  
I am a person to whom m  frie
learn m e ab ut th  pro em.
y n nd er m  
or o is bl   





In he p t, I r sear ed a out t
P ss
 t as e ch b h o  seriously. .73 0  .72 8 is pr blem .7 .78 .70 .5








Table 4 summarizes the items, loadings, Cronbach’s alpha, and variance 
explained in three problems for information forefending. In information forefending, I 
used eight items and found only one dimension: i.e., Eigenvalues = 3.45, 3.01, and 3.54
in war in Iraq, losing weight, and eliminating affirmative action. Factor loa
 
dings varied 
43.08%, 50.21%, and 44.23% 










from .46 to .81. The amounts of variance explained were 
 Cronbach’s alphas were .80, .79, and .81, correspondingly. Therefore, I conclud
that information forefending reached an acceptable level of reliability and inte
consistency. 
Table 5 summarizes the items, loadings, Cronbach’s alpha, and variance 
explained in three problems for information permitting. In information permitting, I used 
five items and again found only one dimension: i.e., Eigenvalues = 2.14, 2.19, and 2.07 
for war in Iraq, losing weight, and eliminating affirmative action. Factor loadings var
from .42 to .79. The amounts of variance explained were 42.88%, 43.71%, and 41.31
and the Cronbach’s alphas were .65, .65, and 
ity coefficients were less than desirable (i.e., .70 to .80). The fewer number of 
items would be a possible cause for marginal reliabilities.  
Table 6 summarizes the items, loadings, Cronbach’s alpha, and variance
explained in three problems for information forwarding. In information forwarding, I 
used 10 items. I also found a single dimension: i.e., Eigenvalues = 4.53, 4.55, and 4.95
for war in Iraq, losing weight, and eliminating affirmative action. Factor loadings vary 
4 to .81. The amounts of variance explained were 56.64%, 50.52%, and 54.97% 
and the Cronbach’s alphas were .89, .88, and .90, correspondingly. Therefore, I concl
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nd the Cronbach’s alphas were .79, .81, 
 that information forefending reached an 
ems, load
explained in three problems for informat ation seeking, I used six 
it ension: i.e., Eigenvalues = 2.83, 3.46, and 3.69 for war in 
Iraq, losing weight, and eliminating affirmative action. Factor loadings varied from .66 
to .85. The amount of variance explained was 56.52%, 57.65%, and 61.45% and the 
Cronbach’s alphas nd . herefore, I conclude that 
information forefe n acc ility and internal consistency. 
Table 9 summ ms, 
explain d in three problem ation processing. In information processing, I used 
three item ension: 
in Iraq, losing weight, and eliminating affirmative action. Factor loadings varied from .64 
to .86. The variances explained were 62.80%, 62.91%, and 54.50% and the Cronbach’s 
alphas were .70, .70, and .58 correspondingly. Although the reliability of eliminating 
affirmative action resulted in a marginal alpha coefficient, the other alpha coefficients 
reached an acceptable level of reliability. 
that information forwarding measures reached an acceptable level of reliability and 
internal consistency.  
In information sharing, I used four items and found a single dimension: i.e., 
Eigenvalues = 2.45, 2.48, and 2.54 in war in Iraq, losing weight, and eliminating 
affirmative action. Factor loadings varied from .74 to .83. The amounts of variance 
explained are 61.12%, 62.01%, and 63.55% a
and .81, correspondingly. Therefore, I conclude
acceptable level of reliability and internal consistency. 
Table 8 summarizes the it ings, Cronbach’s alpha, and variance 
ion seeking. In inform
ems and found a single dim
 were .81, .85, a 87, correspondingly. T
nding reached a eptable level of reliab
arizes the ite loadings, Cronbach’s alpha, and variance 
e s for inform
s and found a single dim i.e., Eigenvalues = 1.88, 1.89, and 1.63 in war 
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In summary, I found that the new construct communicant activeness in problem 
solving achieved a reasonable internal consistency and reliability. I treated CAPS not 
only as a unidim t, but also as a set of multi ts. In 
both und acceptable agreements between data and proposition.  
Cogn trepreneurship in Problem Solving (CEPS)
The second new construct I proposed is cognitive entrepreneurship in problem 
solving (CEPS). CEPS consists of four conceptual subdimen s: cognitive 
retrog ion, cognitive suspension, cognitive m, an g e commitment. 
s for cognitive retrogression and cognitive susp
le items to measure n u  and cognitive commitment: two 
putational formulas in the conceptualization. For CEPS, I conducted an analysis of 
d internal co
m
liability and principal component analysis. 
arize the result of ponent 
is (PCA) of cognitive entrepreneurship easurement, 
roblems: war in Iraq and inating affir itive 
teralism and cognitive comm ent strategies using 
, whi i i s
r CEPS in two different problems. Here 
a PS as if it were a unidimensional construct by entering a our 
ensions. Analysis showed alpha coefficients of .66 for war in Iraq, which is 
ensional construc dimensional construc
cases, I fo
itive En  
sion
ress  multilateralis d co nitiv




retrogression and suspension. In the followi
re
analys
I used two p
multila














 only for the subd
ng tables, I sum
 re
 in problem




imensions of cognitive 
arize the results of the 
In Table 10, I summ liability tests and principal com
 dif
sue.  




I first conducted Cronbach’s alpha tests fo
ted CE ll items for f
marginal, and .74 for eliminating affirmative action. To see whether CEPS has 
multi io ty, I conducted prin l component analysis. PCA showed that there 
are fo di ns in both issues: Eigen lu 71, 2.53, 1.37, and 1.01 for war in 
Iraq and 4.72, 2.43, 1.49, and 1.28 for eliminating affirmative action. For war in Iraq, 
four dimensions explained about 63.45% of variance, and for eliminating affirmative 
action, 58.39% of variance.  
Table
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Items, Factor Loadings, and Reliability for Cognitive Retrogression (n = 1380) 














ing oadi g 
Alpha
I now ow I houl  behk h  s d a r this p e 6ve fo robl m. . 3  .58  
It is too late to change th
pr blem
e position I now have on this 
o . 
  .80  
I have spent too much tim
p ition now.
e on this problem h  
os    
  to c ange my .68  .77 
It s too ate t shak  the 
pr blem   
i  l o e c usion I e n t
o .
 oncl hav draw  for his .66  .74 
I ve ade forts o juha m ef  t st y deci o s l .58 ify m sion n thi  prob em.    
I will k p m  curr nt po
it with contradictor
ee y e sition even if m  
y evidence. 
  so eone challenges .71  .71 
I ve f und ount  evi
in  
ha o c er dence that rej  t os s
different from m e.









fe is tl c e my mi  2 .
R trog ssio  
I el it  cos y to hang nd on this problem.  .7 .74 82 




 2.08 9  4
Vari nce 
  52.9  
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Table 12 
Items, Factor Loadings, and Reliability for Cognitive Suspension (n = 1380) 
 
m e on
.70 .72 .75 .69 












A pha Fa or Alpha 
I t k re time o ak ng up my 
p e
.77  .73  wan to ta e mo
robl m. 
 bef re m i mind for this 
I ta  e up my nd about what should be done for 
this problem
.68  .61  
.81  .79  
2.20  2.07  
hesi te to mak
.  
 mi  










or th s pro lem,
vide ce is n.  
F i b  I will try to spen n g t  a e 
e n  i
su d a y jud men until ll th
Eigenvalues  
 % of 
Variance 
Explained 
54.90  51.73  
As I did for CAPS, I conducted subsequent analyses for cognitive retrogression








reneurship in problem 
Table 11 summarizes the items, loadings, Cronbach’s alpha, and variance 
explained in two problems for cognitive retrogression. In cognitive retrogression, I used 
eight items and found single dimensionality in both issues: i.e., Eigenvalues 2.53 for war 
in Iraq and 3.18 for eliminating affirmative action. Factor loadings varied from .58 to 
The amount of variance explained was 42.08 and 52.99% and the Cronbach’s alphas 
were .72 and .82, correspondingly.  
Table 12 summarizes the items, loadings, Cronbach’s alpha, and variance 
explained in two problems for cognitive suspension. In cognitive suspension, I u
nd again found only one dimension in both issues: i.e., Eigenvalues 2.20 for war 
in Iraq and 2.07 for eliminating affirmative action. Factor loadings vary from .61 to .81. 
The amount of variance explained was 54.90 and 51.73% and the Cronbach’s alphas 
were .72 and .69.  
Antecedent Variables of the CAPS and CEPS 
The situational theory of publics (J. Grunig, 1997, 2003) specifies situational
antecedent conditions explaining when and why a communicant actively seeks or 
passively processes information. They are problem recognition, constraint recognition
level of involvement, and referent criterion. In addition, I introduced a variable called 
situational motivation in problem solving that conceptualizes and measures one’s 
problem-solving motivation in a problematic situation. The primary purpose of the 
present study is to generalize the situational theory of publics by introducing two m
general constructs of communicant activeness and cognitive entrep
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solving. Thu uld 
lics (J. Grunig, 1997). I found only one dimension 
in all three problems: i.e., Eigenvalues = 2.17, 2.11, and 2.11 for war in Iraq, losing 
weight, and eliminating affirmative action, respectively. Factor loadings varied from .82 
to .87. The amounts of variance explained are 72.29%, 70.40%, and 70.33% and the 
s, it is necessary to investigate how the existing antecedent conditions wo
conceptually link with the two new variables. In doing so, I should note that two 
antecedent variables of problem recognition and referent criterion have been conceptually 
refined and thus their measurement items have been modified. Hence, to proceed, I 
checked the new and modified items’ reliabilities and internal consistencies. In the 
following Tables 13-17, I will summarize the analysis and findings for the situational 
antecedent variables. 
Problem recognition. Table 13 summarizes the items, loadings, Cronbach’s alpha, 
and variance explained in three problems for problem recognition. I used four items that 
had been modified from the past measurement items in the situational theory of publics (J. 
Grunig, 1997). I found only one dimension in all three problems: i.e., Eigenvalues = 2.26, 
2.29, and 2.26 for war in Iraq, losing weight, and eliminating affirmative action. Factor 
loadings varied from .63 to .82. The amounts of variance explained are 56.50%, 57.21%, 
and 56.45% and the Cronbach’s alphas were .74, .75, and .74, correspondingly. Therefore, 
I conclude that problem recognition reached an acceptable level of reliability and internal 
consistency. 
Constraint recognition. Table 14 summarizes the items, loadings, Cronbach’s 
alpha, and variance explained in three problems for constraint recognition. I used three 
items as in the situational theory of pub
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Cronbach’s alphas were .81, .79, and .79, correspondingly. Therefore, I conclude that 
constraint recognition reached an ity and internal consistency. 
Level of involvement. Table 15 summarizes the items, loadings, Cronbach’s alpha, 
and v c plained in three pro s for level of involvement. I used four items as in 
the si o  of lics (J. Grunig, 1997). I found only one dimension in all three 
problem : i envalues = 2.07, 2.26, and 2.32 for war in Iraq, losing weight, and 
eliminating affirmative action, respectively. Factor loadings varied from .61 to .82. The 
amounts of variance explained are 51.71%, 56.54%, and 58.04% and the Cronbach’s 
alpha r an , e di . efore, I conclude that level of 
ent reached an acceptable level of reliability and internal consistency. 
Referent criterion. Table 16 summarizes the items, loadings, Cronbach’s alpha, 
s for referent criterion. I used five items that had 
odified from s in the situational theory of publics. For 
e
d). In the other two problems, I found a 
ension: i.e., E (53.44% of variance explained) and 2.47 
ight and eliminating affirmative action 
 .64 to .77 (in the first dimension) and the 
spondingly. The two dimensions in the 
ension was 
maller than the first d  addition, in the other two problems, I found 
ensions. Therefore, with some , I de that referent criterion 
cceptab ncy. 










s we e .69, .74, d .76  corr spon ngly Ther
involvem
and variance explained in three problem
been m
war in Iraq, I found two dim
explained) and 1.03 (20.64% of variance explaine
single dim
(49.35% of variance explained) for losing we
correspondingly. Factor loadings vary from
Cronbach’s alphas were .76, .78, and .81, corre








e., Eigenvalues 2.57 (51.39% of variance 
fic result. Yet, the second dim
nsion. In
igenvalues = 2.67 
caution  conclu
le level of reliability and internal consiste
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 Table 17 summarizes the items, 
loadi ha, and ia e ems for situational 
motivation in problem solving. I used three items. I found a single dimension in all three 
problem of variance explained), 1.97 (65.65% of 
varia xpla and 1.62 (53.99% of variance explained) for war in Iraq, losing 
weigh d el affirma a ,  .71 
to .85 and the Cronbach’s alphas were .67, .74, and .57, correspondingly.  
ysis and reliability analysis helped 
identif l n nt and reliable measurement items. 
s were reliab lly consistent in most of the problems with a few 
es 
ensionality of the construct. T
ean the construct has a temeyer, Bearden, & Sharma, 
tiveness in problem solving to have six 
ensions as a second-order construct.
ensional structure, especially a second-
 confirmatory factor 
is that tested the d a priori conceptual 
Situational motivation in problem solving.
ngs, Cronbach’s alp  var nce xplained in three probl






nating tive ction  respectively. Factor loadings varied from
In summ
y the dim
ary, the exploratory factor anal
ensionality and the interna ly co siste
Item
exceptions. However, reliability analys
unidim
m
2003). Indeed, I conceptualized communicant ac
subdim
communicant activenes




is such as Cronbach’s alpha assum
hus, although alpha level would be high, it does not 
ensionality (Ne
 Thus, it is necessary to find whether 
im
report the results from
chieved un
s has such a multi-d
imensionality of the new construct using 
idim
Table 13 
Items, Factor Loadings, and Reliability for Problem Recognition (n = 1380) 
 





Factor Alpha Factor 
Loading Loading 
Alpha Factor Alpha 
Loading 
To what extent do you think there is something missing in this     
problem? 
.79  .76 .72  
How much does the current situation differ from your 
expectation? 
.63  .73  .75  
How strong do you feel that something needs to be done to 
improve the situation for this problem? 









How much does the current situation deviate from what you 
think it should be?  











Items, Factor Loadings, and Reliability for Constraint Recognition (n = 1380) 
 
War in Iraq eight 
Affirmative 










L ing Lo ing Lo ing 
Please think of whether you, 
that would make a difference in the way these problems are 
.84  .84  .85  personally, could do anything 
handled. If you wanted to do some
ma
thing, would your efforts 
ke a difference? (R) 
To what extent do you believe this problem    is a problem
that you can do something about? (R) 






uld a  the w




To what extent do you believe that you co
this prob
ffect ay 
lem is eventually solved if  to?
.84 .81 .82 .79 
Eigenvalues  2.17  2.11  2.11  
% of
n
 70.33   
ce Varia
Explained 








q t  
 
Table 15 
Items, Factor Loadings, and Reliability for Level of Involvement (n = 1380) 
 


















In n        your mind, how much of a connection do you see betwee
yourself and this problem? 
.61 .74 .73
To what extent do you believe this problem could involve y
 someone close to you at some point? 
ou 
or
  2    .77 .7 .78
H ct 
y
  2    ow much do you believe this problem affects or could affe




or thoughts are about 
this problem? 





How strong would you say your opinions .71 . .72 .7 .75 .7




 51.71  56.54  58.04  
 215
Table 16 
Items, Factor Loadings, and Reliability for Referent Criterion (n = 1380) 
 inating 
ff ti ction 
War in Iraq Losing Weight Elim



















Al a Fact r 
Load g 
lph  F ctor
Lo ding
A
I a  confidenm t t 
problem. 
7  1  4 .  abou my knowledge about this . 5 -. 3  .6   69 
I s ongl  sup
thi prob em. 
tr y po c n  s g
s l
7  4  7 .  rt a ertai  way of re olvin  . 6 -. 1  .7   74 
I h ve a refer
be settled.  
a p e fo w  p e  should 7  4  7 .  nce r ho  the robl m . 5 -. 5  .7   77 
I a  pre y surm tt e n o  s  t
problem. 







st e e p d e
id es s g  le
6  .6  4 .56  
ent 
ion 
Pa  exp rienc
gu elin  for 
 has rovi ed m  with 
olvin  this prob m. 
. 4 1  .7   




.  20.  44 9f 
nce 
 51 39 64  53.  4 .35  
 
Table 17 




War in Iraq i e
Act















How often do you stop to think about each of thes re
problems? 
.75  e th e  .80  .71 
To what extent would you say you are curious ab hi
problem? 





Solving Please, indicate how much you would like to und n
each of these problems better. 
.7  7 8 .68 .57 ersta d 5 .6  .7  .74 




 53.99  60.34  65.65  
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quation Modeling Analysis  
In the prev s section, I reporte e characteristics o e sample and results of 
exploratory analysis of the variables in eed to the 
confirma i hase  tw ne cons t  C PS d C sing the 
EQS .1 a B er, 5 a z the  x  the 
CAP and CEPS. Then, I analyzed a series of causal models in which I specified 
con tual relationships with other conceptual variables (e.g., level of involvement) to 
.  In t e e n, I w irst report 
lts from confirmatory factor analysis of CAPS.  
 Problem
onfirmatory c A ysis of C  
ne ale p
rrent study, I have a large sample size (n = 1,380). Thus, using a sub-sampling strategy, 
 s
nction. e , ss-v a  f a  sca is st al ed b g samples 
 different populations. Although the sub-sampling strategy has a limitation in 
ity of the measurement system and the factor model. The 
e  s ple  n 4 about 33% of 1,380 survey participants.  
Following the two-step process of SEM, I co atory 
is that allowed covarying all th odels using the candidate 
easurement ecking for poor or cross-loading items and 
6.1 produced a set of best item
Structural E
iou d th f th


















amine factor structures of
 an EPS. U
 6 ogr m (
S 
cep




I drew a few sm
fu
from
conducting a cross-validation anal




residual covariances with LM tests in EQS 
he n xt s ctio ill f






eIt is de w m asurement sc with different sam les. In the 
aller developmental amples by using SPSS 11.5 random selection 
  How ver cro alid tion or new le  be  ev uat y usin
ysis, it still allows a better opportunity to evaluate the 
ntal am had  = 67, 
e factors in the m
 first conducted the nfirm
 items. Subsequent analysis ch
s across three 
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problems in the current study: war in Iraq, losing weight, and eliminating affirmative 
action. 
he in l ph , 
factor oblique, and second-order structure model. These three models were nested 
hierarchically under a six-factor oblique m l. Specifically, the one-factor model is the 
onious of the three models compared. Thus, I first compared the one-factor 
o th  f r iqu odel. And, e s c  o u odel turned out 
 be a statistically better model, I compared the six-factor oblique model against the 
which is mo onious than the six-factor oblique 
o  
I summarized the results from model testing in Tables 18-20. Table 18 reports the 
o goo ces an





second-order structure model, 
m
m
del wi  the six- acto  obl e m if th ix-fa tor bliq e m
re parsim
del.
del dness-of-fit indi d model comparison results for the war in Iraq issue.  
 219
χ2 f    
Table 18 
Model Comparisons: Chi-square Differences and Goodness-of-Fit indices (War in Iraq) 
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155 .877 .847 367.166
Six-Factor Obliqu
(Md B) 
396.32 154 2.574 058
(.051, .065) 
.  




15 p < .001 
 
Developmental
Sample (n = 467)
Second-Orde
C) (Md 
399.52 159 2.513 057
(.050, .064) 
 
063 .945 .927 81.529 B vs. C
 3.207
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(Md A
785.47 169 4.648 .089
(.083, .096) 
.  
162 .857 .823 447.476
Six-Factor Obliqu
(Md B) 
395.63 154 2.569 059
(.051, .066) 
.  








Sample (n = 458)
Second-Orde
C) (Md 
408.36 159 2.568 059
(.052, .066) 
 
057 .942 .924 90.366 B vs. C
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755.17 169 4.468 .087
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168 .870 .839 417.175
Six-Factor Obliqu
(Md B) 
401.76 154 2.609 059
(.052, .066) 
.  




15 p < .001 
 
Validation
Sample (n = 460)
Second-Orde
C) (Md 
408.32 159 2.568 058
(.051, .065) 
 
056 .945 .927 90.322 B vs. C
 6.559
 





   
 
r 9   .       
Total  (n = 1380)
Second-Orde  0823.50  15 5.179 .055
(.051, .059) 
055 .949 .933 0505.50
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Table 19 
CAPS Model Comparisons: Chi-square Differences and Goodness-of-Fit indices (Losing Weight) 
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CAPS Model Comparisons: Chi-square Differences and Goodness-of-Fit indices (Eliminating Affirmative Action) 
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In the developmental sample (n = 467), the one-factor model was a significantly 
better model than the independence (null) model:  χ2df (169) = 705.166 vs. χ2df (210) = 
4574.104 and χ2 /df ratios of 4.173 vs. 21.781. Next, I compared the one-factor model 
with th e-e six-factor oblique model. The six-factor oblique model was better than the on
factor model: χ2df (169) = 705.166 vs. χ2df (154) = 396.322 and χ2 /df ratios of 4.173 vs. 
2.574. The nested model test showed that the six-factor oblique factor model is a better 
representation of the observed covariances structure: ∆χ2∆df (15) = 308.844, p < .001. 
According to Hu and Bentler’s (1999) joint criterion: i.e., CFI ≥ .96 and SRMR ≤ .10 or 
RMSEA ≤ .06 and SRMR ≤ .10, the six-factor oblique model is close to an acceptable fi
in terms of the joint criterion: CFI = .944, SRMR = .062, and RMSEA = .058. Howev
the CAPS model is designed to be a second-order structure that is more parsimonious. 
Hence, I conducted the nested model testing between the six-factor oblique and second-








factor oblique model: χ2df (154) = 396.322 vs. χ2df (159) = 399.529 and χ2 /df ratios
of 2.574 vs. 2.513. In addition, the nested model testing showed that the second-order 
model is more parsimonious than the six-factor oblique model: ∆χ2∆df (5) = 3.207, p
> .250. The second-order factor model is also close to an acceptable fit in terms of the 
joint criterion: CFI = .945, SRMR = .063, and RMSEA = .057. Thus, I conclude that th
proposed second-order model is a more viable model structure for the data.23  
Table 19 summarizes the model comparisons for the war in Iraq problem. In the 
losing weight problem with the development sample (n = 467), the six-factor oblique 
model was significantly better than the one-factor model ∆χ2∆df (15) = 304.128, p < .0
                                                 
23 I added error covariances and disturbance covariances in modeling when they were conceptually 
reasonable. Thus, in some models, the degrees of freedom were slightly different even in the same factor 
models (e.g., the second-order factor models) across three problems. 
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The six-factor oblique model χ2 /df ratio was 2.141. It was close to an acceptable fit




testing between the six-factor and second-order factor model showed the 
gain to be statistically not worse: ∆χ2∆df (5) = 4.447, p > .250. The 
model f  
re for the 









ere better than the single-factor model. In the first validation sample (n = 458), however, 
second-order model a
it indices were CFI = .958, SRMR = .049, and RMSEA = .049. Thus, I conclude
that the proposed second-order model is statistically a more viable model structu
data.  
Table 20 reports the model comparisons results for eliminating affirmative action 
as done in previous two problems. In the development sample (n = 467), again the six-
factor oblique model is significantly better than the one-factor model ∆χ2∆df (15) = 
419.202, p < .001. The six-factor oblique model χ2 /df ratio was 2.395. It was close to an 
acceptable fit in terms of the joint criterion: CFI = .955, SRMR = .056, and RMSEA 
= .055. And the nested model testing between the six-factor and second-order factor 
model again showed the second-order mod
p > .250. The model fit indices were CFI = .955, SRMR = .056, and RMSEA
= .054. Thus, from the developmental samples, I conclude that the proposed second-o
model structure better represents the observed data than the six-factor oblique m
Next, I proceeded to the validation samples, which randomly selected 33
total sample (n = 1,380). Two validation samples of n = 458 and n = 460 were d
conducted the same model tests of one factor, six-factor oblique, and second-ord
models. The results of model comparisons are summarized in Tables 16-18. In t
validation samples for the war in Iraq, both six-factor and second-order factor m
w
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the second-order structure was statistically worse than the six-factor structure: ∆χ2∆df (5) 
= 12.733, p = . 025. In the second validation sample (n=460), the second-order factor 
: ∆χ2∆df (5) = 6.559, p > .250.  
Similarly, in the losing weight problem, both the six-factor and second-order 
factor models were better than the single-factor model. In the first validation sample (n = 
458), again, the second-order structure was statistically worse than the six-factor structure: 
∆χ2∆df (5) = 17.927, p ≈ .005. However, in the second validation sample (n = 460), the 
second-order factor model was not worse: ∆χ2∆df (5) = 3.226, p > .500.  
Finally, both the six-factor and second-order factor models were better than the 
single-factor model in the eliminating affirmative action issue. In the first validation 
sample (n = 458), the second-order factor model was statistically not worse: ∆χ2∆df (3) 
= .994, p > .750. In the next validation sample (n = 460), the six-factor structure was a 
better model representation than the second-order structure: ∆χ2∆df (3) = 7.233, p ≈ .05.  
In the validation samples, in three out of six tests, the six-factor oblique structure 
odel better represented the data than the second-order structure, whereas the other three 
tests showed that the second-order factor models better represented the covariance 
structures. Despite the three tests favorable to the six-factor oblique structure, six out of 
nine nested model tests indicated the second-order structure as a better representation. 
The inconsistency (i.e., three tests out of nine) seems to be due to sampling fluctuation. In 
addition, the three tests favoring six-factor oblique models were close to non-significant 
and had almost identical model fit values in terms of joint-criterion. This suggests that the 
second-order structure is a viable representation of the data. In summary, I found six 
subdimensions in the CAPS observed datasets from the analysis. This provides evidence 





ation forwarding, information sharing, information seeking, and information 
processing.   
odels 
H1: The higher the communicant activeness in problem solving, the higher the 
information forefending. 
H2: The higher the communicant activeness in problem solving, the higher the 
information permitting. 
H3: The higher the communicant activeness in problem solving, the higher the 
information forwarding. 
H4: The higher the communicant activeness in problem solving, the higher the 
information sharing. 
H5: The higher the communicant activeness in problem solving, the higher the 
information seeking. 
H6: The higher the communicant activeness in problem solving, the higher the 
information processing. 
 
that there are six sub-constructs, information forefending, inform
inform
Hypothesis Testing  
In the development samples, I found the second-order factor structure to be the 
best structure for the new CAPS construct. To test the hypotheses regarding the 
subdimensions of CAPS, I used the total sample (n = 1,380) across the three issues in the 
study. Tables 16-18 summarize the overall model fits in three problems. For war in Iraq, 
χ2df (159) = 823.500, CFI = .949, SRMR = .055, and RMSEA = .055. For losing weight, 
χ2df (163) = 628.838, CFI = .962, SRMR = .042, and RMSEA = .046. For eliminating 
affirmative action, χ2df (163) = 776.337, CFI = .956, SRMR = .046, and RMSEA = .052. 
Thus, for all three models the second-order structure is a reasonable representation for 
CAPS. Next, I proceed to interpreting the parameter estimates in the second-order m
to test the hypotheses I proposed earlier.  
To conceptualize the new construct of communicant activeness in problem 
solving, I proposed six hypotheses (see Figure 5 in the conceptualization). They are: 
Figures 15-17 summarize the three second-order models  the standardized structural 
path ates and standardized loadings in three problems.   
Fig ar in Iraq). 
 and
 estim
ure 15: CAPS (W
 
 













summarizes the variance explained and the coefficient H of CAPS and its subdimensions.
For those items in the CFA models, I examined the extracted variance to a
construct validity and the coefficient H for construct reliability. The coefficient H is a 
better alternative indicator of construct reliability than other previous measures based on 
the composite score with the equal weight assumption (Hancock & Mueller, 2001). 
Specifically, H is not affected by the loading sign, additional indicators can never detrac
and it is never smaller than the reliability of the best indicator, which is logical in that
factor inferred from multiple indicator variables should never be worse (i.e., less reliable)
than the best single indicator alone” (Hancock & Mueller, 2001, p. 195). For the 
extracted variance, 50% or above is considered good, whereas the coefficient H is 
considered good with .70 to .80 or above. Most subdimensions were higher or close
50% of variance explained and close to or above .70 in the coefficient H. More 
importantly, communicant activeness in problem solving, which is the focal construct, 




Variance Explained and Coefficient H in CAPS 













Information f ng 3. 4 3 8 7 .  Fore endi  5 93 .8 1 51. 9 .81 53.9 820
Infor atiom n m g 1. 8 3 3 8 .   Per ittin 3 37 .5 8 31. 9 .58 29.9 590
Information w g 1. 1 5 1 4 .  For ardin  5 46 .8 9 46. 7 .78 50.3 803
Inform io 2. 7 1 4 7 .  at n Sharing 5 64 .7 6 56. 6 .79 53.7 782
Inform o 6. 9 5 3 6 .  ati n Seeking 4 56 .7 4 54. 0 .89 57.6 852
Information c g 8. 5 4 8 6 .  Pro essin 4 33 .7 0 40. 6 .67 27.0 558
C mmu ican
P ble
o n t i ss
ro m
8. 5 5 7 7 .   Act vene  in 
 Solving 
5 73 .9 1 66. 2 .96 70.2 981
As shown in the figures, in all three problems (n = 1380), the structural paths 






tiveness in problem 
s that a problem solver with heightened motivation in problem 
solving ers 
’s 
eeking and processing increases as one becomes more active in problem 
solving. In summary, from the data analysis and hypothesis testing, I found six 
l significant at the p < .001 level. The loadings in the observed variables were all 
significant at the p < .001 level. Most of the parameter estimates in the measurement 
items varied between .313 and .826.   
The core premise in the CAPS model is that as a communicant becomes active in 
problem solving, he or she will become more selective, transmissive, and acquisitive 
regarding information about the problem. The analysis of CAPS in three individual an
social problems provides supportive evidence for the main postulate and the six a priori 
hypotheses.  
As a communicant becomes active in problem solving, one’s information 
selectivity tends to increase (i.e., H1 and H2). In general, one’s information forefendin
tendency increased more than his or her information permitting tendency as communi
activeness heightens. Interestingly, in all three problems, information transmission 
H3 and H4) was the most salient dimension in the communicant ac
solving. This indicate
 will evolve to be more active in sharing and forwarding information with oth
about the problem. The next salient dimension is information acquisition (i.e., H5 and 
H6). These two variables are the default dependent variables highlighting a public
active and passive communication behaviors in the situational theory of publics (J. 





sed two formulas that are conceptually derived for cognitive multilateralism 
and cognitive commitment. Specifically, I measured the latter two subdimensions by 
using participants’ agreement with factual and evaluative statements of conflicting 
position about the problems. Thus, these two dimensions were measured by single items. 
I avoided nested model testing between one-factor, multiple-factor oblique, and second-
order factor models because of modeling and programming difficulties, although it would 
have been possible to conduct these tests. Instead, I constructed and tested second-order 
factor structure directly whether it achieves a reasonable model fit across issues. Hence, 
if the model tests showed the second-order factor models to be viable, I considered these 
tests to be supporting evidence for the proposed second-order factor structure for CEPS. 
 As done in the confirmatory factor analysis of CAPS, I used randomly drawn 
subsamples: the developmental sample (n = 467, 33% of total n = 1,380) and the 
validating sample (n = 917, 66% of total n = 1,380). Table 20 and 21 report the CFA 
ensions of CAPS as proposed. Each subdimension has a positive 
relationship with its higher dimension of communicant activeness. In the following 
section, I will report another new construct I developed in this study. 
Cognitive Entrepreneurship in Problem Solving 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis of CEPS 
The second new construct is cognitive entrepreneurship in problem solving 
(CEPS). CEPS captures our varying cognitive approaches across different problem 
situations. It possesses four conceptual dimensions: cognitive retrogression, cognitive 
multilateralism, cognitive commitment, and cognitive suspension. In the present study, I 
applied a multiple-item approach for cognitive retrogression and cognitive suspension. In 
contrast, I u
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results in two subsamples for two issues: i.e., war in Iraq and eliminating affirmative 
acti
First, in the developm ple (n = odels were 
statistically viable m rding 9) joint-criterion. For war 
in Iraq, the second-order model resulted in χ2df (29) = 58.935, CFI = .977, SRMR = .055, 
and RMSEA = .047. For eliminatin irmative action, the second-order model resulted 
χ
e is a viable representation of the observed data. In the 
li n sample (n 7), I found si good model fit indices. For war in Iraq, the 
co order model resulted in χ df 154.220, C 55, SRMR = .067, and 
MSEA = .069. For eliminating affirmative action, the second-order model resulted in 
df (28) = 7123.734, CFI = .964, SRMR = .056, and RMSEA = .061.  With the CFA 
sults, I consider the second-order factor representation a viable model structure for 
 proble olving. Henc proceeded to interpret the 
eter estimates in the second-o  mod  the owing.   
For the hypothesis testing, I used the 
the model fits in the Tabl χ2df 
inating 
mative a  found χ2df (28) = 175.969, CFI = .963, SRMR = .056, and RMSEA 
e to interp eter estimates within 
odels.  
on.  
ental sam 467), the second-order factor m
odels, acco  to Hu and Bentler’s (199
g aff
in 






df (28) = 70.080, CFI = .969, SRMR = .059, and RMSEA = .057.  I found, thus, that 
datio
nd-
= 91 milarly 






second-order CFAs. I reported 
(29) = 187.542, CFI = .961, SRMR =
affir
= .062. Thus, these results allowed m
the m
m s e, I 
rder el in  foll
 
total sample (n = 1,380) to conduct the 
e 19 and 20. For war in Iraq 
 .061, and RMSEA = .063. For elim
ction, I
ret the specific param
For those items in the CFA models, again I computed the Coefficient H for 
con b d racted vari  a onstruct validity. Table 24 
mmarizes the variance explained and the coefficient H of CAPS and its subdimensions. 
 C nly e ogression and cognitive suspension were measured by 
ul  items. Most subdimensions were lower than 50% of variance explained. Thus, 
rrent measurement items seemed t construct rather poorly. But, coefficient H 
 c 70 o r oth C itive rship in problem solving, 
ain, had low variance explained. The coefficient Hs were .612 and .627, which were 
w an .70. I c d that the construct 
 th resent study. H e, I interpret the findings more carefully related with the CEPS 
n t.
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CEPS Model Comparisons: Chi-square Differences and Goodness-of-Fit indices (War in Iraq) 
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CEPS Model Comparisons: Chi-square Differences and Goodness-of-Fit indices (Eliminating Affirmative Action) 
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Variance Explained and Coefficient H in CEPS 






Cognitive Retrogression 30.93 .667 39.38 .699 
Cognitive Suspension 34.88 .853 36.27 .785 
C .627 ognitive Entrepreneurship 
in Problem Solving 
19.66 .612 19.96 
 
Figures 18-19 summarize the two second order models and the standardized 
structural path estimates and standardized loadings in two problems. I proposed four 
hypotheses for cognitive entrepreneurship in problem solving. They are: 
H7: The higher the cognitive entrepreneurship in problem solving, the lower the 
cognitive retrogression  
H8: The higher the cognitive entrepreneurship in problem solving, the higher the 
cognitive multilateralism.   
H9: The higher the cognitive entrepreneurship in problem solving, the higher the 
cognitive commitment. 




Figure 18: CEPS (War in Iraq). 
 






As shown in the figures, in both problems (n = 1,380), the structural paths from
the second-order latent variable (i.e., cognitive entrepreneurship) to the first-order latent 
variables (e.g., cognitive retrogression) were significant at the p < .001 level, ex
path to cognitive commitment for the war in Iraq issue (i.e., p < .01). In addition, the
loadings in the observed variables were all significant at the p < .001 level. Most of the 
parameter estimates in the measurement items varied between .400 and .700 (the 
lowest .285, the highest .909).   
The core premise in the CEPS model is that as one becomes active in problem 
solving, one will become less backward reasoning (cognitive retrogression), be more 
possessing of cognitive multilateralism, and show more commitment and more 








ive action issue (i.e., -.258, p < .001). This would suggest that there is 
a stronger backward reasoning tend omega approach) for the war in 
e, 
as expe
s supportive evidence for the main postulate and the four a priori hypotheses.  
In H7, I conceptually predicted that the one’s cognitive retrogression in proble
solving will increase as the cognitive entrepreneurship in problem solving heighte
Cognitive retrogression can be highlighted by one’s backward reasoning—i.e., “a 
conclusion directs certain evidence.” This is an optimization process for a priori 
conclusion. For H7, I found supporting evidence in both issues. Notably, the magnitude 
of the path coefficient was higher for the war in Iraq issue (i.e., -.754, p < .001) than the
eliminating affirmat
ency (i.e., cognitive 
Iraq issue. However, in both issues, the directions of the path were consistently negativ
cted.  
 237
In H8 and H9, I adopted a single-indicator approach in measurement. I applie
derived formulas for cognitive multilateralism and cognitive commitment. In H8, I 
predicted that as cognitive entrepreneurship increases, one will more possess cognitiv
breadth—a greater number of decision alternatives and a greater extent of tolerance in 
dealing with competing information during the problem-solving process. I found sup










ognitive suspension refers to a problem solver’s 
nitive resources in evaluating and reevaluating a 
selected  
ative action issue.   
ore 
nd 
In H9, I expected that as cognitive entrepreneurship heightens one will mak
greater cognitive commitment—a greater degree of enthusiasm and extent of patronizing 
of the proposed solutions for a given problem solving. I found support for the H9 in 
eliminating affirmative action issue (.166, p < .001), but not in the war in Iraq issue (
.113, p < .01). Interestingly, the signs were opposite in the war in Iraq issue, which 
suggests, for the war in Iraq issue, that as one becomes more entrepreneurial in problem 
solving, one would be less enthusiastic and patronizing to the proposed solutions. Thus,
found partial support for the cognitive commitment.  
In H10, I proposed that as one’s cognitive entrepreneurship increases, one’s
cognitive suspension increases as well. C
heightened willingness to invest cog
 solution before finalizing it. In the two issues, I found supporting evidence for
H10: .414 (p < .001) in the war in Iraq issue and .770 (p < .001) in the eliminating 
affirm
Overall results in the CEPS CFA model tests indicated that as the problem 
solver’s entrepreneurial mindset in problem solving heightens, one tends to adopt m
backward reasoning, have cognitive breadth, and show tolerance for competing ideas a
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s—seems to differ across issues. Considering the single-item approach with 
formulas in the cognitive multilateralism and cognitive commitment, such a finding 
requires further analysis. A new study using a multiple-indicators approach, as in the 
cognitive retrogression and suspension, will allow a clearer understanding for the two 
dimensions measured with a single item.  
In summary, I proposed two new variables of CAPS and CEPS to develop a more 
general version of the situational theory of publics (J. Grunig, 1997, 2003). Although the 
previous confirmatory factor analyses provided some confidence in the new constructs, it 
is hardly conclusive in terms of their construct validity. However, construct validity is 
hard to test or establish by the newly developed concept alone. One alternative way to 
demonstrate validity of a construct is to examine its conceptual relationships with other 
established constructs—a “nomological network” (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955). 
Specifically, researchers can evaluate the validity of a new construct when they test 
“distinct antecedent causes” and find “consequential effects and/or modifying conditions, 
as well as quantitative differences in the degree to which a construct is related to 
antecedents or consequences” (Netemeyer, Bearden, & Sharma, 2003, p. 82; Iacobucci, 
Ostrom, & Grayson, 1995; Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994).  Thus, it is necessary to test 
how and to what extent the two new constructs are explained by the antecedent variables 
in the situational theory. In practice, structural equation modeling provides an ideal 
methodological framework to test nomological validity (Bollen, 1989, Hoyle, 1995).  
opinions and to suspend judgment before finalizing a solution. Yet, cognitive 
commitment—the degree of enthusiasm and the extent of patronizing the proposed 
solution
Earlier in the zation, I posited conceptual relationships between the 
new constructs and existing antecedent variables in the situational theory of publics. 
si ruc q ion li p , I tested the presumed conceptual 
lationships between new and existing variables. Specifically, I examined how the newly 
tr  c s co a our antecedent variables from the 
tuational theory of publics. In the following section, I will report a series of models of 
m gical ne rks betwe e antecedent variables of 
tuational theory
u lysis 
tuational Theory  Communicant Activeness in Problem Solving (SITCAPS) Model 
T i  int t is st  i generalize the situational theory of publics 
TP) by introducing CAPS. In the earlier exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis, I 
un v S liable for the three 
dividua  social pr ms. To further explore the validity and utility of the new 
n th model with four antecedent variables in the STP 
oblem recognition, constraint recognition, level of involvement, and referent criterion. 
 a io in uce tion a e, situational motivation in problem 
lv (s i  11 h ma odel, Chapter II: Conceptualization). 
Table 25 reports the SITCAPS model testing results. According to Hu and 
entler’s (1 t crit , all three ls reached an acceptable level of model fit. 
r the ndic  (154) = 927.538, CFI = .930, SRMR 
.077, and EA = .06 espite a r ly low CFI value, the combination of 



















SRMR and RMSEA m
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oduced oncept are nceptu lly linked with the f




he pr mary eres of th udy s to 





























SRMR ≤ .10 or SRMR ≤ .10 and RMSEA ≤ .06). For losing weight, the model fit indices 
ere χ2df (259) = 855.524, CFI = .960, SRMR = .036, and RMSEA = .041. Finally, for 
liminating affirmative action, the model fit indices were χ2df (154) = 752.310, CFI = .954, 
SRMR = .072, and RMSEA = .053. Thus, I will proceed to interpreting the model 
parameter estimates to test hypotheses.  
Hypothesis Testing 
Earlier I posited five hypotheses between communicant activeness in problem 
solving and the four situational antecedent variables and one motivational variable. They 
are:  
H11: The higher the problem recognition, the higher the situational motivation in 
problem solving.  
H12: The higher the constraint recognition, the lower the situational motivation in 
problem solving.  
H13: The higher the involvement recognition, the higher the situational motivation in 
problem solving.  
H14: The higher the referent criterion, the higher the communicant activeness in problem 
solving. 
H15: The higher the situational motivation in problem solving, the higher the 
communicant activeness in problem solving. 
 
Figures 20-22 summarize the SITCAPS models and their parameter estimates in 






SITCAPS Model with Situational Motivation in Problem Solving: Chi-square Differences and Goodness-of-Fit indices 


























































































































War in Iraq (n = 1380)




























































are some obstacles in a situation that limit one’s ability to do anything about the 
 
In H11, I expected a positive relationship between problem recognition (i.e., 
“detect something is missing and should be done”) and situational motivation in proble
solving (i.e., the likelihood of “stop to think about” the problem). I found positive path 
coefficients in all three problems: .115 (p < .05) for war in Iraq, .181 (p < .001) for losing 
weight, and .262 (p < .001) for eliminating affirmative action. Thus, as the probl
recognition increases, the more one becomes motivated in problem solving. In H12, I 
expected a negative relationship between constraint recognition (i.e., “perceive that there 
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situation”) and situational motivation in problem solving. I found all negative p
coefficients across all three problems: -.140 (p < .05) for war in Iraq, -.657 (p < .001) for 
losing weight, and -.158 (p < .001) for eli
ath 







t, such as wishful thinking or willful thinking about the 
or example, a terminally ill patient would have a strong willful 
thinkin
ay 
bjective referent—for a PC virus infection from a past experience. 
ill 
one’s constraint recognition increases, one’s situational motivation in problem 
solving 
In H13, I expected a positive relationship between level of involvement (i.e., 
perceive some “connection” between a situation and oneself) and situational motivation.
found strong positive relationships: .831 (p < .001) for war in Iraq, .420 (p < .001) for 
losing weight, and .630 (p < .001) for eliminating affirmative action. I thus conclude that 
as one’s perceived involvement increases, his or her situational motivation toward the 
problem will increase.  
H15 asks how one’s problem solving would differ in the presence of a referen
criterion. Referent criterion was redefined in this study as any knowledge or subjecti
judgmental system that exerts specific influence on the way one approaches problem 
solving. This can be any decisional guideline or decision rules perceived as relevant 
given problem: i.e., either an objective referent, such as one carried from prior problem 
solving, or a subjective referen
problem outcomes. F
g on his problem (“I will be fine”—i.e., subjective referent) and subsequently he 
thinks and look for information that reinforce his strong “subjective” belief. Or, one m
carry a solution—i.e., o
The availability and applicability of such cognitive knowledge (internal referent) w
increase communicant activeness regardless whether it is subjective or objective.  
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ansmission of one’s knowledge on the problem will increase as one possesses a stronger 
referent criterion about the problematic situation. From the analysis, I found support on 
this prediction: .493 (p < .001) for war in Iraq, .149 (p < .01) for losing weight, and .492 
(p < .001) for eliminating affirmative action. 
Finally, I expected that the situational motivation in problem solving will increase 
communicant activeness in problem solving (H15). In all three problems, I found support 
for this prediction: .559 (p < .001) for war in Iraq, .887 (p < .01) for losing weight, 
and .542 (p < .001) for eliminating affirmative action. Thus, I conclude that as situational 
problematic perception increases, one will experience a heightened situational motivation 
toward problem solving; and it subsequently increases one’s active communication in 
information selection, transmission, and acquisition. The presence of a strong referent 
criterion, regardless of its subjectivity (e.g., a willful thinking toward the outcome), is 
likely to increase subsequent communicant activeness about the problem.  
It is notable that the coefficients were rather fluctuating across different issues. I 
reason the fluctuation as originated from the issue sensitivity in this particular sample 
(i.e., students). For this homogeneous student group, respondents were similarly sensitive 
in some issues than others (e.g., war in Iraq). In addition, it is notable that the current data 
were drawn from a non-random sample, not a possible population. With a more 
heterogeneous samples (e.g., random samples drawn from a national population), the path 
coefficients could have been more similar across three problems. Finally, I took out some 
The CAPS model includes variables in information selection (e.g., information 
forefending) and information transmission (e.g., information forwarding) as new key 
dimensions. Thus, I conceptually predicted that a problem solver’s selectivity and 
tr
corr et xo s v  
recognition and constraint recognition in Figure 20) because specifying those correlations 
ade a m del convergence impossible.  
Situational Theory of Cognitive Entrepreneurship in Problem Solving (SITCEPS) 
o
Another new construct I developed is cognitive entrepreneurship in problem 
lv (CEPS). CEPS alone is an independent concept that features different cognitive 
proaches across dif nt types of problems. However, CEPS can also be explained by 
tu ante les. he conceptual relationships with the antecedent 
riables (see Figure or the summary model, Chapter II: Conceptualization). The 
m d del b es one of the situational theories of problem solving.  
Table 26 reports the results of the SITCEPS model tests. For war in Iraq, the 
od ce  χ = 5, CFI = .963, SRMR = .041, and RMSEA 
.052. Fo iminating affir tion, the model fit indices were χ2df (94) = 397.388, 
FI RM 04  R  = .048. Model fit indices suggest that both 
odels are good enough to interpret. Thus, I proceed to interpreting the model parameter 
ti s st hy ese
yp s sting
I posited five hypotheses between cognitive entrepreneurship in problem solving 
d the four tional antece riables and the situational motivation variable. 
e s are: 
16: The hi  the problem recognition, the higher the situational motivation in 
problem solving.  
tional motivation in 
problem solving.  
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H18: The higher the involvement recognition, the higher the situational motivation in 
problem solving.  
H19: The higher the referent criterion, the lower the cognitive entrepreneurship in 
H20: The higher the situational motivation in problem solving, the higher the cognitive 
entrepreneurship in problem solving. 
 





SITCEPS Model with Situational Motivation in Problem Solving: Chi-square Differences and Goodness-of-Fit indices 
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Figure 23: SITCEPS (War in Iraq). 
 
Figure 24: SITCEPS (Eliminating Affirmative Action). 
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The hypotheses from H16 to H18 are conceptually identical predictions to those 
in H11-H13.  In general, I found similar support as found in the SITCAPS analysis. In 
H16, I expected a positive relationship between problem recognition and situational 
motivation in problem solving. I found partial support: .464 (p < .001) for war in Iraq
-.080 (n. s.) for eliminating affirmative action. In H17, I expected a negative relationship 
between constraint recognition and situational motivation in problem solving. I found all 
negative path coe
 and 
fficients across all three problems: -.136 (p < .01) for war in Iraq and -








s suggests that 
.535 (p < .001) for eliminating affirmativ
ship between level of involvement and situational motivation. I found positive 
relationships: .581 (p < .001) for war in Iraq and .655 (p < .001) for eliminating 
affirmative action. H19 inquires about the presence of a referent criterion during a 
problematic situation. From the analysis, I found support for this prediction: -.489 (p
< .001) for war in Iraq and -.589 (p < .001) for eliminating affirmative action. T
suggests that the presence of referent criteria tend to decrease one’s entrepreneurial 
mindset—i.e., with applicable referents one becomes less entrepreneur
. With the deployable referent for a given problem, one will be more likely to 
jump into a conclusion (i.e., a solution carried from prior situations) and to turn to 
information that optimizes the chosen solution—i.e., backward reasoning.  
Finally, in H20, I expected that the situational motivation in problem solving will 
increase cognitive entrepreneurship in problem solving. However, from the analysis, I 
found no support for this prediction: -.487 (p < .001) for war in Iraq and -.422 (p < .001)
for eliminating affirmative action. Notably, the signs of the paths were both opposite (i.e
negative) from situational motivation to cognitive entrepreneurship. Thi
 252
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the more one is situationally m
test to examine the significance of the 
otivation and cognitive retrogression. The Sobel test allows 
testing of whether the indirect
an, 
West, & Sheets, 2002; Sobel, 1982). In both issues, the mediation effects between 
situatio gnitive retrogression were significant: .454 (p < .001) for 
war in 001) for eliminating affirmative action. For cognitive 
multilateralism, the indirect paths were not significant for both issues: -.007 (n. s.) for 
war in Iraq and .014 (n. s.) for eliminating affirmative action. For cognitive commitment, 
I found a significant mediation effect: as the situational motivation heightens, cognitive 
commitment increases: .111 (p < .001) for war in Iraq and .075 (p < .01) for eliminating 
affirmative action. Finally, for cognitive suspension, I found that as situational motivation 
increases, cognitive suspension decreases:  -.096 (p < .01) for war in Iraq and -.078 (p 
< .01) for eliminating affirmative action.  
The tests show that the CEPS construct in the SITCEPS model is primarily 
characterized by the cognitive retrogression dimension (i.e., the more entrepreneurial, the 
less retrogression). The standardized path coefficients were -.933 for war in Iraq and -
.972 for eliminating affirmative action. Cognitive retrogression refers to a cognitive 
otivated for problem solving, the less one becomes 
entrepreneurial in problem solving.  
Careful examination of the subdimensions in CEPS shows that the more one is 
situationally motivated, the more he or she engages in backward reasoning (i.e., cognitive 
retrogression). Cognitive retrogression was the strongest dimension among four 
subdimensions of CEPS. I conducted Sobel’s 
effect between situational m
 effect of an independent variable on a dependent variable 
via the mediator is significantly different from zero (MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffm
 
nal motivation and co
Iraq and .410 (p < .
tendency for backward reasoning (i.e., “a conclusion dictates evidence that secures and 
warrants the chosen conclusion.”). In other words, as situational motivation in problem 
solving grows, one tends to move backward in thinking about the problem. Thus, the 
result indicates that situational motivation does not create cognitive entrepreneurship in 
problem ore one is motivated toward problem solving, the 
more one is likely to become non-entrepreneurial. From the finding, I conclude that 
situ al motivation tends to pressure problem solvers to hastily turn to a conclusion 
and optimize the hastily drawn conclusion.  
umm  simi t for H16-H18 for situational perceptual 
riables as in the SIT PS analysis. ddition, for H19, I found the more one 
s s feren terio e le e becomes entrepreneurial in problem solving. 
r H20, I failed to find support. The finding suggests the opposite relationship between 
tu ti a itive entrepreneurship in problem solving: i.e., as one 
comes m vated in prob  solving, one tends to become non-entrepreneurial. It 
g ro ed ion, problem solvers tend to mobilize available 
gnitive resources backwardly—to optimize the selected solution to be more conclusive 
d vi g.  
la s etw AP d CE
The previous two structural models were designed to test the nomological validity 
 the two ne onstructs. tion, they tested the more generalized version of the 
tua  of pro . Each model was derived from the situational 
eory of pro  solving and stands by itself as a conceptual model with a unique 
CAPS is designed to understand and explain different 
 solving. On the contrary, the m
ation
















sesse  a re t cri n, th ss on













m solvtional th ble ing
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communicant behavior during problematic situations. SITCEPS is intended to describe 
and understand differential cognitive approaches in problem solving.  
Because of model identification issues, I constructed two nonrecursive models 
that examine the simultaneous causal influences between CEPS and CAPS (see Figure 13 
and 14 
 




H21: The higher the cognitive entrepreneurship, the higher the communicant activeness 
in problem solving.  
H22: The higher the communicant activeness, the lower the cognitive entrepreneurship in 
problem solving.  
 
for the summary model, Chapter II: Conceptualization). As discussed, 
nonrecursive models are often difficult to solve mathematically. I tried both of the model
specifications but found that only the Figure 16 model (i.e., referent criterion CEPS) 
converged successfully in both issues of war in Iraq and eliminating affirmative action. 
The Figure 17 model (i.e., referent criterion CAPS) failed to converge in both issues. 
Table 25 reports the result of the converged nonrecursive model tests.  
For war in Iraq, the model fit indices were χ2df (217) = 794.508, CFI = .961, 
SRMR = .045, and RMSEA = .044. For eliminating affi
 were χ2df (153) = 932.838, CFI = .931, SRMR = .066, and RMSEA = .061. 
According to Hu and Bentler’s joint criterion, these fit indices suggest that both models
are good enough to interpret. Thus, I interpret the model parameter estimates to test 
hypotheses.  
Hypothesis Testing 
I posited two hypotheses between cognitive entrepreneurship in problem solvin





Nonrecursive Model: Chi-square Differences and Goodness-of-Fit indices 







































































CAPS, featuring communicative behavior, and CEPS, featuring the cognitive approach in 
roblem solving, seem to explain each other to some degree. However, it is hard to define 
one as the antecedent condition to the other. Indeed, it is most plausible to conclude that 
CAPS and CEPS affect each other simultaneously (i.e., bidirectional causality).  
Figures 25-26 summarize the parameter estimates for the converged models. For 
H21, I expected a positive causal influence from cognitive entrepreneurship in problem 
solving to communicant activeness in problem solving. However, I found no support for 
this prediction in both issues: -.959 (n. s.) for war in Iraq and -.892 (n. s.) for eliminating 
affirmative action. Notably, the signs were opposite, unlike what I expected before model 
testing; and the standard errors of the parameter estimates were relatively large (i.e., 
1.150 of unstandardized parameter estimate with 2.401 of S. E. in war in Iraq and .459 of 
unstandardized parameter estimate with .633 of S. E.).  
For H22, I expected a negative causal influence from communicant activeness in 
problem solving to cognitive entrepreneurship in problem solving. I found support for 
this expectation in both issues: -.919 (p < .001) for war in Iraq and -.622 (p < .001) for 
eliminating affirmative action. This suggests that the more active communicative 
behaviors in information forefending, forwarding, and seeking, the less one will become 
entrepreneurial in problem solving. The accumulated knowledge and experience from 
roblem-solving efforts in dealing with information seems to reduce entrepreneurial 




































































War in Iraq (n = 1380)









































































Eliminating Affirmative Action (n =1380)
χ2 (153) = 932.838 , p < .001df 
CFI = .931
SRMR = .066









I pay special attention to the H21. I expected that the higher cognitive 
 
solver could also be very active in communication behavior. In conceptualizing cognitive 
entrepreneurship in problem solving, I explicitly said that a non-entrepreneurial mindset 
 
entrepreneurship in problem solving would lead to higher communicant activeness. 
However, in retrospect, I failed to consider that the low cognitive entrepreneurial problem
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would also be very active in problem solving but in a different way from the 












affirmative action.  
ness in communication behavior. As we found routinely, many non-
entrepreneurial problem solvers tend to vigorously seek and forward information that is 
consistent with a hastily drawn conclusion. Thus, it was not conceptually and empirica
valid to specify a positive causal relationship between high cognitive entrepreneurship
and communicant activeness in problem solving. The nonsignificant path from cogn
entrepreneurship to communicant activeness seems to reflect such a notion.  
In contrast, the reverse causal flow seems to be logical conceptually. As a 
problem solver experienced heightened communicant activeness, she or he is likely to 
develop a good deal of knowledge and preference on how to solve the problem. Th
such preference (i.e., high information forefending) would increase cognitive 
retrogression (i.e., optimizing a preferred conclusion backwardly) and less tolerating o
incompatible information, less committed to all the available candidate solution and ide
and less suspending. As a result, the problem solver becomes more non-ent
re, the negative path from CAPS to CEPS seems to reflect such a negative 
conceptual relationship.   
A careful examination of the two nonrecursive model reveals the domination of 
cognitive retrogression and the information forefending in both issues. Information 
forefending is the strongest dimension in CAPS and cognitive retrogression is strongest
dimension in CEPS. The relationship between cognitive retrogression and information 
forefending is positive: .885 (p < .001) for war in Iraq and .734 (p < .001) for eliminatin
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In summary, from the H21 and H22 tests, I found that communicant activenes
problem solving tends to reduce the problem solver’s cognitiv
s in 
e entrepreneurship 
treated with caution. 
dditional Analyses 
In the test of a nonrecursive relationship between CAPS and CEPS, I found that 
formation selectivity and cognitive retrogression dominated the other dimensions. In 
ddition, I found a nonsignificant path from CEPS to CAPS. As I discussed, the H21 
rediction was a conceptual mistake in that both high and low entrepreneurial problem 
solvers could be high in communicant activeness. In other words, there is no conceptual 
reason that less entrepreneurial problem solvers should be low in communicant 
ctiveness. To test this reasoning, I conducted additional analysis to inquire how different 
they are in terms of communicant activeness.  
In conceptualizing CEPS, I proposed a model of cognitive alpha and omega 
groups (CAOS) in terms of their reasoning direction: i.e., “evidence conclusion” for 
forward reasoning and “conclusion evidence” for backward reasoning. I named those 
forward reasoning problem solvers as the cognitive alpha group, and those backward 
reasoning problem solvers as the cognitive omega group (see Figure 9, Chapter II: 
Conceptualization).  
Thus, I computed the average scores of cognitive retrogression (i.e., backward 
reasoning) for all the respondents and regrouped them high, medium, and low scorers in 
cognitive retrogression. For analysis, I selected the high and low groups and named them 








as cognitive omega (i.e., high in cognitive retrogression) and cognitive alpha (i.e., low in 
cognitive retrogression).   
I expected that similar model structures of CAPS in both the cognitive alpha 
group and cognitive omega groups. However, I predicted that they will differ in terms of 
information selectivity. Specifically, I expected that the cognitive alpha group would 
have a low path coefficient in information forefending and a high one in information 
permitting. In contrast, I predicted that the cognitive omega group would show the 
opposite pattern—i.e., high path coefficient in information forefending and low path 
coefficient in information permitting. If supported, this pattern of structural paths in 
CAPS would provide some evidence for the explanation of nonsignificant path in H21 
(i.e., the low entrepreneurial problem solvers can also be active in communication 
behavior, just as those high entrepreneurial problem solvers are active in communication 
behavior.). The higher or lower entrepreneurial problem solvers do not differ in their 
information transmission and acquisition but only in their information selectivity (i.e., 
non-entrepreneurial problem solvers tend to more forefend information.).  
Table 28 reports the CAOS and CAPS comparison models. For war in Iraq, the 
CAPS model fit of cognitive alpha group were χ2df (139) = 314.960, CFI = .946, SRMR 
= .061, and RMSEA = .053 and for the cognitive omega group were χ2df (145) = 265.130, 
CFI = .969, SRMR = .047, and RMSEA = .043. For eliminating affirmative action, the 
CAPS model fit of cognitive alpha group were χ2df (97) = 230.285, CFI = .936, SRMR 
= .054, and RMSEA = .055 and for the cognitive omega group were χ2df (96) = 175.514, 
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A careful examination indicates that information selectivity was different between 
the cognitive alpha group and cognitive omega group in both issues. Specifically, the 
cognitive alpha groups in the two issues were lower in information forefending (i.e., .488 
for war in Iraq and .449 for eliminating affirmative action) and relatively higher in 
information permitting (i.e., .538 in war in Iraq and .524 in eliminating affirmative 
action). The pattern reversed in the cognitive omega group. Cognitive omega groups were 
higher in information forefending (i.e., .656 for war in Iraq and .776 for eliminating 
affirmative action) and relatively lower in information permitting (i.e., .496 for war in 
raq and .246 for eliminating affirmative action). I tabulated these findings in the Tables 
29-32.  Notably, the information selectivity shows contrasting reflections between the 
cognitive alpha and omega groups. For the information transmission and acquisition 
dimensions, I expected a similar pattern between two groups. I visualized these 
dimensions in Tables 29-32. Even with eyeball examination, two groups possess similar 
structural path coefficients in information transmission and information acquisition.  
Thus, I conclude that the additional analysis of CAOS and CAPS seems to 
support why H21 failed to get support. In other words, the low entrepreneurial problem 
solvers can also be active in communication behavior, just as those high entrepreneurial 
problem solvers are active in communication behavior.  Specifically, the low and high 
entrepreneurial problem solvers seem to differ in information selectivity. However, those 
higher or lower entrepreneurial problem solvers do not differ in their information 
transmission and acquisition (i.e., those non-entrepreneurial problem solvers tend to more 
forefend information, while they are similarly seeking and forwarding information as 




Figure 29: Standardized structural path coefficients between cognitive alpha and
cognitive omega group (War in Iraq). 
 



































Figure 30: Standardized structural path coefficients between cognitive alpha and 
cognitive omega group (Eliminating Affir





































Figure 31: Standardized structural path coefficients between cognitive alpha and 
cognitive omega group (War in Iraq). 
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Figure 32: Standardized structural path coefficients between cognitive alpha and 
cognitive omega group (Eliminating Affirmative Action). 
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In the next chapter, I will discuss the findings and their implications to theory and 
practice. Following that, I will discuss the limitations of current study and the suggestions 
for future research.  
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CHAPTER V: CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
All life is problem solving.  
Karl Popper 
The primary purpose of this study was to develop two new concepts, 









) rather than to spend cognitive efforts 
after fi
r the 
nicant activeness in problem solving (CAPS) and cognitive entrepreneursh
problem solving (CEPS). I then added CAPS and CEPS as the dependent variables to
situational theory of publics (J. Grunig, 1968, 1989, 1997). By this way, I elaborated
refined the existing situational theory of publics (STP) further. As a result, STP b
more general theory of human problem solving, and I called the resulting theory the 
situational theory of problem solving (STOPS).  
In CAPS, I started with the guiding premise: The more one commits to probl
resolution, the more one becomes selective in dealing with information, the more one 
becomes transmissive, and the more one bec
ing to the problem. In CEPS, I postulated: A problem solver with heightened 
cognitive entrepreneurship tends to 1) generate a large number of mental syllogistic 
models before he or she finally selects one for problem solution; 2) commit more t
proposed solution proposals, as if they are a solution, during evaluation; 3) be more 
heedful in finalizing a conclusion; and 4) be more likely to invest cognitive labor pr
finalizing a conclusion (i.e., an evaluation purpose
nalizing a conclusion (i.e., justification purpose). 
Parallel to the conceptual explication, I developed measurement systems fo
new concepts and tested their validity and utility with the situational antecedent variables 
such as problem recognition, constraint recognition, level of involvement, referent 
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criterion, and situational motivation in problem solving. In doing so, I refined the 
concepts of problem recognition and referent criterion to address some issues raised 
against the situational theory of publics.  
After the introduction of the key variables in the new situational theory of 
problem solving, I constructed a series of confirmatory factor analytic models and full 
causal structural equation models.  
ns. 
 valid 
Overall, I posited 22 hypotheses among the key variables and their subdimensio
I collected data using the survey method and analyzed them using structural equation 
modeling with the EQS 6.1 program. 
In general, I found a good amount of support for most hypotheses. Those few not 
supported revealed conceptual mistakes I made in deriving predictions (e.g., situational 
motivation CEPS in the SITCEPS model). Also, some serendipitous findings provide a 
valuable chance for conceptual refinement.   
This final chapter consists of the detailed summary of what I found from the 
model and hypothesis testing, discussions regarding supported and non-supported 
hypotheses, the implications of CAPS, CEPS, and STOPS to theory and practice, and 
finally a summary of limitations and ideas for future research. In the following section, I 
will first recapitulate the results of this study with discussions of major findings.  
Summary and Discussion 
Reliability and Validity of the Measurement Instruments 
Of two new concepts, CAPS and CEPS, it is necessary to have reliable and
measurement systems to be useful. I conducted a series of exploratory tests such as 
Cronbach’s alpha and Principal Component Analysis. In general, analysis of three 
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problems (war in Iraq, losing weight, and eliminating affirmative action) showed that 
CAPS and CEPS measurement systems are reliable and internally consistent. 
For nomological validity test purposes, I introduced five situational antecedent 
variables: problem recognition, constraint recognition, level of involvement, referent 
criterio
erformed an acceptable job 
bility and validity.  
Tests of the New Constructs and Hypotheses 
After the reliability and validity tests, I proceeded to confirmatory factor analysis 
and causal model analysis to examine construct validity of the two new constructs. I 
summarize the findings of the SEM analysis in following. 
CAPS 
Using the sub-sampling strategy, I divided total sample of n = 1,380 into 
developmental (n = 467) and validation samples (n = 458, n = 460). In all the nested 
model tests, the six factor oblique models were always better than one-factor model 
structure for CAPS. This suggests that CAPS has multidimensionality, as it was 
conceptualized. Of six out of nine nested model tests in three issues, the second-order 
factor structure turned out to be a better model than the six factor oblique model. In 
general, CAPS seems to be better represented as a second-order construct. Hence, I 
conducted three second-order confirmatory factor analyses using the total sample (n = 
1,380) to test hypotheses regarding CAPS.  
n, and situational motivation in problem solving. I examined the internal 
consistency and reliability of the situational antecedent variables and found, overall, the 




The evaluation of the model fit to data showed that in all three models the second
order structure is a reasonable conceptual representation for the CAPS data. Thus, 
examined the parameter estimates in the second-order models to test H1-H6.  All
hypotheses found support as expected at (p < .001). The loadings in the observed 
















ement items vary between .313 and .826.   
The core premise in the CAPS model was that as a communicant becomes active
in problem solving, one will become more selective, transmissive, and acquisitive
regarding information about the problem. Specifically, as a communicant beco
in problem solving, one’s information selectivity tends to increase (i.e., H1 and H2
Notably, the subject’s information forefending tendency increased more than the 
information permitting tendency as communicant activeness heightens: for informatio
forefending .691, .613, .748 vs. for information permitting .530, .612, .538 in three 
problems. Thus, as problem solvers become more active, they tend to lose information 
permissiveness, which is often
f social conflicts).  
In all three problems, information transmission (i.e., H3 and H4) was the most 
salient dimension in communicant activeness in problem solving: .921, .903, .984 for 
information forwarding; .946, .973, .968 for information sharing. This indicates that as 
problem solvers become more active, their dominant characteristic is to give informa
about a problem to others. As discussed earlier, the previous situational theory of public
and other communication models often focused exclusively on information acqu
conceptualizing communicator activeness. Such findings tell us how the omission of 
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information giving in previous research was a loss in understanding communicator’s 
activeness in dealing with his or her life problems. To name just a few, with the inclusion 
of information selectivity and information transmission variables, now we can explain 







I divided the total sample of n = 1,380 into developmental (n = 467) and 
validation samples (n = 917). For CEPS, I proceeded directly to the second-order 
confirmatory factor analysis in the development and validation samples. I considered the 
second-order confirmatory factor analyses as a good model structure if the model tests 
resulted in the acceptable fit indices according to Hu and Bentler’s (1999) joint criterion. 
rtain social problems are enduring and become chronic (conflict resolution), and 
how activist and active publics can be conceptually distinguished (public relations). 
 The last dimension of information acquisition consists of information seeking 
and information processing (i.e., H5 and H6). These two variables are the defaul
dependent variables highlighting publics’ active and passive communication behaviors in
the situational theory of publics (J. Grunig, 1997).  Consistent with what past studi
the STP found, information seeking and processing were increased as one become
active in problem solving: .893, .899, .794 for information seeking; .474, .819, .912 for 
information processing. Problem solvers with heightened motivation in problem solv
tend to make efforts in gaining information about the problem.  
In summary, I found support for the hypotheses regarding six conceptual 
subdimensions of CAPS. Each subdimension has a positive relationship with its higher 




Results n of 
001 
1). In 
 CEPS model, I postulated that as one becomes active in problem solving, 
one wil
i.e., a 
er. For H7, I found 
 evidence in both issues. Notably, the magnitude of the path coefficient was 
higher for the war in Iraq issue (i.e., -.754, p < .001) than the eliminating affirmative 
action issue (i.e., -.258, p < .001). This would suggest that there is a stronger backward 
 showed that the second-order structure was a good conceptual representatio
the data.  
I tested the two second-order models and the standardized structural path 
estimates and standardized loadings in two problems. In both problems (n = 1,380), the 
structural paths from the second-order latent variable (i.e., cognitive entrepreneurship) to 
first-order latent variables (e.g., cognitive retrogression) were significant at the p < .
level, except the path to cognitive commitment in the war in Iraq issue (i.e., p < .0
addition, the loadings in the observed variables were all significant at the p < .001 level. 
Most parameter estimates in the measurement items varied between .400 and .700 (the 
lowest .285, the highest .909).   
In the
l use less backward reasoning (cognitive retrogression), will possess more 
cognitive multilateralism, will exhibit more commitment, and will exhibit more 
suspending in finalizing a solution. The analysis of CEPS in two social problems 
provides supportive evidence for the main postulate and the four hypotheses.  
In H7, I conceptually predicted that one’s cognitive retrogression in problem 
solving will decrease as cognitive entrepreneurship in problem solving increases: 
negative relationship. The most salient feature in cognitive retrogression is one’s 
backward reasoning—i.e., “a conclusion directs certain evidence.” This is an 




reasoni r the 
and H9, I adopted a single indicator approach in measurement. In H8, I 
predict e 




s seemed to feel tired of the issue, because it had been 
prolong n 
 
osition, it will result in a low score in cognitive commitment. In 
contrast, the eliminating affirmative action issue was relatively a less “entrenched” 
ng tendency (i.e., cognitive omega approach) for the war in Iraq issue than fo
eliminating affirmative issue. 
In H8 
ed that as cognitive entrepreneurship increases one will possess more cognitiv
breadth and tolerance—the number of decision alternatives and the extent of tolerance in 
dealing with competing rival information during the problem-solving process. I found 
support for this prediction in both issues: .184 in war in Iraq and .334 in eliminating 
affirmative action. H9 predicted that as cognitive entrepreneurship heightens, one will 
make more cognitive commitment—the degree of enthusiasm
zing the proposed solutions for a given problem solving. I found partial support 
for H9 in the eliminating affirmative action issue (i.e., .166, p < .001), but not in th
in Iraq issue (i.e., -.113, p < .01). The signs were opposite in the war in Iraq issue, which 
suggests that for the war in Iraq issue, as one becomes more entrepreneurial in problem 
solving, one would be less enthusiastic and patronizing to the proposed solutions.  
About the reversal of sign in cognitive commitment, I speculate that for the w
Iraq issue, survey respondent
ed about two years at the time the data were collected (spring 2005). Thus, eve
respondents who were high in entrepreneurship in problem solving would stick 
exclusively to a certain perspective. Hence, the cognitive commitment was less because
survey respondents became entrenched in certain positions even if their cognitive 
entrepreneurship increased. Considering the computation formula, if one adheres 













, so the participants with high entrepreneurship in problem solving seemed t
think and value different perspectives more than in the war in Iraq issue. In other wor
people result in more “hedging” (i.e., commit to different ideas at the same time), and th
resulting commitment scores become higher as one’s cognitive entrepreneurship 
heightens.  
H10 predicted as one’s cognitive entrepreneurship increases, one’s cognitive 
suspension increases as well. Cognitive suspension refers to a problem solver’s 
heightened willingness to invest cognitive resources in evaluating and reevaluating a 
selected solution before finalizing it. In both issues, H10 was supported: .414 (p < .001
for the war in Iraq issue and .770 (p < .001) for the eliminating affirmative action issue.  
Overall results in the CEPS CFA model tests indicated that as the problem 
solver’s entrepreneurial mindset in problem solving heightens, one tends to adopt more
a backward reasoning strategy, have cognitive breadth, exhibit more tolerance of 
competing ideas and opinions, and suspend judgment before finalizing a solution. Yet, 
cognitive commitment—the degree of enth
d solutions—seems to differ across issues. This requires further study with 
different types of issues. Considering the single-item approach with formulas for 
cognitive multilateralism and cognitive commitment, such a finding begs further analysis. 
A new study using a multiple-indicator approach as in the cognitive retrogression and 
suspension will allow a clearer understanding for the two dimensions measured with a 
single item.  
In sum, I proposed two new variables, CAPS and CEPS, to make a more gene
version of the situational theory of publics (J. Grunig, 1997, 2003). To examine constr
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validity (i.e., “nomological network,” Cronbach & Meehl, 1955), I created several causal 
nets using situational antecedent variables. Earlier in the conceptualization, I posited 
conceptual relationships between the new constructs and existing antecedent variables in 
the situational theory of publics. Using structural equation modeling, I tested the 
presumed conceptual relationships between new and existing variables. In the following 











cts and the antecedent variables of situational theory.  
SITCAPS 
From the SITCAPS model testing, I found that the three SITCAPS showed 
acceptable fit to the data. I thus, examined the model parameter estimates to tes
hypotheses.  
In H11, I expected a positive relationship between problem recognition (i.e., 
“detect something is missing and should be done”) and situational motivation in proble
solving (i.e., the likelihood of “stop to think about” the problem). I found positive pat
coefficients in all three problems: .115 (p < .05) for war in Iraq, .181 (p < .001) for losing
weight, and .262 (p < .001) for eliminating affirmative action. As problem re
increases, one becomes more motivated in problem solving. 
In H12, I expected a negative relationship between c
ve that there are some obstacles in a situation that limit one’s ability to do 
anything about the situation”) and situational motivation in problem solving. I found a
negative path coefficients across all three problems: -.140 (p < .05) for war in Iraq, -.65







erceived as relevant to a given problem: i.e., either 
an obje
rease 
hether it is subjective or objective. The CAPS 
udes variables in information selection (e.g., information forefending) and 
informa
lysis, I found good support for this 
prediction: .493 (p < .001) for war in Iraq, .149 (p < .01) for losing weight, and .492 (p 
< .001) for eliminating affirmative action. 
re, as one’s constraint recognition increases, one’s situational motivation in 
problem solving decreases.  
In H13, I predicted a positive relationship between level of involvement (i.e., 
perceive some “connection” between a situation and oneself) and situation motivation. 
found strong positive relationships: .831 (p < .001) for war in Iraq, .420 (p < .001) for 
losing weight, and .630 (p < .001) for eliminating affirmative action. I thus conclude that 
as one’s perceived involvement increases, his or her situational motivation toward 
problem will increase.  
H14 investigated the role of a referent criterion in a problematic situation. I 
redefined referent criterion as “any knowledge or subjective judgmental system
exerts specific influence on the way one approaches problem solving.” This can be any 
decisional guideline or decision rules p
ctive referent, such as one carried from prior problem solving, or a subjective 
referent, such as wishful thinking or willful thinking about the problem outcomes. The 
availability and applicability of such cognitive knowledge (internal referent) will inc
communicant activeness regardless of w
model incl
tion transmission (e.g., information forwarding) as new key dimensions. Thus, I 
conceptually predicted that the problem solver’s selectivity and transmission of one’s 
knowledge on the problem will increase as one possesses a stronger referent criterion 
about the problematic situation. From the ana
 278
 
Finally, by H15, I predicted that the situational motivation in problem solvin
increase communicant activeness in problem solving. In all three problems, I found 
support for this prediction: .559 (p < .001) for war in Iraq, .887 
g will 
(p < .01) for losing 
weight, tic 
n, transmission, and acquisition. The presence of strong referent 
criteria s 
e previous 








 and .542 (p < .001) for eliminating affirmative action. As situational problema
perception increases one will experience a heightened situational motivation toward 
problem solving, which subsequently increases one’s active communication in 
information selectio
 regardless of their subjectivity (e.g., a willful thinking toward the outcome) i
likely to increase subsequent communicant activeness about the problem. In th
situational theory, the referent criterion had explained little variance in communication 
behavior
rent criterion had eventually been dropped from the independent variables. J. 
Grunig (1997) discussed the referent criterion as an effect or outcome of communication 
behavior such as information seeking.  
I support his reasoning as logical and strategic in theory building. Nonethele
the referent criterion still could be useful as an antecedent variable in a way I redef
For many problem-solving contexts, we observe that our preconception, subjective 
beliefs, or carried-over knowledge from past situations affects our subsequent 
communication behaviors. Specifically, our subsequent information seeking
nally tuned by what a referent criterion prescribes and proscribes. We tend to see 
what the referent criterion implies. Hence, our information seeking and forwarding or
sharing are selective.  If so, a new situational theory should reintroduce the varia
referent criterion. In other words, I theorize that a referent criterion is not only an effect 
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and outcome of communication behaviors, but also an antecedent condition 
contextualizing subsequent communication behaviors. At times, a referent criterion 






top to think about the issue?” were considered as measures for situational 
motiva
es 
 In addition, communication behavior has become more general. Information 
seeking would be reduced in the presence of a referent criterion. However, a referent 
criterion seems to trigger and drive one to be more selective and to be willing to share 
and forward information to others. I found supportive evidence for this reasonin
higher the referent criterion, the higher the communicant activeness in problem solving. 
Finally, I revised problem recognition to be more of “detect” something miss
rather than “stopping to think.” I followed Kim, Downie, and De Stefano’s (2005) 
conceptual explication to distinguish situational motivation (i.e., “stop to think about” 
tendency) from the joint function of “detect,” “perceived connection,” and “perceived 
obstacle” in doing something about the problem. Hence, I used a new measuremen
for problem recognition. The previous problem recognition measures, such as “how often
do you s
tion in problem solving. Analyses with these refined measures were consistent 
with the previous situational theory’s prediction (e.g., the more one exhibits problem 
recognition, the more one will do information seeking.). Besides, the reported 
multicollinearity issue (e.g., standardized beta coefficients greater than 1.00) between the 
independent variables was not found.  
In summary, the causal networks I posited between newly refined situational 
antecedent variables and CAPS have gained a good amount of support. The finding giv
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us some confidence in the construct validity for the new construct of CAPS and the 
situational theory of problem solving.  
SITCEPS 
From the SITCEPS model tests, I found acceptable model fits to the data, t
proceeded to interpreting the parameter estimates to test hypotheses. For hypotheses from 











 eliminating affirmative action. This suggests that the presence of a 
referen
 as found in the SITCAPS analysis.  
In H16, I expected a positive relationship between problem recognition and 
situational motivation in problem solving. But, I found partial support: .464 (p < .001) for
war in Iraq and -.080 (n. s.) for eliminating affirmative action.  
In H17, I expected a negative relationship between constraint recognition and 
situational motivation in problem solving. I found significant negative path coefficient
both problems: -.136 (p < .01) for war in Iraq and -.535 (p < .001) for eliminating 
affirmative action.  
In H18, I expected a positive relat
n motivation. Again, I found significant positive relationships in both 
problems: .581 (p < .001) for war in Iraq and .655 (p < .001) for eliminating affirmative
action.  
H19 inquired about the presence of a referent criterion in a problematic situation. 
From the analysis, I found support for this prediction: -.489 (p < .001) for war in Iraq
-.589 (p < .001) for
t criterion tends to decrease one’s entrepreneurial mindset. With applicable 
decisional referents, one becomes more non-entrepreneurial in problem solving. I 
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predicted so because, given a deployable referent for a problem, one will be more likely
to jump into a conclusion (i.e., a solution carried from prior situations) and turn to 
information that optimizes the chosen solution—i.e., backward reasoning.  
Lastly, H20 predicted that situational motivation in problem solving will increa
cognitive entrepreneurship in problem solving. However, I found no support for this 
prediction: -.487 (p < .001) for war in Iraq and -.422 (p < .001) for eliminating 
affirmative action. Notably, the signs of the paths were both opposite (i.e., negative) fro
situational motivation to cognitive entrepreneurship. This suggests that the more
situationally motivated for problem solving, the more one becomes non-entrepreneuri
in problem solving.  




 one is 
al 








etween situational motivation and cognitive retrogression via CEPS.  In both 
issues, the indirect effects between situational motivation and cognitive retrogression via
CEPS were significant:  .454 (p < .001) for war in Iraq and .410 (p < .001) fo
eliminating affirmative action. For cognitive multilateralism, in both issues the indirect 
paths via CEPS were not significant: -.007 (n. s.) for war in Iraq and .014 (n. s.) fo
eliminating affirmative action. For cognitive commitment, I found a significant effect. A
the situational motivation heightens, cognitive commitment increases: .111 (p < .001) for 
war in Iraq and .075 (p < .01) for eliminating affirmative action. Finally, for cognitive 
suspension, I found that as situational motivation increases, cognitive suspension 




Notably, in the SITCEPS model, I found that cognitive retrogression is the mos
salient conceptual subdimension to conceptualize cognitive entrepreneurship in prob
solving (i.e., -.933 for war in Iraq and -. 972 for eliminating affirmative action). 
Cognitive retrogression refers to a cognitive tendency of doing backward reasoning (i
“a conclusion dictates evidence that secures and warrants the chosen conclusion.”).
other words, as situational motivation in problem solving grows, one tends to move
backward in thinking about the problem. From the finding, I conclude that situa
motivation tends to pressure problem solvers to hastily turn to a conclusion and op













S analysis. In addition, in H19, as expected, I found that the 
more o m 
e 
 to 
Relationships between CAPS and CEPS 
perceptions (e.g., fee
eneurial mindset. It explains why our problem-solving efforts are very often 
ineffective even if we are very eager and pressured (i.e., “motivated”) to work on 
problem resolution.  In other words, a problem solver’s motivation cannot be exclusi
equated with his or her adoption of the entrepreneurial cognitive strategy.  
In summary, I found similar support for H16-H18 for situational perceptua
variables as in the SITCAP
ne possesses a referent criterion, the less one becomes entrepreneurial in proble
solving. However, I failed to find support for H20. The finding suggests the opposit
relationship between situational motivation and cognitive entrepreneurship in problem 
solving. It thus suggests that from the heightened motivation, problem solvers tend
mobilize available cognitive resources backwardly—to optimize the selected solution to 
be more conclusive and convincing.  
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I constructed two nonrecursive models that investigate the simultaneous causal 









atically. I tried both of the model specifications and found that only the Figure 
model (i.e., referent criterion CEPS) converged successfully in both issues. Thus, I used 
the Figure 16 model to test the hypotheses regarding bidirectional causality between 
CEPS and CAPS.  
For H21, I expected a positive causal influence from cognitive entrepreneurship in
problem solving to communicant activeness in problem solving. However, I found no 
support for this prediction in both issues: -.959 (n. s.) in war in Iraq and -.892 (n. s.) in 
eliminating affirmative action. For H22, I predicted a negative causal influence from 
communicant activeness in problem solving to cognitive entrepreneurship in pro
solving. I found support for this expectation in both issues: -.919 (p < .001) for war in 
Iraq and -.622 (
re one’s communicative behaviors (i.e., high in information forefending, 
forwarding, and seeking), the less one will become entrepreneurial in problem solving
(i.e., doing more cognitive retrogression in problem solving). The accumulated 
knowledge and experience from problem-solving efforts in dealing with informat
seems to decrease an entrepreneurial mindset because of more expertise and/or 
confidence on the given problem.  
For H21, I expected that higher cognitive entrepreneurship in problem solving 
will lead to higher communicant activeness. However, in retrospect, I failed to consider 
that the low cognitive entrepreneurial problem solver could also be active in 
communication behavior. In other words, high cognitive non-entrepreneurship do
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mean passiveness in communication behavior. As we found routinely, many non-
entrepreneurial problem solvers tend to vigorously seek and forward information that is 
consist
trast, the reverse causal flow seems to be logical conceptually. As a 
riences heightened communicant activeness, she or he is likely to 
develop
PS seems to reflect such a negative 
concep
d 
ent with their preferred conclusion. Thus, it was not conceptually and empirically 
valid to specify a positive causal relationship between high cognitive entrepreneurship 
and communicant activeness in problem solving. The nonsignificant path from cognitive 
entrepreneurship to communicant activeness seems to reflect such a notion.  
In con
problem solver expe
 a good deal of knowledge and preference on how to solve the problem. Then, 
such a preference (i.e., high information forefending) would lead to more cognitive 
retrogression (i.e., optimizing a preferred conclusion backwardly) and less tolerance, less 
commitment to all the available candidate solution and ideas, and less suspension of 
finalizing a solution. As a result, the problem solver becomes less entrepreneurial. 
Therefore, the negative path from CAPS to CE
tual relationship. In summary, from the H21 and H22 tests, I found that 
communicant activeness in problem solving tends to reduce the problem solver’s 
cognitive entrepreneurship eventually, while the reverse cannot be assumed. 
Additional Analysis 
As I discussed, the H21 prediction was a conceptual mistake in that both high an
low entrepreneurial problem solvers could be high in communicant activeness. There is 
no conceptual reason that the less entrepreneurial problem solvers should be low in 
communicant activeness. To test the validity of this reasoning, I conducted an additional 
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analysis of how the high and low entrepreneurial problem solvers would differ in 
communicant activeness.  




n. I then 
selected e 
p 








ng a problem solver’s reasoning direction: i.e., “evidence conclusion” f
forward reasoning and “conclusion evidence” for backward reasoning. I named those
forward reasoning problem solvers as the cognitive alpha group, and those in the 
backward reasoning group as cognitive omega. Using the CAOS model, I sorted sur
participants into three groups: high, medium, and low in cognitive retrogressio
 the high and low groups and named them cognitive omega (i.e., high in cognitiv
retrogression) and cognitive alpha (i.e., low in cognitive retrogression).  
I expected similar model structures of CAPS in both the cognitive alpha grou
nitive omega groups, but I predicted that the two groups will differ in in
selectivity. Specifically, I expected the cognitive alpha group would have a low path 
coefficient in information forefending and a high one in information permitting. In 
contrast, I predicted that the cognitive omega group would show the opposite pattern—a
high path coefficient in information forefending and a low path coefficient in inform
permitting. If the patterns developed as I expected, this should become evidence for th
explanation of a nonsignificant path in H21: high or low entrepreneurial problem
do not differ in their information transmission and acquisition but only in their 
information selectivity (i.e., non-entrepreneurial problem solvers tend to more fore
information.).  
As I expected, information selectivity was different between the cognitive
group and the cognitive omega group in both issues. Specifically, the cognitive alpha
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groups in two issues were lower in information forefending (i.e., .488 for war in Iraq 
and .449 for eliminating affirmative action) and relatively higher in information 
permitting (i.e., .538 for war in Iraq and .524 for eliminating affirmative action). I found 
a reversed pattern in the cognitive omega group. Cognitive omega groups were higher in 
information forefending (i.e., .656 for war in Iraq and .776 for eliminating affirmat




g affirmative action). The two groups possess similar structural path 








in problem solving increases, thos as information forefending, 
inform rmation seeking, 
n and informa
tion selectivity between cognitive alpha and omega groups shows an interac
like pattern. 
Thus, I concluded that the additional analysis of CAOS and CAPS reinforced my
explanation of why H21 failed to get support. The low entrepreneurial problem so
can also be active in communication behavior, just as those high entrepreneurial p
solvers are active. Thus, this at least in part explains why my conceptual prediction in 
H21 failed.  
Overall Discussion 
To recap, the present study finds support for communicant activeness in prob
solving. Tests showed that CAPS is a multidimensional construct. In all six dimensions
found the expected positive structural path coefficients: as one’s c
e subdimensions such 
ation permitting, information forwarding, information sharing, info
and information processing increase as well.   
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I introduced a new concept, cognitive entrepreneurship in problem solving, wh
















 positive relationships with their higher order construct, cognitive 
entrepreneurship. Cognitive retrogression captures how one would deploy a backward 
reasoning strategy in problem solving. In general, I found support for these predicti
However, I found only partial support for cognitive commitment. In two tests, I found a 
positive path (in eliminating affirmative action) and a negative path (in war in Iraq). So
from the current data, we cannot say definitively whether cognitive commitment 
generally increases as cognitive entrepreneurship increases. This may be a matter
sensitivity. A future study with multi-items and comparisons across more diverse types of
problems should bring clearer understanding.  
This study’s findings suggest that high problem recognition and level of 
involvement with low constraint recognition increases one’s situational motivation i
problem solving. As the situational motivation in problem solving grows, commun
activeness in problem solving increases. In ad
n, this tends to increase communicant activeness in problem solving.  
However, if one has a heightened situational motivation, she or he tends to have
low cognitive entrepreneurship in problem solving. The presence of a stronger referent 
criterion tends to lower the cognitive entrepreneurial approach in problem solving.  
From the bidirectional analysis, I found that problem solvers with high 
communicant activeness in problem solving are not necessarily entrepreneurial in their 
problem solving. Low and high entrepreneurial problem solvers both can be activ
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communication behavior. Nonetheless, as communicant activeness in problem solving 
increases, the lower the cognitive entrepreneurship in problem solving one tends to 
develop. Finally, the cognitive alpha group (i.e., the entrepreneurial problem solvers) 
tends to be less forefending and more permitting in information acquisition and 








problem solvers) tend to be more forefending and less permitting in dealing wit
tion during problem solving.  
To conclude, in the present study, I found a good amount of evidence for 
communicant activeness in problem solving, cognitive entrepreneurship in problem 
solving, and the situational theory of problem solving. These constructs describ
cognitive and communicative features during problematic situations. In addition, they 
explain how and why those unique features arise in some situations and not in others. Yet, 
I found a few unexpected findings (e.g., the higher the situational motivation in problem 
solving, the lower the cognitive entrepreneurship) that provoke further theoretical 
development. In future study, such serendipity will provide a chance for theo
elaboration.  
Implications 
This study has introduced two new concepts of communicant activeness in 
problem solving and cognitive entrepreneurship in problem solving. With the new 
concepts, the situational theory of publics becomes a more general theory by re
tion seeking and processing (i.e., “particular”) with six subdimensions in 
communicant activeness in problem solving and four subdimensions in cognitive 
entrepreneurship in problem solving (“the general”). The resulting theory and models
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have implications for communication theory in general as well as for subfields such as 
public relations, health and risk communication, political communication, and con
resolution. In the following section, I will discuss the implications of communicant 
activeness in problem solving (CAPS), cognitive entrepreneurship in problem solving
(CEPS), and the situational theory of problem solving (STOPS). 
Implication of CAPS 
The CAPS model I have developed aims to capture the notion of 
intercommunication. A dominant view is that communication is an individual ac
information inflow or outflow, not an individual’s act of information interflow 











g potential. However, to explain information interflow, we need both conceptua
nuts and bolts.  
With the concepts of information sharing, information forwarding, inform
processing, and information seeking, we can look at how communicants interlock wi
each other. Active communicants who are dealing with a life problem are not only 
seeking information about it but forwarding information about the problem and solutions 
to others. They are not only active in information taking but also active in information
giving. Some communicants are active but may not seek information because of their 
successful problem solving in past (P. K. Hamilton, 1992). With their subjective 
confidence that they developed in dealing with a problem, they do not actively collect 
information about the problem but actively forward and forefend information to othe
communicants. It has been conceptually inconvenient to explain active communic
who are active in information giving but not active in information taking. Previous 
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theories could not capture such type of active communicants because they did not 
explicitly conceptualize information giving. 
In addition, I have introduced another conceptual dimension, information 
selection, to capture how a communicant deals with information as having heightened 
activeness in problem solving. We routinely encounter active communicants i
life who selectively
n our daily 
 share, forward, process, or seek information about some problem. 
rtain ways of 
selecting information. Our society, thus, is like a box of nuts and bolts of different sizes
Communicants not only are interconnected with each other, but they have ce
 
and shapes. Matching such a mixed pile of nuts and bolts is not a simple task to 
accomplish. Indeed, many information forwarders find it difficult to meet information
processors (who are possessed by other life problems) who are likely to take information 
as the forwarders wish. Finding the right fits is more difficult than most message senders 
believe because of the information selectivity that problem solvers tend to develop 
the problem-solving periods.  
CAPS, Communicant Network, and Model of Meso-Level Intercommunication 
With CAPS, we can break down the process of trafficking information among 
individuals within a communication network. To explain, I introduce two terms
communicants and peripheral communicants. Focal communicant refers to a central 
person who plays a role of information station regarding a problem. The focal 
communicant actively “inhales and exhales” information in an effort to solve a problem. 
He or she is actively seeking, forefending, and forwarding information about the
Within the boundary of the communication network in which he or she is situated, a foca









across one’s interconnected communicant networks. In contrast, peripheral 




d communicative behavior as focal communicants have and do.  





ation to other communicants in an effort to solve a problem they feel 
important. Notably, as shown in past research, interpersonal communication networks, 
rather than mass-mediated channels, such as word-of-mouth spread among people who 
are acquainted with each other (e.g., “weak ties,” Granovetter, 1983) are by far the most 
effective method of communication (Rosen, 2000). Thus, building a model that 
conceptually illustrates the process of information trafficking among individual 
communicants would be theoretically useful.   
Although prior studies distinguish the communication process by the medium 
utilized, this often misleads our study of communication effectiveness.  For example, 
scholars of mass media effects distinguish mass-mediated communication from 
interpersonal communication in building a communication model. However, such a 
a communicative network but who are less active on the problem. Peripheral 
communicants tend to passively process, permit, and share information they encoun
from the communicative interactions. They may or may not cultivate a similar situational
perception an
Focal and peripheral communic
ity. Focal communicants can be various types of people and social figures. They 
could be, for example, our geographically close friends and neighbors who are ups
about some issue, media reporters who investigate and report publicly some new threa
to readers, government officials working for a citizen safety issue, or a corporate 




distinction is futile in studying communication effectiveness from information giver to 
information takers in that the mass-media cannot exclude other communicant media in its 
effects (Chaffee, 1982). Too often, mass-mediated communication and interpersonal 
communication are closely intertwined, almost inseparable from other communication 
networks such as mass-mediated communication flows (Chaffee, 1982). The approach in 
studying communication effectiveness by distinguishing the medium would only be a 
phenotypic account that prohibits better understanding. A better alternative puts the 
emphasis on “communicants,” not the “medium” of communication, to describe 
information trafficking across people. In the below model, a focal communicant can be a 
person (e.g., a roommate) or a mass medium (e.g., a local newspaper). In either case a 
person or a mass medium, plays a role of information provide, acquirer, and selector as a 
communicant to other communicants. Thus, without distinguishing between medium and 
person, we can conceptually describe information interflow with a single frame.  The 
llowing figure describes information trafficking among the interconnected fo
communicants.  




This model illustrates the active communicant’s role in transmitting information
about some proble
 












ess in problem solving, active communicants—focal communicants—are seeking 
information from other referents. Focal communicants, as a way of problem solving (e.g
effectuating), forward information (e.g., about problems and/or solutions) to other 
communicants who are most likely within their routine relationship network. Such
forwarding would, to some extent, have effects on information processors’—peripheral 
communicants—perception regarding the problem. If peripheral communicants find 
personal connection to the forwarded problem, then they would become active 
communicants. However, it is possible that peripheral communicants would n
enough of a connection to elevate one’s problem perception and communicant activeness
They might toss information, reactively, to other communi
nity (e.g., “FYI”). Importantly, this meso-level model takes information 
trafficking as a joint function of information transmission efforts as well as info
acquisition efforts among interconnected communicants, not attributing it to the sole 
function of one party.  Thus, it models the intercommunication process, not 
communication itself.   
CAPS provides conceptual nuts and bolts to describe how some problems a
solutions are exchanged across the social pipelines. It will reserve a fresh look for 
communication phenomena, such as opinion leadership, agenda setting, and diffusion of 
innovation.  
CAPS and Problem-Solving Potential 
CAPS and its subconstructs provide a way to explain how active publics behave
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in some social conflicts and to estimate the extent to which a conflict would bear 
resolution potential. In the conceptual diagram in Figure 34, I summarize how the six 
subdimensions in CAPS model can predict the three key problem solving potentials.  
Figure 34: Communication behaviors and problem-solving potential in controversial 
social issues. 
 
Predicting symmetrical resolution potential: Open versus closed problem solver. N
personal problems evolve into social problems. Yet, many individual problems ha
some potential to evolve into social problems if many people are affected by a sam





would become an issue resulting in a collective problem-solving effort if neighbors 
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organize to challenge the company. Problems that attract multiple stakeholders often 
result in conflict. Often, one party’s proposal for problem resolution is less attractive to 
another. Because problem solvers apply their own evaluative lens—i.e., becoming 





ating). Sharing a 
em, its cause, and some negative consequences helps 
individ  
 get any 
istasteful. Problem solvers in a conflict situation are tempted to refute the other 
party’s proposal.  
Because problem solvers abide by their own decisional rules, knowing how much 
individual problem holders have a tendency for information selection (forefending) can 
be a good predictor for symmetrical problem-solving potential. In other words, a problem 
solver’s openness to reviewing information from competing perspectives, even if 
distasteful, can be a litmus test for diagnosing the potential for a symmetrical resolution 
of a social problem. Thus, here I refer to an open problem solver as a person who is 
willing to use any information to increase problem-solving potential. I refer to a cl
problem solver as a person who discriminates against distasteful information 
incompatible with his or her frame of reference. They want to increase problem-solving 
al by subscribing to a certain type of information.  
Collective action potential: Individual versus collective problem solver. As 
mentioned, information transmission is a critical part of problem solving (i.e., 
effectuating a solution). By giving information about a problem, those isolated individu
problem solvers evolve into a social collectivity (i.e., collective effectu
similar perception about a probl
ual problem solvers increase their problem-solving potential (e.g., easier to




 Also, by 
d 
oblem solvers (e.g., an activist group). Thus, 
knowing who is likely to em
n. 
problem solvers. In contrast, collective problem solvers not only recognize a problem but 
also recognize comrade problem solvers. The only way that individuals communize a 
similar sense of problem perception is through forwarding and sharing information about 
the problem with one’s neighboring communicants.  
Stagnancy potential: Situational versus dormant/chronic problem solver. Some 
problems are more enduring than others for various reasons. Problem solvers may suffer 
potentially useful information without communicating about his or her problematic state: 
i.e., problem forwarding. A communicant should talk about his or her problem.
provoking other communicants to recognize a problematic state, individual problem 
solvers can enhance the pool of potentially useful information, can divide the costs for 
problem solving, and can increase their bargaining power in demanding resources from a 
relevant party. Information forwarding and permitting is at the heart of the locating an
networking with other individual problem solvers. 
Giving information about a problematic situation is thus a necessary condition for 
a problem to produce a group of collective pr
it information about a problem and a solution to other 
communicants explains what kind of problem would have potential for collective actio
I refer to an individual problem solver as a person who is working on a problem in an 
independent and isolated way without knowing other problem solvers. A collective 
problem solver is a person who tries to solve the problem through coordinated efforts 
with others. The key difference between individual and collective problem solvers is 
whether one has a cross-awareness between problem solvers. In other words, individual 
problem solvers recognize a problem but may not recognize the presence of other 
 
from absence of a solution (e.g., curing can r ons may be obvious, yet 
problem solv er fr c esources to enact a solution; or they have 
difficulties mobilizing the attention of those who have necessary resources (e.g., 
obtaining budget for a community educational facility from government). If a 
problematic situation continues, problem so s be chronic problem solvers unless 
they leave th ion p o  (i.e -o ht syndrome). To highlight such 
a distinction in terms of on, situational problem solver from 
a chronic problem solver  a d t pr m so  
situational problem solver refers to a problem solver whose problem is solvable 
within a short amount of ple, a person with the flu would try to find a cure 
effo ly. Yet, reso f oble t uld end simply as time passes. 
 contrast, a c pro o fers o  who has procrastinated 
caus  th sence o n or for inability to mobilize resources. For 
stanc iabetes patients are chronically active trying to learn and manage their 
sease ou ut their ime. In contrast, a dormant problem solver is a person who 
s found a  in t  a w pa s r problem-solving effort. From 
eir past proble olvin t ant m rs would possess some 
owledge. However, th re b  solv othe  important problems; hence, 
ey temporarily leave the problematic state until a new problematic state arises from it.  
Taking information urrent as possi o solve a problem would decrease a 
tagnant” state in problem ing. If competing parties are dormant or chronic in a 
cial conflict, the members tend to less active in information acquisition. Thus, with the 
 acquisition tendency, we can predict how 
cer). O  soluti
ers
e si
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pes of publics derived 
from th  
situational active public, open-situational activist public, closed-situational activist 
public, open-chronic activist public, and closed-chronic activist public (see Table 29). 
 given social conflict would be stagnant in conflict resolution. 
CAPS and Typology of Publics 
The situational theory of publics classifies publics into categories such as 
nonpublic, latent, aware, and active publics predicted by the interaction of three 
independent variables, problem recognition, constraint recognition, and level of 
involvement—i.e., 2 x 2 x 2 = 8 (J. Grunig & Hunt, 1984). However, the STP 
conceptualizes communication behavior only by the information taking dimension (i.e., 
information seeking and processing). Active and passive communication behaviors 
explain only when people, as information consumers, are more or less likely to take 
information. Hence, the active, aware, latent, and nonpublic categories are us
understanding how a public is likely to consume information, but not useful in explaining 
how a public is likely to interpret, produce, and transmit information to other publics and
how selective they would be.  
The CAPS model offers a more comprehensive framework that develops a new 
typology of publics using its general conception of communicant behavior. Using and
combining six subdimensions under information selection, transmission, and acquisitio
generates eight different publics. I distinguish eight different ty
ree key characteristics in problem solving behavior. These are open-dormant
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Dewey (1927) provided a classic definition of a public that avoids the common 
confusion in lay use of the term public (e.g., a general public). In Dewey’s theory, a
public is a group of peopl
 
e who 1) face a similar problem, 2) recognize that the problem 







consist  a 
problem
their ex m 
solver b
exists, and 3) organize to do something about the problem. Following Dewey, J. Grunig 
nt (1984) distinguished four types of publics. They labeled a group of people who
face a similar problem but do not detect the problem a latent public. When group 
members subsequently recognize the problem, they become an aware public. If the pub
organizes to discuss and do something about the problem, they become an active pu
Finally, as a logical extension, those groups of people do not meet any conditio
Dewey’s notion of publics are called nonpublics. J. Grunig and Hunt (1984
tiated these four types of publics by “the extent to which they participate in active
r to do something about” a problem (p. 145).  Thus, their typology of publics is
ent and compatible with the present model of communicant activeness in
atic situation. Specifically, nonpublic, latent, aware, and active publics differ in 
tent of problem solving efforts—i.e., communicant activeness. As a proble
ecomes more serious in tackling a recognized problem, he or she will be more 
active in information acquisition, transmission, and selection.  
In Figure 35, I offer a three dimensional model to illustrate such conceptual 
correspondence between types of publics and three communicant activeness dimensions. 
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ortance of viewing a public as having situational 
propert
practitioners can anticipate which types of publics (e.g., closed-situational activist) 
emerge with what types of behavioral characteristics (e.g., collective problem solver), 
From the CAPS conception, a public is a problem solver who uses 
communication behavior as a coping mechanism to inquire and effectuate a chosen 
solution. A public may be individually or collectively working toward problem resolutio
A public as a problem solver may have an enduring or a transient problem, may app
problem resolution individually or collectively, and may take an open or closed approac
in using information during problem solving process. I emphasize, following J. Grun
(1968, 1989, 1997, 2003, 2005), the imp
ies in terms of communicative activeness to end a problematic situation.  
As is easily observable, different problems produce different types of publics. 








Open-Situational Active Public 
(Symmetrical Potential Rich) 










Open-Chronic Activist (active) 
(Symmetrical Potential Rich) 




(Asymmetrical Potential Rich) 
Active Public 
(Individual Problem Solver)
Open- Situational Activist 
(Symmetrical Potential Rich) 
(Collective Problem Solver)  
Closed-Situational Activist 
(Asymmetrical Potential Rich) 
(Collective Problem Solver)  
Closed-Chronic Activist (active) 
(Asymmetrical Potential Rich) 





they will make a more strategic choice in dealing with publics (e.g., negotiation or 
information campaign).  
CAPS and Criticisms of the Situational Theory of Publics 
Criticism about failure to explain the communicative nature of publics. Vasquez 
and Taylor (2001) said that the STP is limited because it heavily hinges on a “socio-
/psycho-centric view of a public,” a “tautological conceptualization of individual and 
public,” and a “view of communication that is outdated or out of touch with actual 
observations” (p. 150). Above all, they said that the STP failed to explain “the 
contemporary communicative nature of a public” (p. 150). They asserted: 
The situational perspective identifies communication as central to the emer
after the characteristics and composition of a public have been identified does 
“logic” of the situational perspective is grounded in the assumption of 
conceptualization and operationalization is a source of tension for the situation
centric view of a public. [italics added] (Vasquez & Taylor, 2001, p. 150) 
CAPS grants STP a conceptual coherence that resolves this “source of tension” by
its extended and general conception of communication behavior. Specifically, CAPS 
defends STP against the criticisms that it uses “social-psychological variables
gence 
of a public but uses social-psychological variables to investigate a public. Only 
communication become important as an outcome effect. Yet, the underlying 
communication—public discussion, debate, and argument. The difference in 
al 
perspective that has the effect of orienting the researcher to a socio-/psycho-
 
 
” and treats 




unication…as an outcome effect” (Vasquez & Taylor, 2001, p. 150). Opposit
the criticism, STP’s use of “social-psychological” variables and viewing communication 
as a dependent variable to study publics is not a problem, but a strength of the theory
The conception of communication as an outcome of problem perception is indeed the
core virtue that the STP uniquely has brought into the field of communication. Prior to 
STP and another audience-centered model such as uses and gratifications theory (Blu
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& Katz, 1974), communicants were only described as pathologically helpless targets of 
message sender’s persuasive intent. They were fed or merely declined messages given by 
senders. As an assumption, communication was almost always an unquestioned causal 
ssage 
ns.  
In this vein, STP considers communication to be as “outcome effect” 
corresponding to a communicant’s own problem perception in a given situation. A 
public’s problem perception is imperative for understanding when publics do or do not 
engage in problem-solving actions (e.g., debate against people with a competing 
perspective about a social issue). Knowing the degree of problem perception is, in turn, 
essential to understand when publics arise and evolve to do something about the problem. 
We can never understand how and why people become communicatively active without 
using “social-psychological” variables such as the degree of problem recognition and the 
perceiv t 
 the 
s to discuss the “nature, role, and 
influen e created, 
variable that a sender does to receivers, not an outcome variable that reflects a me
taker’s needs and purposes across their life situatio
ed degree of involvement. For problem solvers (i.e., publics), information is no
simply given but actively sought, forwarded, and selected purposefully. Few prior 
communication theories, if any, could dare to theorize in that way. Thus, attacking
STP’s conception as problematic because it treats communication as an outcome is 
missing the point (ignoratio elenchi).24
CAPS provides a framework for researcher
ce of communication” by understanding how “problematic situations ar
raised, and sustained through the symbolic convergence (configuring and reconfiguring) 
of messages” (Vasquez & Taylor, 2001, p. 150). The information transmission variables 
                                                 
 This term refers to a missing the point “the arguer is ignorant of the logical implications of his or her 




in CAPS provide conceptual links that enhance the STP’s contribution to balancing a 
sender-biased conception and upsetting the traditional communication assumption
Through the concepts of information forwarding and information sharing, CAPS allows 
researchers to set communication behavior as independent variables as well. That is, 
active communicants who are publics tend to forward information about a problemati
state as well as their own solution proposals to other communicants. Forwarding or 
sharing information about their problem is a means to effectuate their preferred solution
Thus, by setting up communication as an independent variable, we can understand how 














tion. Then, we can illustrate a process through which a communicant, a member 
of public, begins to perceive a problem and a social collectivity arises in the social mesh 
of communicants to deal with their common problems. Hallahan (2001) lamen
“issue process” and “issue dynamics” received “too little attention” in public rel
research (p. 49). He (2001) thus posited a question, “what role does communication play
in creating problem recognition, involvement, and constraint recognition?,” and requested
a conceptual effort to put communication as “independent variable” (p. 49).  
I believe the new model of CAPS answers Hallahan’s call for new research. 
Although in the present study I did not test it, the follow
l effect from communication behavior as a cause to the other communicants’ 
perceptions in a problematic situation. In the following model, I predict the effect of 
communication as an independent variable will reduce perceptual gaps among interacting
communicants. Thus, as focal and peripheral communicant activeness increases, the 
perceptual gaps between two interacting communicants will decrease about the proble
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and the “accuracy,” “understanding,” and “agreement” (two concepts in the Coorientation 
model, McLeod & Chaffee, 1972) about the problem will increase.  
Figure 36: Effects of communicant activeness to perceptual and communicative 
behavioral coorientation among problem solvers. 
 
 




cross meta-perception about problem perception among individual problem solvers (e.g., 
at 
isolated publics turn into a social collectivity or a system to coordinate their behavior 
Importantly, CAPS advocates the conception of “collective consciousness” in 
STP as a viable explanation of how an isolated individual member of a public transforms 
into a cohesive collective public in some problems. The communicant interaction 
captured in CAPS explains h
 themselves. Then, it explains how the individual problem solvers are transfo
llective problem solvers.  
Information forwarding by activist communicants, which is parallel to 
tion seeking by active communicants, increases the chance of meta-perception o
individual problem solvers are aware that other individual problem holders are aware th
I am making an effort to solve this problem.). This is the process and the point at which 
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toward problem resolution. Thus, CAPS rebuts the criticism of “the tautological 
conceptualization of individual and public” by explaining how a collective conscio
arises. By CAPS, we can conceptually differentiate publics as individual problem solvers 
(e.g., open/chronic active publics) and collective problem solvers (e.g., open/chronic 
activist publics). Further, the conceptual dimensions of CAPS, such as information 
selection, transmission, and acquisition, explain not only the detailed evolving process 
from individual to collective problem solving, but also the extent to which a problem
the potential for a collective problem solving. 
Vasquez and Taylor (2001) attac
usness 
 has 
ked the situational theory of publics as “outdated 






on, the homo narrans perspective, the 
situatio t, 
raised, 
and lacking in correspo
seen in the observations of everyday life” (p. 150). They said that STP 
“marginalized the role of communication process and dynamics” because of its 
“socio/psycho-centric conceptualization of a public” (Vasquez & Taylor, 2001, pp. 14
150). Although most attacks against the situational perspective have come as straw man 
arguments (e.g., the “tautology” claim of public concept against the STP), their cal
for emphasizing “communication process and dynamics” seems to be a constructive 
criticism for advancing our understanding of publics.  
By extending the conceptual scope of communicant behavior beyond information 
acquisition, as CAPS does, I believe the situational theory of publics better explai
“communication process and dynamics” inherent in the emergence of publics and s
issues. Just as they claim for their favored positi
nal theory of publics with CAPS is better capable to explain the process tha
“Symbolic reality and individual knowledge of a problematic situation are created, 
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and sustained through the symbolic convergence (configuring and reconfiguring) of 
messages” (Vasquez & Taylor, 2001, p. 150). Vasquez and Taylor (2001) requested a 
refinement such that: “One could question whether or not the STP information-
processing and information-seeking behaviors are appropriate variables of concern f
explicating the communicative nature of a public. A single coherent approach is needed” 
(p. 150). CAPS would be a single coherent approach to respond to their request for 
further refinement of the situational theory and even for their “rhetocentric” homo 
narrans perspective (Vasquez & Taylor, 2001).  
CAPS and Active Public
or 
s without Information Seeking 
hat some 
ow 
sufficiently avoid negative communications, will indeed reduce their level of 
 a respondent who 
continues to be highly involved and low in constraint but has in essence decided 
 he or she recognized. The question is would situational 
theory continue to count this individual as being high in communication activity? 
any uncertainty, will be contrary to situational theory’s prediction. [italics added] 
 
The situational theory of publics predicts active publics will seek information 
about a problem. However, P. K. Hamilton (1992) posed one intriguing question 
regarding the predictive power of the situational theory of publics. He found t
active publics who are high in problem recognition and involvement perception with l
constraint recognition are not actively seeking information about the problem. P. K. P. K. 
Hamilton (1992) explained: 
…individuals who have made up their mind regarding the election, and can 
information seeking. Indeed this specific case will find
how to solve the problem
If so, then the reduced level of information seeking, because there is no longer 
(p. 144) 
CAPS provides a conceptually coherent answer to P. K. Hamilton’s question. With its 
general conception of communicant activeness other than information acquisition (e.g., 
information seeking), CAPS predicts a special active public that would be low in 
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information seeking or processing, will be high in information transmission (i.e., 
information forwarding) and high in information selectivity (i.e., information forefendin
Conceptually, such an active public is, CAPS predicts, in the effectuating phase who
“active” in translating their favored solution (e.g., actively promote their preferred 
candidate to other voters), while having little need for more information. In other words, 
the “anomaly” public is active in information transmission and selectiveness afte
passed the inquiring phase. Thus, P. K. Hamilton’s paradox of active publics is not a
paradox from the CAPS point of view.  
CAPS and Campaigns 
Often we observe that apparently well thought-out mass-mediated campaigns a
not successful. The model of communicant activeness, CAPS, illustrates this in two ways. 






 to be selective in their informational activities. Thus, 
campai
ts who 
gners who are selective in their information forwarding would be frustrated by the 
active information seeker’s information forefending. In contrast, those less active 
communicants are less selective (i.e., permissive) and thus would be less resistant to the 
attempts of an information forwarder’s selectivity. However, their permissiveness makes 
it difficult to catch and hold their attention. They are processing information, not seeking. 
Further, even if they pay attention, they are not likely to withhold information as 
information forwarders intend. They neither refute the informational contents nor 
withhold it. They are nonchalant and transient.  
At the same time, the new model of communicant activeness can enhance 
campaign effectiveness. Some communication theories encourage campaigners to 
segment their audience. Taking an example, the situational theory of publics predic
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are likely to seek information with its three independent variables, problem recognition, 
constraint recognition, and level of involvement (J. Grunig, 1989, 1997). This theory 
suggests that public communicators should not attempt to communicate with those 
passive publics (who are engaged in information processing) and whose communicatio
behaviors are almost random. Instead
n 
, the situational theory recommends segmenting the 







ers are individuals 
 knowledge by others. The CAPS framework 
considers such “reactive leadership” as passive communicant behavior by the variable 
active communicants who are likely
gners can increase the communication effectiveness and decrease the 
communication costs.  
In addition to information seeking and processing, the four additional variable
CAPS (i.e., information forefending, information permitting, information forwarding, and 
information sharing) allow information campaigners to predict, first, when a 
communicant would refute or receive information from the campaigner and, second,
when a communicant would voluntarily disperse information that he or she learns to other
communicants (c.f. word-of-mouth campaign). With CAPS, public communicators can 
predict better when their information campaign would be more successful and less costly 
by allowing a more comprehensive audience segmentation.   
CAPS and Opinion Leadership 
Opinion leadership has been defined as the act of being sought out for informatio
and advice on a topic (Troldahl & Van Dam, 1965). CAPS explains the opinion lea
concept in a fresh way. Despite its conceptual appeal, opinion leadership concept hinges 
more on a reactive notion of leadership. In literature, the opinion lead













tion sharing. I suggest expanding the opinion leadership concept to 
leadership.” Opinion leaders (active communicants) at times offer information even 
without a request. They may voluntarily disperse opinions, issues, and solutions to 
neighboring communicants. CAPS extends reactive opinion leadership to a proactive
with its generalized notion of communicant activeness. It explains how opinion 
leadership might differ across problems. For example, proactive opinion leaders are 
likely to seek information, forefend information, and forward information. Reactive 
opinion leaders are more likely to permit, process, and share information. We can 
conceptually distinguish v
n, transmission, and acquisition dimensions in a more comprehensive way than 
information acquisition alone. 
In addition, CAPS extends opinion leadership beyond a non-varying personal tr
The opinion leadership literature treats opinion leadership as an enduring personal 
characteristic. Yet, we encounter many situations in which an unlikely individual plays 
the role of opinion leader (e.g., uneducated, less prone to think). Because CAPS ad
notion of “situational” activeness, any individual can be an active opinion leader in som
problem he or she is seriously trying to solve. Indeed, almost everyone is an active 
problem solver at some times for some issues. It is not surprising, therefore, that some 
unlikely people transmit or are sought for information by other communicants even when
they deviate from a typical opinion leader profile (e.g., old, experienced, and/or highly 
educated). CAPS lifts the conceptual bar for lay people to become opinion leaders at
some situation by relieving rigid assumption of enduring personal traits in opinion 
leadership. Any problem solver can be an opinion leader when he or she develops enough
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confidence and competence through solving a problem. Extraordinary problem sit
make even laypeople situational opinion leaders who forward/share their soluti
uations 
ons with 
other c  
 things is 
 theory 
e 
ation seekers and processors and information forwarders and 
PS postulates that active 
commu
n 
n theories (McComb & Shaw, 1972). It cleverly solved the puzzle of 
ommunicants. CAPS conceptually welcomes and resolves such an anomaly in
previous opinion leadership studies. 
CAPS and Diffusion of Innovation  
The theory of the diffusion of innovations uses two simple variables, time and 
number of adopters. In brief, the increased “number of adopters” of new ideas or
a function of time (Rogers, 1995). Despite the theory’s parsimony, it is interesting to 
conceptually partial out the variance of the independent variable of “time.” From a
building perspective, time is neither interesting nor useful because time engulfs many 
possible causes. Hence, conceptually partialing out the variance in “time” advances 
diffusion theory. CAPS can segment significant variance from the independent variable, 
“time.”  Specifically, CAPS explains the key dependent variables in the diffusion theory 
such as the adoption rate, the number of adopters, or the shape of adoption curve of som
innovation (e.g., Chaffee’s, 1977, three curves of diffusion). These can be determined by 
the number of inform
sharers regarding a given innovation/things. Also, because CA
nicants not only learn something new but also educate others about it, the 
changing rate of communicants from information seeker to information forwarder of a
innovation can explain a portion of the variance contained in time.   
CAPS and Agenda Setting Theory  
















al failure to find a strong mass communication effect on attitudes and behav
By shifting its focus from “what to think” (i.e., “attitude change”) to “what to think 
about” (i.e., audience’s “learning” public issues and their priorities), McComb and Shaw 
(1972) found a strong mass media effect on audience thinking (McQuail & Winda
1993). In essence, the agenda setting hypothesis postulates that the mass media influenc
public opinion by “paying attention to some issues and neglecting others” (McQuail &
Windahl, 1993, p. 104).  
Using the definition of communicant activeness in CAPS, active communicants
are those who seek, forward, and forefend about some problem. When speculating on the
role of media and actors in mass media institutions (i.e., reporters and editors), we can 
consider the mass communication actors (c.f., gatekeepers) to be “activ
ast quasi-active communicants who seek, forward, and forefend information about 
social problems. If we extend the conception of individuality or personality to the 
organizational persona of a mass medium, we can connect the CAPS framework to the
agenda-setting hypothesis. Active media communicants are selective in sampling social 
problems/issues and prioritizing them by applying their own decision rules. For exa
active media communicants (a reporter or editor who subjectively defines social issues) 
whose “problem” is to fulfill a social watchdog responsibility select information routine
Their communicant activeness may be triggered not by a personal problem but by a 
quasi-problem perception (e.g., “although I am not personally interested in it, the side 
effects of this new medical pill seem to be a serious problem to my readers”) (J. Gruni
1983). They think some issues are more worthwhile to seek and forward to other 
communicants (audiences) while others are not: i.e., information forefending. 
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With the CAPS framework, those “institutional elites” (e.g., members of the 
domina





n for problem 
resolution. Then, how can commu orienting effort between 
compet
scribe 
nt coalition or public relations managers) or activist groups who are the 
“information sources” for the media are also active or activist communicants. These 
institutional elites or organizational rebels actively promote their problem as a critical 
issue for society and demand public attention. Just as media reporters are active 
communicants in that they tend to forefend, seek, and forward information in dealing 
with information to readers, these organizational elites or rebels actively seek and 
forward information selectively to media and audiences. Although the routes or sources 
of problem recognition would be different, the resulting communicant actions of media 
reporters, active organizational c
nally identical. CAPS conceptualizes media reporters as active communicants wh
perceive a set of possible problems (agendas), who place problem priorities on that list 
(agenda setting), and who inquire and effectuate their problems for their problem (social 
watchdog) solving.  
CAPS and Coorientation: From Competitors to Cooperators 
Many social problems lead to social schisms because of a lack of “coori
among problem solvers (e.g., different “orientation” between pro-choice activists
pro-life activists). Achieving a cooriented state between problem solvers with dif
definitions of the problem and its solutions is therefore a necessary conditio
nication moderate a co
itors? 
In a conflict, the potential for resolution depends on the extent of cognitive 
overlap between the competing parties. The extents to which conflicting parties sub
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to similar sets of information and to the extent to which they have similar interpretatio
of information, that is, “coorientation,” will be keys to predicting a likelihood of 
collaboration and conflict resolution. By seeking, consuming, and generating a certain 
subset of information that fits with their desired end state (information forefending), 
people construct their own situational reality regarding the problem they face. In terms o
the coorientation model (McLeod & Chaffee, 1973), rampant social schisms on many
issues result from a lack of coorientation. CAPS explains the lack of coorientation (e.g., 




ng from an unabated information 




thy to liberate suppressed Iraq civilians. On the opposite side, some anti-
war act
f 
forefending tendency among acti
For example, the U. S. military and government prohibited publicity about dead U
S. soldiers from the war in Iraq (since March 2003). Active communicants become 
selective in information giving. The U. S. authorities in charge of the war were active 
communicants themselves who wanted to define, interpret, and construct the problem and 
solution in a way consistent with their interest and beliefs. They were forefending, 
seeking, and forwarding information to illustrate and define reality as their strong
lead (referent criteria). They referred to the things, events, and segments of reality in a 
way consistent with their constructed solution (referent criterion). They conclu
the war was wor
ivist groups selectively looked for how many U. S. soldiers and civilians died 
from the war (information seeking and forwarding with strong forefending). An activist 
group’s strong belief of ‘stop the war’ (referent criterion) leads them to selective 
information seeking and forwarding.  
People reduce their conflict resolution potential because of the dissimilar sense o
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reality, which is caused and reinforced by their subscription to filtered information. The 
degree of information forefending and permitting, therefore, becomes a critical indica
to diagnose resolution potential in m
tor 
any social problems held between competing parties. 
nformation forefending with different definitions of 







at I used to distinguish two groups in problem solving. I introduced a model of 
When problem holders are high in i
s and solutions proposed, they tend to construct and become entrenched with
certain aspect of reality—constructing a sense of reality by sampling only some porti
of information—over the other alternatives. Not surprisingly, the potential of reaching an 
integrative solution decreases.  
Often, such an issue devolves to a chronic social problem. This, in turn, creates
chronic rebellions against each other. Correspondingly, active or activist publics become 
habitual in their communicative efforts. They experience a chronic problematic situation 
and become chronically active publics. In many cases, such chronic problems breed 
closed mindsets in reviewing available information (e.g., a solution proposal from othe
Having competing entities (e.g., activist groups) routinizes stro
ding in their communicative actions. Then, a chain reaction, seeking and 
forwarding the forefended information to others, sets in motion. Each faction of 
collective problem solvers mirror what the other did previously thereafter. 
Implication of CEPS 
Cognitive entrepreneurship in problem solving consists of four underlying 
subfactors: cognitive retrogression, multilateralism, commitment, and suspension. 
Among four dimensions, I paid special attention to cognitive retrogression with its 








ory   
dissonance theory explains. When a person 





, & Guerrero, 1969).  Such an instance is a cognitive alpha strategy whereby the 
problem  vein, 
ve alpha and omega strategies (CAOS) in terms of their reasoning directio
“evidence conclusion” for forward reasoning and “conclusion evidence” for backward
reasoning. I referred to those forward reasoning problem solvers as the cognitive a
group, and the backward reasoning group as the cognitive omega group. The CAOS 
model helps us explain some important phenomena and theories. In the following sec
I will review the implications of CEPS and CAOS.  
CAOS and Dissonance The
CAOS explains typical cases of what 
issonance (“perceived discrepancy” in terms of the situational theory of proble
solving) with the joint conditions of other situational antecedent variables (e.g., high in 
problem recognition, level of involvement, constraint recognition, and referent criter
the person would use a “backward cognitive strategy” (i.e., cognitive omega approach) 
about the dissonance state. She or he may effortfully justify his or her choice by 
selectively seeking or avoiding some information that can fortify his or her readym
decision.  The cognitive omega approach is a fair reflection of the dissonance 
phenomenon.   
However, CAOS does not exclusively associate with activeness and backward 
reasoning. It is possible that problem solvers would dare to seek “dissonant” informatio
At times, we observe that problem solvers do not fear or shy away from dissonance 
arousing information or situations (Chaffee, Saphir, Graf, Sandvig, & Hahn, 2001; Carter,
Pyszka




theory loses its explanatory power.  
CAOS and Information Selectivity 
Cognitive alpha and omega strategies explain why selectivity arises—one’s 
inclusion and exclusion of information to devise a set of solution alternatives. In the 
cognitive alpha strategy, one’s communicative efforts are more likely to be used to revise 
and reform the prior maladaptive solution, rather than to reinforce an old solution.  Thus, 
people with high cognitive entrepreneurship in problem solving are more likely to be 
selective in the sense that she or he adopts an “except this” approach—i.e., excluding an 
old ill-suited solution.  Besides, as one’s information acquisition becomes comprehensive, 
certain guiding principles emerge with subjective confidence in evaluative tasks.  This 
makes communicants more selective.  Such selectivity takes the form of “preference” 
rather than “avoidance” as in the cognitive omega approach.  
In contrast, in the cognitive omega strategy, which is a default human cognitive 
strategy in problem solving, one’s communicative efforts are more likely to be used to 
reinforce and reconfirm a preferred solution. But, it tends to make one more maladaptive 
ntrepreneurship in 
problem
ffers a more general conceptual frame beyond the point at which dissonance 
to the problematic situation. Again, people with low cognitive e
 solving are also likely to be selective in a different sense from the cognitive 
alpha approach. Now, problem solvers adopt an “only those” approach—i.e., including 
information that reconfirms a preferred outcome state and increase confidence in the 




In the present study, I found that the cognitive omega group had stronger 
selectivity (i.e., more information forefending and less information permitting), whereas 
the cognitive alpha group showed relatively low selectivity (i.e., less information 
forefending and more information permitting). Such a finding helps us understand how 
subdimensions of 
CAPS. With this understanding, we can introduce a normative knowledge about a better 
problem-solving practice. 
CAOS and Theories of Behavioral Intention 
Social psychologists have proposed several theories to explain why and how 
one’s attitude affects behavior. They have been puzzled by the so-called attitude-behavior 
inconsistency problem (e.g., the weak empirical evidence of attitude as a cause of a 
behavior). Such efforts resulted in the theory of reasoned action (the TRA) (Fishbein & 
Ajzen, 1975).  In tackling the puzzle of strong attitudes but low behavioral interpretation, 
Fishbein (1967) devised a clever conceptual bridge, namely behavioral intention.  
Fishbein (1967) reasoned that the proximal cause of a behavior is one’s intention. 
Intention is antecedent to an action.  The intention is, in turn, determined by one’s 
attitude toward the behavior and subjective norms (e.g., compliance to a specific norm of 
reference regarding the behavior).  Attitudinal influence on a behavior is mediated by 
behavioral intention, which is a preliminary decision to act in a certain way.  Eagley and 
Chaiken (1993) praised Fishbein’s approach to the attitude-behavioral inconsistency such 
that:  
The scientific and philosophical issue of how the mental event of holding an 
ing 
another psychological event, the formation of an intention, between the attitude 
information selectivity arises and how it specifically differs in six 
attitude is transformed into observable action was thus resolved by interpos
and the behavior.  Intention, a psychological construct distinct from attitude, 
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represents the person’s motivation in the sense of his or her conscious pla
 
n to 
exert effort to carry out a behavior. (p. 168)  
Figure 37 summarizes the conceptual process that Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) 
proposed to explain the linkages attitude to a behavior. 
Figure 37: Conceptual model of the theory of reasoned action.  
 
 
*This figure is adapted from Ajzen and Fishbein (1980, p. 84). 
However, the TRA has a conceptual limitation that CAOS does not.  In the CAOS 
conceptualization, our action or effectuating--the last step of problem solving--does not 
require our intention.  For many problems, we take the cognitive omega strategy in which 
we skip much cognitive effort in order to solve the problem quickly.  Thus, we may not 
need intention to behave.  Indeed, Ajzen, Timko, and White (1982) found this deficiency 
to be a severe limitation of the theory of reasoned action.  They criticized the theory 
because it was founded on the assumption that behavior is always volitional.  And with 
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that assumption, the TRA only explains behaviors that are consciously thought ou
beforehand.  T
t 
o fix the problem, Ajzen proposed a theory of planned behavior (the TPB, 
Ajzen, 1985) to explain non-volitional behaviors in the TRA (see Figure 34 for a 
summary of the TPB). 
Figure 38: Conceptual model of the theory of planned behavior.  
 
*This figure is adapted from Ajzen (1991, p. 182). 
Ajzen (1985) reformulated the theory of reasoned action to explain the cases in 
which behaviors can occur without a person's volitional control (i.e., intention).  He 
introduced a new variable of “perceived behavioral control”—self-perception of how 
easy or difficult it is to perform the behavior.  Perceived behavioral control is analogous 
to “self-efficacy,” which refers to the “conviction that one can successfully execute (a 
given) behavior” (Bandura, 1977, p. 193).  Thus, when one has a sufficient level of 
perceived confidence, she or he would not necessarily go through “intention” to execute 
an action (the dotted path from perceived behavioral control to intention in Figure 38).  
The inclusion of perceived behavioral control released the burden of the intention 
assumption (i.e., volition action) for the reasoned action model.  Especially, when we 
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explain well-rehearsed or trivial acts (e.g., easily executable actions or habitual 
behaviors), the intermediate conception of intention is of no use to explain behavior.  
However, Pavitt (2003) pointed out the weakness of theories that use behavioral 
intention in general:  
Other forces might prevent a person from behaving consistently with an intention,
Nonetheless, the mental state has the power to direct behavior in an attempt to 
intentional explanations by their very nature cannot be causal because goals 
explanations rely on 
 
and some behavior is performed without any relevant intentions at all.  
achieve a person’s goals…. This is a good time to dismiss the argument that 
[intention] occur after the behavior requiring explanation.  Intentional 
entpres  conceptions of goals to explain future behaviors. 
[italics added] (Pavitt, 2003, p. 8) 
As Pavitt pointed out, we can easily identify situations in which people go from 
behavior to intention.  Our choice of a behavior can precede our perceived intention when 
we do something in response to a strong urge and then look for justification: e.g., one 
might shoot another person and then reconstruct and subsequently elaborate one’s 
intention as self-defense.  At times, we cognitively retrogress to reconstruct our intention 
to increase our confidence, satisfaction, or “consonance” with our preceding behavior.  
Under such circumstances of reconstruction of intention, we need nonrecursive paths 
between behavior and intention.   
In Figure 34, I drew a nonrecursive path from behavior to intention to illustrate 
the point.  Although Ajzen (1985) conceived of cases in which intention is absent for a 
certain behavior, it is questionable whether the theory of planned behavior can explain 
the reversal of temporal order between intention and behavior.  As mentioned, the 
cognitive alpha and omega model suggests that people in some instances can rationally 












ing refers to when people hold one 
belief and re ging and 




ion.   
With a serious problem, people hastily decide (behave) what to do and reconstruct
reasons (behavioral intention) backwardly.  The motivation to select the backward 
cognitive approach could be to explain an action to others (e.g., answering a doctor
question about a risky personal behavior) or to justify and reinforce an a priori choice
behavior.  The reverse temporal order between intention and behavior highlights the 
conceptual limitations of some theories, such as the theory of reasoned action, that rely
on the concept of intention to explain a behavior. CAOS reveals such a limitation in a 
few popular social psychological models using the concept of behavioral intention. 
Cognitive Multilateralism and Hedging and Wedging 
The studies on environmental issues, Stamm and J. Grunig (1977) and J. Grunig 
and Stamm (1979) found that people have situationally different cognitive strategies—
“hedging” and “wedging.” They found that environmental publics often hold
incompatible beliefs and frequently change their beliefs across situations. Hedgin
to when people hold two conflicting beliefs; wedg
ject other (J. Grunig & Hunt, 1984). J. Grunig (1997) used the hed
g concepts in combination with the concept of “attitude” to explain when an
publics’ attitudes differ from situation to situation. Hedging and wedging concepts ar
useful alternative to illustrate how communication effects happen without the “vale
prediction of attitudes.  
I created a new concept, cognitive multilateralism, which is implied in hedging 
and wedging. Cognitive multilateralism in problem solving refers to cognitive bread
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during a given problem solving task—i.e., the number of alternatives one generates and 
one’s tolerance of rival information during the problem-solving process. I speculated that 
a more entrepreneurial mindset in problem solving will have more cognitive breadth. To 
expand a viable candidate solution for a given problem requires “tolerance.” Expansion
of the candidate solutions inherently has a problem solver sustaining incompatible ideas 
and opinions. Thus, one’s situational need and willingness to withhold incompatibl
and competing perspectives can
 
e ideas 
 be a good yardstick of the extent of an entrepreneurial 
problem
l in applied communications. For 
nt of cognitive multilateralism may associate with the style 
of polit ld 
 
 
nitive multilateralism and cognitive entrepreneurship) rather than changing their 
problem
 solving approach.   
Cognitive multilateralism has much potentia
instance, knowing voters’ exte
ical information processing and electoral decision making. A researcher cou
study how voters with different level of cognitive multilateralism and cognitive 
entrepreneurship would vary in forefending (permitting), seeking (processing), and 
forwarding (sharing) election-related information. It also explains how effective a 
political candidate and supporters might be in managing conflicting social issues. In
addition, assuming that cognitive multilateralism can better prepare one in health problem 
solving, a public health intervention program would aim at rather modest but realistic
objectives, such as incrementally changing a risky group’s cognitive strategy (to have 
more cog
atic behaviors immediately. Considering the difficulties in changing audience 
behaviors as a communication objective in health campaigns, enhancing cognitive 
entrepreneurship (e.g. reducing retrogression, increasing multilateralism) as an 
intervention objective must be a better alternative for health communicators.  
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CEPS and Characteristics of An Excellent Organization 
The IABC funded study, excellence in public relations and effective organizations 
(L. Grunig, J. Grunig, & Dozier, 2002; J. Grunig, 1992), found that a set of factors (e.g.
roles and models of public relations preferred by CEO) affect the “excellence” and 
“effectiveness” of public relation and its hosting organizations. Treating cognitive 
entrepreneurship in problem solving as an enduring personal trait (e.g., the extent of 
cognitive retrogression), it is interesting to study how the problem-solving characteristics 






ong organizational elites would have on the communication 
excelle
ion 
structures) as a promising new research direction. In this vein, I proposed two new 
nce (e.g., the likelihood of giving public relations access to the decision-making 
process), types and quality of relationships with key stakeholders and publics (e.g., the 
likelihood of holding a symmetrical worldview), and the effectiveness of the organiz
The IABC study found that the values of CEOs and dominant coalition members we
critical factor for excellence in public relations and organization effectiveness. In this 
vein, it is worth investigating what kind of influence the extent of cognitive 
entrepreneurship am
nce and the organizational effectiveness.  
Implications of Situational Theory of Problem Solving (STOPS) 
Researchers have tried to expand the situational theory by introducing new 
dependent variables such as “cognitive response” (Slater, Chipman, Auld, Keefe, & 
Kendall, 1992) and “message retention,” pro- or anti- “cognition,” “attitude,” and 
“behavior, (Major, 1993; J. Grunig, 1982). J. Grunig (1997) posited a need for “extens
of the theory to new outcomes of communication” (e.g., “breadth and depth” of cognitive 
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concepts of CAPS and CEPS and introduced them as dependent variables. In a nutshell, 










 eight types of publics: open-dormant passive public, closed-dormant passive 
 that a problem solver takes during a problematic situation. I tested how well the 
situational antecedent variables account for the two new communicative and cognitive 
variables. Findings suggest that the situational theory of problem solving explains whe
why, and how we communicate and how and why we take a differential cognitive
approach in problem solving.  
In the next section, I will discuss implications of the new situational theory to the 
theory and practice in the field of communication.  
STOPS and Public Relations 
The situational theory of publics, STOPS’ pre
ent of a general theory of public relations (L. Grunig, J. Grunig, & Dozier, 2002
J. Grunig, 1992). It provides a conceptual ground for strategic management of public 
relations (J. Grunig & Repper, 1992) and the two-way models of public relat
Grunig, J. Grunig, & Dozier, 2002; J. Grunig & L. Grunig, 1992). In this vein, the 
situational theory should be considered as an essential theoretical foundation for the field 
of public relations. For that reason, I consider the influences and implications of this 
situational theory of problem solving to be the same as those of the situational theory of 
publics.  
First, an immediate implication of STOPS relates to segmenting publics. Beca
of CAPS and CEPS, practitioners can classify publics in more useful ways. For example






d of problem-solving potential there is 
for the lving 
tude, 
oners 




 open-situational active public, closed-situational active public, open-situational 
activist public, closed-situational activist public, open-chronic activist publi
chronic activist public. Then, practitioners can predict when the information about the 
given problem or issue would be sought or just processed, forwarded and/or shared, and 
forefended or permitted. Furthermore, after practitioners identify the profiles of the 
publics in a problem, they can anticipate what kin
issue—i.e., the symmetrical problem-solving potential, collective problem-so
potential among publics, and stagnant potential for a given problem.  
Related to segmentation, J. Grunig (1982) studied the probabilities of a public’s 
information seeking and processing and other useful outcomes such as cognition, atti
and behavior. The probabilities of communication behavior, cognition, attitude, and 
behavior guide public relations practitioners to prioritize publics in relation to their 
monetary and time budget constraints. Such knowledge of probabilities help practiti
make a more strategic decision in implementing communication programs with the 
identified publics.  
In a similar way, the situational theory of problem solving can generate a 
probability table for the subdimensions in CAPS and CEPS. Thus, in preparing 
communication pro
tion forwarding, information sharing, information forefending, information 
permitting, cognitive retrogression, cognitive multilateralism, cognitive commitment, and 
cognitive suspension. These probability estimates can be used in the “expected-valu
analysis” (J. Grunig & Hunt, 1984) that is a critical guideline in budgeting and decisio
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making for public relations programs. STOPS can improve public relations pract
formative and evaluative research in practice.  
Second, public relations researchers have proposed several typologies of publics. 
For example, Chay-Nemeth (2001) offered “circumscribed,” “co-opted,” “critical,” an
“circumventing” publics. Hallahan (2001) outlined “active (high knowledge and high
involvement),” “aroused (high involvement and low knowledge),” “aware (high 
knowledge and low involvement),” and “inactive (low knowledge and low 






84) classified publics as “active,” “aware,” “latent,” and “nonpublic.” Each type 




ected with eight types of publics segmented by three independent variables of STP
(e.g., high problem facing, low fatalistic behavior).  
Following its mother theory, STP, STOPS generates a new typology of publics 
that hinges on the dimensions of communication behavior. It is not intended to compete 
with existing typologies, but to complement them by emphasizing different 
communicative features among publics. It brings much conceptual utility in segm
ing, and predicting publics’ actions. Also, the new typology invites more researc
about publics. For example, researchers can investigate extent and kind of relati
that each type of public would form with organizations and what kind of behaviors each 
public would engage in (e.g., joining activist group, contacting organization/government 
official, changing one’s behavior). Also, with a finer distinction between active and 
activist publics (e.g., closed-chronic activist public vs. open situational activist public), 




Third, as discussed earlier, with the inclusion of CAPS, the situational theory n
describes in more detail how a group of publics would arise and the role of 
communication in the emergence of publics. In short, the information forwarding and 
forefending of focal communicants increase cross-awareness among isolated individu












lematic situations are created, raised, and sustained 
g and reconfiguring) of messages” 
 solvers into collective problem solvers.  
Provoking other communicants to recognize a problematic state, individual 
problem solvers can enhance the pool of potentially useful information, divide the costs 
for problem solving, and increase their bargaining power in demanding resources from
relevant party. Information forwarding and permitting is at the heart of locating and
networking with other individual problem solvers. Giving information about a 
problematic situation is thus a necessary condition for a problem to produce a group of 
collective problem solvers (e.g., an activist group). Thus, knowing who is likely to 
transmit information (i.e., problem and solution) to other communicants explains wha
kind of problem would have more potential for resulting in a collective action. CA
describes such processes with new dimensions of communication behaviors. It highligh
the “intercommunication” process (see Figure 33 in this chapter) among communicant
(problem solvers)  
Such understanding of the intercommunication process highlights the role of 
communication behaviors in the emergence of public and the “nature, role, and influe
of communication” in the social contexts (Vasquez & Taylor, 2001, p. 150). Thus, 
STOPS better explains how “prob








 of support” should be added to the situational theory. I second J. Grunig’s 






ez & Taylor, 2001, p. 150). With CAPS, in which publics are defined as 
“communicants” who work on problem solving, the new situational theory explains 
intercommunication better. Publics are conceived not only as the information takers, but 
also information givers and selectors who create perceptions around a problem, rais
issues, and sustain their problem-solving efforts via symbolic interactions. Now the 
situational theory responds directly to the request of “communication process and 
dynamics” (Vasquez & Taylor, 2001) and “a framework that shifts the locus of analysis
to the public’s communicative practices in interactional settings” (Cozier & Witmer, 
2001).  
Fourth, the new situational theory addresses the issue of valence prediction with
the earlier situational theory. Cameron and Yang (1990) and Slater et al. (1992) p
that “valence
 rejection of such request for “philosophical” and “pragmatic” reasons (pp. 38-3
Interestingly, a redefined referent criterion and new dimensions such as information 
forefending ensures advancement for this issue.  
Although I opposed adding “valence” to the theory, it is possible and useful to 
know when and why a problem solver becomes more selective in dealing with 
information. I explained that problem solvers become selective because of the presence
of a strong referent criterion. I defined referent criterion as “any knowledge or subjec
judgmental system that exerts specific influence on the way one approaches probl
solving”—this includes any “decisional guidelines or decision rules perceived as relevant 
to a given problem.” In other words, a referent criterion can be either “objective
“subjective.” However, both types of decisional referents are functionally identic
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problem solving. Selectivity is divorced from the “valence” of one’s beliefs. In other 
words, 
ew situational theory has resolved an issue of multicollinearity 
among 
s. In 






ng in the 
em of 
multico  
predicting when a person becomes “selective” is different from predicting 
“valence” of support. Although I oppose the prediction of valence with the situational 
theory, I alternatively suggest predicting the communicant’s selectivity. STOPS now 
opens a way to explain and predict such recurrent selectivity among publics.  
Finally, the n
independent variables (Kim, Downie, & De Stefano, 2005; J. Grunig, 1997). J. 
Grunig (1997) posed a question about multicollinearity among independent variable
one study using the situational theory of publics, J. Grunig and Childers [a.k.a. Hon] 
(1988) found a few standardized path coefficients greater than 1.00. Such unusual 
standardized coefficients often result from the multicollinearity problem among 
independent variables (Jöreskog, 1999). Kim, Do
of multicollinearity particularly from the conceptual overlapping between level 
involvement and problem recognition. Kim et al. (2005) conceptually explicate
definition of problem recognition as more of “detect something is missing” in the 
situation and isolated the “stop to think” tendency as the situational motivation. The
empirical analysis reduced multicollinearity with the refined conceptual definition o
problem recognition. In the present study, I redefined and used measures of probl
recognition to be more about a perceived problem (i.e., detect something is missi
situation). Analyses showed that situational theory now has little, if any, probl
llinearity. Thus, I conclude the refined conceptual definition can be recommended
in future research and practice.   
STOPS and Health and Risk Communication 
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Researchers have applied STP to enhance the effectiveness of health and ris
communication (e.g., Aldoory, 2001; Chay-Nemeth, 2001). Similarly, STOPS with 
CAPS (i.e., SITCAPS) helps risk and health communicators better identify critical agents 
for health/risk information diffusion. Focal communicants who are active problem 
solvers tend to disperse problems and solutions proactively. They are sophisticated 
information takers and givers who regularly and selectively upd
k 
ate information related to 
ts tend to be in an effectuating stage, they are 
likely t a first 
ely. For 
 if a 
ation 
 previously drawn conclusions. Tests with the situational 
anteced
ive 
the problem. Because focal communican
o forward information. Further, focal communicants, even reactively, act as 
stop referent (cf. opinion leader) when neighboring communicants are identifying a 
problem and entering into the inquiring stage.  STOPS can prescribe and trigger better 
information trafficking regarding health problems among target segments of the 
population. 
For health care experts frustrated with groups that continue to engage in risky 
behaviors, STOPS with CEPS (i.e., SITCEPS) explains how and why some chronic 
problem holders fail to use information adequately and fail to behave appropriat
example, the theory predicts that most information dissemination efforts will be futile
risky behavior group possesses a strong cognitive omega approach. As discussed earlier, 
a cognitive omega strategy in problem solving can worsen one’s problematic situ
when one refuses to revise
ent variables indicated that as one has higher problem recognition, lower 
constraint recognition, higher involvement, and higher referent criterion, one’s cognit
entrepreneurship decreases. SITCEPS thus requests differential intervention in 
accordance with the level of entrepreneurial mindset in one’s problem solving.  
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STOPS and Political Communication 
Communication effects studies originated from the early studies about voters and 
election (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1944). The main 
interest was to understand how voters were influenced and influenced other voters. In 
essence, such studies inquired how political information was dispersed and us
what effectiveness.  
First, STOPS with CEPS explain how voters and citizens make political dec








ion and behavioral changes are the prime “communication 
objectives.” However, researchers have found that these objectives are rarely met. J. 
teralism are especially interesting in this context. For example, a voter with mo
cognitive multilateralism and less cognitive retrogression would make a decision
slowly, would consider more aspects before decision making, and would have more o
tendency to cross-vote than to vote a party line.  
Next, STOPS with CAPS fits well with the “two-step flow model” of personal 
and mass media influence. As discussed in opinion leadership and meso-level 
intercommunication models, communication by opinion leaders in political issues a
elections is a special case of focal communicants (high in CAPS). They sometimes 
reinforce and compete with other focal communicants such as mass media or rival 
candidate supporters. Thus, SITCAPS will provide a conceptual framework that 
illustrates how voters’ information behavior will be different and how focal and 
peripheral communicants shape the electoral outcomes in the political arena. 











CAPS, CEPS, and STOPS fill t , CAPS conceptualizes unique 
features of a problem solver’s information selectivity, transmission, and acquisition. 
Problems can be any life problems that lay people experience routinely (e.g., a health 
problem, buying a car, or job hunting), whereas they can be scientific problems that 
 and Hunt (1984) introduced alternative communication objectives such as 
“coorientation” and “symmetrical” communication approaches such as “accuracy,” 
“understanding,” and “agreement.” With the new situational theory of problem solving, I 
also introduced a new set of communication objectives: e.g., increasing “informatio
permitting,” and “information forwarding,” making less “retrogression,” having more 
“cognitive multilateralism,” and more “cognitive suspension.” 
STOPS and Communication of Science 
Several disciplines contribute to a better understanding of the antecedents, 
processes, and consequence
s essential understanding of how scientific epistemics differ from non-scientific 
lay thinking: i.e., philosophy of science (Popper, 1963). History of science elucidate
how, why, and what factors drive scientific advancements or “paradigm shift
1962). Sociology explains how scientific knowledge and technology are dispersed, 
scientists gather, connect, compete, and advance knowledge in terms of social connection 
(Kraut, Egido, & Galegher, 1990; Bijker, Hughes, & Pinch, 1987). Psychology 
investigates how scientific inference and method is different from and similar to the 
process of naïve lay inference and lay epistemics (Kruglanski, 1989). However, there is 





researchers and scientists work to resolve professionally (e.g., curing cancer with stem 
cells, explaining the causes of the Great Depression, decoding particles consisting of d
matter in the universe). Regardless of the type of problems, life or scientific mysteries, 
human activities around information play the key role in bringing solutions. Thus, studies
should ask, “How are lay and scientific epistemics different in terms of their 
communication behavior?” CAPS provides a way to distinguish the lay problem sol
and scientific problem solvers with 1) the extent of their information permitting to 
different or competing ideas and 2) their distinct “causes” of information forefending. 
Types of referent criterion, whether subjective beliefs (e.g., wishful or willfu
thinking) or a more objective knowledge (e.g., carried solution from experts or 
experience of the successful problem solving in past), affect the types of information 






onance theory) or 
coming effective in distinguishing relevant information as a 
result o
from 
“revising selectivity” (e.g., be
f extended problem solving). In reinforcing selectivity, the purpose is to enhance 
cognitive confidence in the preferred solution, whereas in revising selectivity,  the 
purpose is to enhance “efficiency” in problem solving stemming from information 
saturation. In addition, it is interesting to see whether problem solvers will continue to 
permit information even when it conflicts with or refutes one’s current beliefs in the 
problem-solving outcome. I reason that the scientific problem solver would be more 
permitting than the lay problem solver (cf. “Scientific theories are distinguishable 
myths merely in being criticizable, and in being open to modifications in the light of 
criticism,” Popper, 1963).  
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CEPS will add knowledge to why and how a communicant’s information 
ity arises and how, in turn, selective communicant activeness would reduce the 
eneurial mindset in problem solving. Then, it is interesting to investigate
selectiv
entrepr  whether 




how sc  entrepreneurial mindset would 
hat there are differences between scientific and lay problem solvers in 




n permitting, less cognitive multilateralism, or more cognitive retrogression), 
lf-awareness about their problem-solving approach 
(e.g., tr  for 
Validity of Findings 
In general, CAPS and its subdimensions had close to or more than 50% construct 
validity in terms of variance extracted. Construct reliabilities for CAPS and its six 
dimensions were also more than the minimum values of .70. However, CEPS (i.e., about 
cognitive retrogression (i.e., backw
 solving as a less retrogressive problem solver would be (i.e., forward reason
tion, it is interesting to investigate whether cognitive entrepreneurship and its 
ensions can also be conceptualized as an enduring personal trait. If so, I can test 
ientific problem solving and the traits of an
correlate with each other.  
Assuming t
their approach, those situational antec
ces and how we encourage positive aspects and discourage negative 
characteristics in approaching both scientific and lay problems. For example, with 
knowing what factors (e.g., subjective type of referent criterion such as wishful o
thinking) causes an undesirable problem-solving approach for some problems (e.g., le
informatio
we can cultivate problem solvers’ se
ain children which cognitive and communicative approach one should take




20%) and its two subdimensions (i.e., 30-40%) and low variance extracted. For cons
reliability, two subdimensions of CE
truct 
PS in two issues were close to .70 or higher. For 
ower H and construct validity 
seemed
e CAPS case. With this notion in mind, it is 
n of the CEPS concept. Future research 
should  
 
rly tests of nascent theories” adopt non-
probability student samples. Such a l, but they are useful for initial 
theoriz ).  
CEPS, itself, .612 and .627 which is lower than .70. The l
 to originate from the smaller pool of CEPS items. The sheer number of question 
items for three problems reached 100 questions and up to 300 responses. In order to 
minimize participant fatigue, I reduced the number of items from what I originally 
proposed. I set more priority on the CAPS items, with its six dimensions, and thus the 
number of items for the CEPS dimensions was smaller. As a result, it was difficult to 
identify good items, as I could do in th
necessary to be more conservative in interpretatio
address this limitation by using more items and a multiple-item approach for the
cognitive multilateralism and the cognitive commitment dimensions.25  
Generalizability of Findings 
In the present study, I chose the convenient snowball sampling method. This is a 
non-probability sample that has great limitations if the purpose of the study is statistical
generalization. For example, the  However, the purpose of this study was to develop new 
variables and new theory. In practice, “most ea
strategy is not idea
ing and hypothesis testing with “multivariate relationships” (Caplan, 2005, p. 732
Besides, I delimit the scope to “theoretical generalizability” rather than statistical 
generalizability. Calder, Philips, and Tybout (1981) pointed out: 
                                                 
25 However, the multiple-item approach can lead to a more participant fatigue. Thus, narrowing-down the 
research focus either to SITCAPS or SITCEPS, not both, will be necessary to reduce the number of 
questionnaire items.  
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[to make] theoretical generalizations, a representative sample is not required 
is applied beyond the research setting. The research sample need only allow a
sample), not just a representative one, can provide such a test. (p. 200)  
In addition, Shapiro (2002) said: 
[the issue of] rejecting a study that seeks to expand theory and that detects a 
misunderstanding of the nature of generalizability. If a study detected important 
people, in some setting, at some time, for some message. The next step ma
applies and to whom it does not. (p. 499)  
Thus, I delimit the generalizability of this study only as theoretical generalizability, no 
because statistical generalization of the finding is not the goal. It is the theory that 
 test 
of the theory. And, any sample within the theory’s domain (e.g., any relevant 
 
 
potentially important effect on the basis of a nonrandom sample usually reflects a 
effect, no matter what kind of sample is used, it is clearly true for some group of 
y be to 








than that.  
Cross-validation with Single Sample 
Related to convenience sampling, in an ideal study cross-validation tests for th
variables should be tested using different samples. In the present study, I used a sub-
sampling strategy (randomly select subsamples from the total sample) for cross-
validation tests. In future research, this limitation can be addressed by using multiple 
samples.  
ursive Model Identification 
It was interesting to test an integrated model that contained nonrecursive 
relationships between CAPS and CEPS while specifying situational antecedent variables
as exogenous variables. However, such model is either hard to identify (just identifi
best) or hard to converge. As a realistic alternative, I used the referent criterion v
only for identifying the nonrecursive model. However, it was still an interesting model 
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that integrated all the variables into a single model. Future study should continue to 
attempt such an integrative model. 
Similarity between CAPS and CEPS Survey Instruments 
Although cognitive and communicative characteristics are conceptually distinct, 




ay depend on the problem chosen. For example, the structural path 
coeffic  
h 
survey instruments was unavoidable, but it is still a limitation from the survey 
instrument approach. Thus, it is necessary to be cautious interpreting the nonrecu
model findings between CAPS and CEPS, although the nonrecursive models converged 
and reached to acceptable model fit.  
Demographic Variables and Problem Sensitivity 
The current study did not include demographic variables such as sex, age, and 
income. However, it would be interesting to examine whether there are some mediating 
effects from demographic variables (e.g., gender difference in situational perception
addition, the theory m
ients in SITCAPS could be different with other types of problems (e.g., Tuition
Increase) for the current respondent group. Future study should test whether there is suc
problem sensitivity using different problems.  
Future Research 
Findings from the current study generate interesting new studies. First, CAPS is 
an apt model whereby I can test reversal effects from communication behaviors to 
situational antecedent variables. The CAPS model captures information transmission 
from the focal communicant to other peripheral communicants in their communicant 
networks. It would be interesting to test how the activeness of focal communicant’s 
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communicant activeness in problem solving would influence perceptual gaps between 
focal and peripheral communicants (e.g., problem recognition gap). In addition, it is 










budgeting and decision making of public relations programs. It helps to predict how a 
ual gaps regarding a problem. Finally, I can test the effect of communication on
“accuracy,” “understanding,” and “agreement” in the coorientation model (McLeod &
Chaffee, 1973). This is a way of empirically testing the coorientation model within the 
situational theory framework. Also, this study answers Hallahan’s (2001) call for 
research on using communication as an independent variable. Snowball sampling can
provide a way to test such a hypothesis using the clusters within a snowballed sample.  
Second, I conceptualized relationships between the six dimensions in 
problem-solving potential in socially conflicting issues. In doing so, I proposed three 
types of problem-solving potential symmetrical problem-solving potential, collective 
problem-s
n a public’s communication behavior and issue resolution potential has rarely bee
studied. The study of CAPS and problem-solving potential in conflicting social issues 
will contribute to a body of knowledge in public relations as well as conflict resolution. 
Third, J. Grunig (1982) studied how the situational variables explain the 
occurrence of cognitive, attitudinal, and behavioral effects of communication behavi
well as the occurrence of communication behavior. This study expanded the situatio
theory of publics not only theoretically but also practically. In his study, J. Grunig 
presented a table of probabilities of communication behaviors and effects of 16 
behavioral situations. As discussed in the implication section, this table is useful in 
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given communication program would pay off by expected-value analysis. Thus, it wou
be interesting to revisit
ld 












hose types of publics (e.g., all-issue publics, hot-issue publics 
tc). If replicated, I can study how those publics differ and how each type of public would 
differ in the six dimension of CAPS and four dimensions of CEPS. For example, we may 
 (e.g., probabilities of information forwarding, sharing, permitting, and cognitive 
multilateralism). The resulting probability tables can enhance public relations 
the 1982 study has done.  
Fourth, J. Grunig has developed a methodology to identify publics formed ar
particular issues. The method is useful for public relations practitioners to target 
communication p
ous testing and refinement of the new situational theory, it will be necessary t
devise specific steps of how public relations practitioners can segment publics with the 
new situational theory. Replication of the STOPS with different problems, org
settings, and societies should be done. Those accumulated findings from validatio
replication studies will provide examples for practitioners to apply in actual public 
segmentation tasks.  
Fifth, studies using the situational theory of publics have found four re
f publics. They are all-issue publics, apathetic publics, single-issue publics, and 
hot issue publics. J. Grunig (1997) noted that these types of publics seem to have 
theoretical regularity, which he found repeatedly from canonical correlation analysis. 
consider a canonical correlation study with different issues and with the new situational 
theory interesting. With CAPS and CEPS and the newly revised antecedent varia




inquire how single-issue publics and hot-issue publics differ in terms of their information 
forefending and permitting and information forwarding and sharing. The findings will 
result in better understanding of different kind of publics that are critical in practice.  
Sixth, I deployed survey methodology for testing CAPS, CEPS, and STOPS in 
owe
Specifically, a validation study setting experimental manipulation of antecedent variables 
will test how and
PS and CEPS
mental des
and the extent of rmation permitting, cognitive 





for CEPS and CAPS. I conducted a SEM 
analysis for a non
helpful in unders ts. However, 
ative study
develop rich desc d communicative behaviors are 
interconnected. Future study with focus groups, elite interviews, and in-depth interviews 
this study. H ver, I found a need for validation studies with experimental design. 
 to what extent CAPS and CEPS would differ. In addition, I believe 
CA  constructs are useful and promising on their own. For example, an 
experi ign that manipulates cognitive retrogression as an independent variable 
 information forefending, info
nd cognitive sus
tween cognitive strategies and communicative behavior in problem 
solving.  
Seventh, in the developmental stage of the CAPS and CEPS, I conducted a few 
iews to understand communicants’ characteristics in social issues. Such 
 lead me to propose the propositions in CAPS and CEPS. However, I 
found a need conducting qualitative study on 
recursive relationship between CAPS and CEPS. The finding was 
tanding the interrelationship between the two concep
quantit  using survey methods is quite limiting as a way to test in-depth and to 
ription about how cognitive features an
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with different types of publics (e.g., open-situational activist public) would provide a 
better understanding.  
the present study. However, I am interested in whether these concepts can be 
ore enduring cognitive and communicative styles in dealing with 
Ninth, assuming CEPS as a personal trait, it is interesting to test whether the 
 solving would affect the styles in ethical 
tionships between CEPS and ethical decision-making style will enhance our 
ess management. Further, it 
akers to be 
-making style and problem-solving approach.  
Finally, I asked what kind of relationship exists between the extent of cognitive 
 Grunig, & Dozier, 2002). Such study as a 
continuous theory-building for strategic management of public relations will improve our 
anagement excellence.  
 
Eighth, CAPS and CEPS have been conceptualized as “situational” constructs in 
conceptualized as enduring personal traits. From informal studies, I found that people 
tend to develop m
problems. Hence, in future study, I will reconceptualize and test CAPS and CEPS as 
personal traits.  
tendency of entrepreneurial mindset in problem
decision making (e.g., teleological or deontological approach). Testing of the 
rela
understanding regarding ethics in public relations and busin
will result in some normative knowledge, such as how we train decision m
aware of their ethical decision
entrepreneurship of dominant coalition members and excellence in public relations and 
organizational effectiveness (L. Grunig, J.







INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
Identification of 
Project/Title  
Situational Theory of Publics  
Statement of Age of 
Participant (parental 
consent needed for 
minors)  
I state that I am 18 years of age or older and wish to participate in a program of 
research being conducted by Jeong-Nam Kim and Dr. James E. Grunig in the 
Department of Communication at the University of Maryland, College Park, MD 
20742-7635.  
Purpose  The purpose of the research is to test the influence of personal traits on perception 
of issues and communication behavior in the United States and Korea.  
Procedures  The procedures involve answering a number of questions. I understand my 
participation will require approximately 20 minutes.  
Confidentiality  All information collected in the study is confidential. The data I provide will not b  e
linked to my name and, furthermore, will be grouped with data others provide for 
reporting and presentation.  
Risks  I understand that there are no foreseeable personal risks associated with my 
participation.  
Benefits  I understand that the study is not designed to help me personally, but that the 
investigator hopes to learn more about communication behaviors in the United 
States and Korea.  
Freedom to Withdraw, & 
Ability to Ask Questions  
I understand that this participation is voluntary and free to ask questions whenever I 
feel like to do. I understand that I can withdraw from participation at any time 
without penalty and/or decline to answer certain questions. I understand that 
alternative assignments are available if I decide not to participate and it is possible 
to earn equal extra credit I would get from participation of this study. Finally. I 
understand that any record of my participation will be destroyed, if I withdrawal 
from the study.  
Principal Investigator  Dr. James E. Grunig 
Department of Communication 
2118 Skinner Building 
University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742-7635  
Phone: (301) 405-6525; Email: jgrunig@umd.edu  
Obtaining a copy of the 
research results  
I understand that I may obtain a copy of the results of this research after July 2005 
by contacting Jeong-Nam Kim, at the Department of Communication, 2118 Skinner 
Building, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742-7635. Phone: (301) 












Please Read Each Statement and Pick a Number that Best Reflect Your Feeling, Thoughts, and Opinion 
Regarding Three Problems.  
 
Please enter the last four digits of SSN and the first letter of your last name ("S6789", "D3212", ...) 
 
 
1. In your mind, how much of a connection do you see between yourself and this problem? 
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate  
 
2. To what extent do you think there is something missing in this problem?  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate   
 
3. I continue to think about the pros and cons of possible solutions regarding this problem.  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate   
 
4. How much does the current situation differ from your expectation? 
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate  
 
5. I have found enough support for the position I take in this problem.  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate  
 
6. How strong do you feel that something needs to be done to improve the situation for this problem?  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate   
 
7. From time to time, I contact people about this problem to learn what kind of solutions there are.  
 345
 
Please rateWar in Iraq   
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate   
 
8. I hesitate to make up my mind about what should be done for this problem.  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate  
 
9. I have made efforts to justify my decision on this problem. 
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate   
 
10. To what extent do you believe this problem could involve you or someone close to you at some 
point? 
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate   
 
11. I want to take more time before making up my mind for this problem.  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate   
 
12. I know what people around me think about this problem.  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Please rateElimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education    
 
13. I have found much evidence that reinforces my decision regarding this problem.  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate   
 
14. Sometimes I find I am engaging in aggressive conversations on this problem.  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
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Losing Weight  Please rate  
Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate   
 
15. Regarding this problem, I regularly meet and chat with likeminded people whose views about the 
problem are similar to my own.  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
firmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rateElimination of Af   
 
16. It is one of my top priorities to share my knowledge and perspective about this problem.  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate   
 
17. If it is possible, I take time to explain this problem to others.  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate   
 
18. How much does the current situation deviate from what you think it should be?  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate   
 
19. Others respect my perspective about this problem because it is simple and clear.  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate   
 
20. To what extent would you say you are curious about this problem?  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate   
 
21. I am frustrated because there is too much information available about this problem. 
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
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firmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate  Elimination of Af 
 
22. There are many misleading but widely accepted opinions about this problem.  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
firmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate  Elimination of Af 
 
23. To make better decisions regarding this problem, I listen to opposite views and information as long 
as they are related to the problem.  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Please rate  Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education   
 
24. Some publicized statements about this problem are worthless.  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate   
 
25. I have spent too much time on this problem to change my position now.  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Please rate  Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education   
 
26. I have invested enough time and energy so that I understand this problem.  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Please rate  Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education   
 
27. I know where to go when I need updated information regarding this problem.  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Please rate  Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education   
 
28. I have studied this problem enough to judge the value of information.  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  




29. I have found counter evidence that rejects the positions different from mine. 
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate   
 
30. I am confused with what is going on when I hear something about this problem.  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate   
 
31. To what extent would you say that this problem is more difficult for you to understand than other 
problems?  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate   
 
32. I am confident about my knowledge about this problem.  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Please rate  Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education   
 
33. I paid attention to a news report about the problem recently.  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Please rate  Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education   
 
34. It is too late to change the position I now have on this problem.  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Please rate  Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education   
 
35. It is worthy spending some time to persuade others about this problem.  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Please rate  Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education   
 
36. I feel like resisting some persuasive efforts around this problem.  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
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Losing Weight  Please rate  
firmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate  Elimination of Af 
 
37. I will keep my current position even if someone challenges it with contradictory evidence.  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
firmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate  Elimination of Af 
 
38. Please, indicate how much you would like to understand each of these problems better. 
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
firmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate  Elimination of Af 
 
39. I express my opinions confidently about what should be done to deal with this problem.  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate   
 
40. I feel it is costly to change my mind on this problem.  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate   
 
41. How much do you believe this problem affects or could affect you personally?  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate   
 
42. Although I am knowledgeable about this problem, I rarely speak up.  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate   
 
43. I look for chances to share my knowledge and thoughts about this problem.  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  




44. I actively seek out opportunities to participate in public opinion polls about this problem.  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate   
 
45. For this problem, I welcome any information regardless of where it comes from.  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate   
 
46. It is important to learn the latest information around this problem.  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate   
 
47. To what extent do you believe this problem is a serious national or social problem? 
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate   
 
48. I am shy in expressing my opinions publicly about this problem.  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate   
 
49. I strongly support a certain way of resolving this problem. 
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate   
 
50. I have a preference for how the problem should be settled.  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Please rate  Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education   
 
51. I am careful in accepting information about this problem because of the vested interests of those 
who provided the information. 
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War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate   
 
52. I love to start a conversation on this problem with others.  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate   
 
53. How strong would you say your opinions or thoughts are about this problem?  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate   
 
54. I am sure that I will be quite active in passing on information related to this problem in the near 
future. 
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate   
 
55. I know how I should behave for this problem.  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate   
 
56. I regularly visit websites relevant to the problem.  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate   
 
57. I am a person to whom my friends and others come to learn more about this problem.  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate   
 
58. I volunteer to inform others about the problem.  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
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Losing Weight  Please rate  
firmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate  Elimination of Af 
 
59. To what extent do you think this problem is too complicated for you to do anything about?  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
firmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate  Elimination of Af 
 
60. Listening to an opponent's view about this problem is a waste of time.  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
firmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate  Elimination of Af 
 
61. It is too late to shake the conclusion I have drawn for this problem.  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
firmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate  Elimination of Af 
 
62. I regularly check to see if there is any new information about this problem on the Internet.  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
firmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate  Elimination of Af 
 
63. I would request booklets containing relevant knowledge about the problem.  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
firmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate  Elimination of Af 
 
64. Please think of whether you, personally, could do anything that would make a difference in the way 
these problems are handled. If you wanted to do something, would your efforts make a difference?  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Please rate  Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education   
 
65. I believe there is no need to buy or read books or brochures about this problem.  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
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Please rate  Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education   
 
66. I feel happy when I provide new information about this problem to others.  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Please rate  Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education   
 
67. I pay attention to the problem when a news report appears on TV news.  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate   
 
68. I visit an online or regular bookstore to find useful information about the problem.  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
firmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate  Elimination of Af 
 
69. My friends think that I take too much time for learning about this problem.  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
firmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate  Elimination of Af 
 
70. I feel like I am suffering from information overload about this problem. 
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
firmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate  Elimination of Af 
 
71. To what extent do you believe this problem is a problem that you can do something about?  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
firmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate  Elimination of Af 
 
72. I often play a leadership role in initiating conversation about the problem.  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate   
 
73. In the past, I researched about this problem seriously. 
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War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
firmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate  Elimination of Af 
 
74. I am pretty sure, I know how to solve this problem. 
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
firmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate  Elimination of Af 
 
75. I don't want waste my time trying to persuade others about this problem.  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
firmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate  Elimination of Af 
 
76. Past experience has provided me with guidelines for solving this problem. 
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate   
 
77. I may take some time listening if someone tries to give information about this problem.  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate   
 
78. I listen to even opposite views on this problem.  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate   
 
79. At times, I find that I have accepted conflicting information about this problem.  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate   
 
80. At times, I am asked to give advice regarding this problem. 
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
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Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate   
 
81. How often do you stop to think about each of these three problems?  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate   
 
82. To what extent do you believe that you could affect the way this problem is eventually solved if you 
wanted to? 
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate   
 
83. People around me know clearly what I think about this problem.  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate   
 
84. I am willing to write a letter, email, or fax to express my concern about this problem to a relevant 
organization.  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate   
 
85. I hesitate to share my knowledge about this problem with others.  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate   
 
86. I have never participated in a public opinion poll related to this problem. 
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate   
 
87. I don't want share my ideas and opinions with other people regarding this problem.  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  




88. I am picky in choosing information sources when I think about this problem.  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate   
 
89. I need more time to think before I finalize my position on this problem. 
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate   
 
90. For this problem, I will try to suspend any judgment until all the evidence is in.  
War in Iraq  Please rate  
Losing Weight  Please rate  
Elimination of Affirmative Action in American Higher Education  Please rate   
 
Please read the statements below and pick a number that best reflects the extent to which you agree with the 
statement.  
 
91. The war in Iraq can be justified because the cost of controlling Saddam Hussein was in while he 
power was higher than that of war.  
Please rate   
 
92. With the economic and domestic security problems the United States was facing, it was a bad time 
to go to war in Iraq.  
Please rate   
 
93. A pre-emptive attack by the U.S. gives credibility to those who describe the U. S. as an aggressive 
nation. 
Please rate   
 
94. The war in Iraq has increased anti-American sentiment.  
Please rate   
 
95. Saddam was connected with terrorists. 
Please rate   
 
96. Saddam's human rights record, among the worst in the world, was enough justification to go to war.
Please rate   
 
97. Affirmative action demeans true minority achievement because success is labeled as a result of 
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affirmative action rather than hard work or ability. 
Please rate   
 
98. Affirmative action levels the playing field because minority students, generally speaking, start out at 
a disadvantage.  
Please rate   
 
99. Diversity is desirable yet won't always occur if left to chance. 
Please rate   
 
100. Because of affirmative action, a wealthy minority student who doesn't put in much effort could be 
chosen over a poor white student who works harder. 
Please rate   
Thank you! You finish the questionnaire! 
 
 
  Submit  
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